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Foreword 
The United States Congress engages resolutely and routinely in the fashion­
ing and enactment of laws. It is in the primacy of its lawmaking role that 
the U.S. Congress is distinguishable from most other national parliaments. 
Because Congress is, first and foremost, a lawmaking body, its legislative 
workload and performance are of prime significance in coming to under­
stand the institution. Moreover, the congressional workload is relatively quite 
large in volume and complexity. In the 1990s several thousand bills and res­
olutions were introduced in the average Congress (for instance, 7,532 bills 
and 200 joint resolutions were introduced in the 105th Congress, which sat 
from 1997 to 1999). And, on the average in the 1990s, each Congress, in its 
two-year lifetime, enacted about four hundred public bills. 
In short, the congressional agenda of legislative work is somewhat 
daunting in scope. As the demand for legislative productivity has expanded, 
congressional leaders have adopted a variety of strategies to cope with the 
escalating workload. One strategy entails merging a number of legislative 
proposals that otherwise might be considered independently into a single, 
overarching bill, aptly called "omnibus legislation." This practice of "pack­
aging" or "bundling" a number of legislative proposals into one large leg­
islative measure has been engaged in for about half a century. Dubbed 
"mega-bills" by congressional scholar Roger Davidson, the first significant 
omnibus bill was the Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1950, which at the 
time was the largest appropriation bill in the history of the Republic. Since 
then, omnibus bills frequently have concerned financial legislation—bud-
geting, appropriations, taxing—but other issue areas have experienced 
omnibus legislating as well. An early instance was President Jimmy Carter's 
1977 national energy plan, considered by Congress in the form of an 
omnibus package. This energy package came to be considered by nineteen 
committees of the House of Representatives, epitomizing the growing 
practice of "multiple referral" of bills to committees and precipitating the 
emergence of leadership mechanisms designed to coordinate congressional 
handling of complex legislation. 
IX 
x Foreword 
As Glen Krutz carefully demonstrates, omnibus legislating has grown 
in use, apparently peaking in the 1980s at about one-fifth of all major leg­
islation. Although only a minority of congressional bills are of the omnibus 
type, some of the most important legislation of the contemporary era have 
taken the form of omnibus measures. Since the passage of the Congres­
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which reshaped the 
congressional budget process, most omnibus bills have involved budget 
legislation. Because of the centrality of budget issues to the national policy 
debate today, omnibus legislation has become a highly important congres­
sional practice. Yet mega-bill processing by Congress has heretofore been 
only rarely studied systematically. Accordingly, Krutz's seminal, meticulous, 
and wide-ranging analysis of omnibus legislating makes a very significant 
contribution to understanding the legislative process in Congress. 
Krutz develops empirical desiderata for identifying omnibus bills in 
Congress, and then carefully assays the historical development of omnibus 
legislating. Having established the incidence of mega-bills, Krutz brings 
down upon this growing congressional practice the impressive armamen­
tarium of modern empirical research technology: computer database devel­
opment and multivariate analytical procedures. The upshot is a highly orig­
inal and probing examination of omnibus legislating, suffused with savvy 
of congressional politics and procedures, sensitive theoretical insights, and 
pertinent historical grounding. The author delineates the development of 
legislative packaging and explains why congressional leaders have come 
to employ mega-bills for important legislation. 
The complexity of modern public policy issues, especially those arising 
in the budgetary process, and the intricacy of contemporary congressional 
politics, have given rise to omnibus legislating. Krutz's trenchant analysis 
focuses on how omnibus legislating is invoked to confront problems of 
policy gridlock in order to enhance Congress's legislative productivity, and 
how mega-bills reflect and influence relations between Congress and the 
president. In the end, he observes, "Much major lawmaking is undertaken 
with this method, and a significant proportion of legislative initiatives in 
Congress see the light at the end of the legislative process because they 
become attached to omnibus bills." It is, therefore, the case that "omnibus 
bills alter the traditional lawmaking process in many ways." 
Finally, Krutz draws upon his extensive research, including interviews 
with congressional "insiders/7 to take stock of the modern U.S. Congress 
complete with its omnibus lawmaking ways. Weighing the shortcomings 
and benefits of omnibus legislating, at the end of the day Krutz concludes 
 xi Foreword
that "omnibus bills . .  . are good for legislative institutions and have value 
for democratic politics." His rigorous theoretical and analytical journey to 
this affirmative conclusion is, needless to say, laid out so that his readers can 
assay policy-making change in Congress for themselves. 
SAMUEL C. PATTERSON 
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Focusing Attention on 
Omnibus Legislation 
Once upon a time, Congress made health policy one bill at a time. 
Then came the 1980s and legislating "by the numbers." 
—Julie Rovner, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 
The methodology sags somewhat in addressing the 1980s, when 
omnibus budgetary acts came to be vehicles for many items of sub­
stantive legislation. The model of major free-standing enactments 
that are specific to policy areas applies less well after the 1970s. 
—David Mayhew, Divided We Govern 
Over 40 years ago, E.E. Schattschneider (1960) placed a theoretical pre­
mium on the scope of conflict determining political outcomes. One of the 
most powerful strategies by actors in the game of politics, he argued, is 
expanding or contracting the scope of debate. Advocates of the existing 
order want to keep things quiet. Those seeking change try to socialize the 
conflict and get others to pay attention to it and join in the fight. Once 
things become overly controversial, those actors seeking to squelch the 
conflict are limited in what they can do. Hence, Schattschneider argued 
that the best approach for those favoring the status quo is to keep things 
quiet in the first place. "The best point at which to manage conflict is before 
it starts" (15). That holds unless you are a party leader in Congress with the 
potent power to assemble an omnibus bill, an agenda control strategy that 
has proliferated in the post-World War II period but that we know little 
about. 
Omnibus legislating is the practice of combining numerous measures 
from disparate policy areas in one massive bill.1 Several scholars conclude 
that one of the most major recent changes in the legislative process is the 
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development of omnibus legislation (Baumgartner, Jones, Krutz, and Rosen­
stiehl 1997; Browne 1995; Cameron, Howell, Adler, and Riemann 2000; 
R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 1994,1998; Mayhew 1991; Oleszek 1989; Sin­
clair 1992,1995,1997; Smith 1989).2 David Mayhew (1991) in a study of 
267 landmark enactments from 1946 to 1990 and Frank Baumgartner et al. 
(1997) in an analysis of all 15,850 statutes from 1949 to 1994 both showed 
a decrease in statutory output beginning after the Great Society, juxtaposed 
with an increased propensity to pass larger, bundled bills into law.3 
Omnibus packages are considered "must-pass" bills because they typi­
cally contain a nucleus that has widespread support in Congress (Sinclair 
1992, 668). The interesting part, however, and where the power exists for 
congressional leaders, is deciding what gets packed in with the nucleus. Bills 
that become overly controversial, have too much attention paid to them, 
and therefore are likely to fail alone can be tucked away in an omnibus bill. 
There they are overshadowed by the larger issue of the omnibus nucleus, 
which draws the most controversy and attention. Once assembled, the 
nucleus is what is debated, not the attachments. 
Members at large, busy people with too much to do (Hall 1996; King-
don 1981), pay attention to the main part of the bill as it is processed 
through Congress. They are seldom aware of the minutiae of omnibus 
packages (Oleszek 1989; Smith 1989; Staff Interviews 2000). When asked 
about the contents of the October 1998 omnibus funds package, Senator 
Robert Byrd (D-WV) replied, "Do I know what's in this bill? Are you kid­
ding? No. Only God knows what's in this monstrosity" (Hager 1998, Al). 
It is unclear whether Senator Byrd was referring to a religious God or the 
Republican leadership. 
To employ Schattschneider's scope of conflict theory most fully, there­
fore, it is important to introduce a role for institutions and institutional pro­
cedures. Bryan Jones (1994) asked the important question: "How do the 
structure and organization of democratic institutions direct the attention 
of policymakers to issues?" (7). Shifting attentiveness can dramatically affect 
political choices and outcomes. Omnibus legislating is just such a technique 
for directing the attention of policy makers to certain things and away from 
others.4 Members do not pay full attention to the attachments, which are 
safe in the friendly confines of an omnibus bill. The omnibus strategy 
affects outcomes because omnibus bills (consisting of the nucleus plus pre­
viously controversial attachments) produce a different set of outputs than 
would be achieved if all the bills were processed sequentially. 
Yet while institutional mechanisms like the omnibus method affect 
 3 Focusing Attention on Omnibus Legislation
how political issues are attended to and thus subsequent political outcomes, 
understanding that is only half of the theoretical picture. Institutions are 
not simple ex ante bargains struck before the game begins. Institutions 
change. When this development is studied across time, we gain important 
and interesting insights (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Baumgartner, Jones, 
and MacLeod 2000; Binder 1997; Bosso 1987; Cooper and Young 1989; 
Dion 1997; Gamm and Shepsle 1989; Jenkins 1998; B.Jones, Baumgart­
ner, andTalbert 1993; King 1997; Schickler 1998). 
In the case of omnibus legislating, the technique affects the policy 
process and outcomes now, but how did we get here? Why did Congress 
move to omnibus bills during the post-World War II period? My first pur­
pose in writing this book is venturing an answer to this question. While 
scholars have commented in general on this important development, we 
know little about the causes and effects of the rise of omnibus legislation. 
Further, "there is no technical definition of what constitutes an omnibus 
bill" (Sinclair 1997, 64). Simply put, systematic research on omnibus bills 
is nonexistent. Hence, in addition to answering the "Why omnibus?" ques­
tion, a second purpose of this book is to provide a definition of omnibus 
legislation (which is no easy task) and to gain a full descriptive under­
standing of omnibus legislation. 
The Concept of Omnibus Legislating 
Barbara Sinclair (1997,64) defined omnibus legislation as follows: "Legis­
lation that addresses numerous and not necessarily related subjects, issues, 
and programs, and therefore is usually highly complex and long, is referred 
to as omnibus legislation." This concept has been presented in similar fash­
ion by other scholars (Baumgartner et al. 1997; Browne 1995; Cox and 
McCubbins 1993; R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 1994,1998; Oleszek 1989; 
Sinclair 1997; Smith 1989). Omnibus bills take several forms, including 
program reauthorizations, budget reconciliation bills, continuing appro­
priations legislation, and original bills. 
Omnibus legislating represents a significant departure from traditional 
lawmaking in two main ways. First, omnibus bills alter the time-honored 
legislative process. Omnibus bills are often fast-tracked through commit­
tees with less consideration than typical bills (Sinclair 1997; Smith 1989; 
Tate 1982). In some cases, there is no committee consideration at all. For 
example, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) bypassed the Judiciary Committee 
in assembling the omnibus crime bill in 1993 (Congressional Quarterly Inc. 
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1994). Similarly, Barbara Sinclair (1997) demonstrated that the Senate 
completely bypassed committee consideration of the Omnibus Drug Ini­
tiative Act of 1988. 
Once assembled by leaders in the prefloor process, omnibus bills are 
treated as one piece of legislation, thus seriously restricting the choices 
available to members on the floor (Browne 1995; Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 
1992,1995,1997; Smith 1989; Tate 1982). Rather than opting to accept 
or reject individual parts of the legislation, members must take or leave the 
entire package. "Large, complex bills, with many provisions . . . also put 
rank-and-file members on the floor at a severe informational disadvan­
tage" (Smith 1989,56; see also Sinclair 1997,229). Senator John McCain 
(R-AZ) revealed that the fall 1998 omnibus budget bill was available for 
member review only the day before the final vote and was "scattered in 
pieces around the Republican cloakroom" (Will 1998, C7). 
Leaders, on the other hand, possess the critical and complex infor­
mation on these measures. Omnibus bills empower leaders (Browne 1995; 
Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1992,1995,1997,1998). "These are must-pass bills 
and only the party leadership possess the coordination capacity required to 
put together and pass such legislation" (Sinclair 1992, 668; see also Cox 
and McCubbins 1993,248-49). 
Environmental policy provides a great example of the power of omni­
bus bills for party leader agenda setting and power. The Democrats used 
omnibus bills in the 1980s and early 1990s to incorporate controversial 
environmental protection items that faced opposition from the Republican 
minority. Once in control of the Congress in 1995, the Republicans used 
the same technique to move environmental policy in the opposite direction 
over the protests of a Democratic minority (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 
1986-1997). 
Omnibus bills also obscure the pathways of representation and affect 
democratic accountability. They make it less clear to constituents where 
members of Congress stand on the important issues of the day. They poten­
tially dissolve what R. Douglas Arnold (1990) called the "causal chain" 
between members and constituents (13). Members can choose to call atten­
tion to many parts of an omnibus bill in order to explain their vote. Chal­
lengers, too, can focus on particular parts of omnibus bills to hammer their 
election opponent. 
Second, omnibus packages present a viable alternative legislative route 
for policy entrepreneurs pushing legislation. Legislative leaders behave 
strategically. They attempt to assemble omnibus bills that will succeed. 
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Evidence suggests that they are close to perfectly strategic in constructing 
omnibus bills; nearly all of the omnibus bills identified in this study were 
enacted. Hence, measures that become attached to them almost always 
become law. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of standard bills fail 
at some point in the legislative process (Oleszek 1989). In sum, there is 
essentially no variation to be explained between successful and unsuccess­
ful omnibus bills. The important question is what gets attached. Along 
these lines, William Browne (1995) documented the efforts members put 
into incorporating their desires in omnibus packages. Hence, omnibus 
legislating in effect inserts an important decision about policy outcomes 
(what will be incorporated into a must-pass bill) into the prefloor legisla­
tive process. 
How Omnibus Legislating Differs from Other 
Legislative Procedures 
Comprehensive bills unifying diverse topics are not entirely new and have 
always been subject to agenda manipulation. Traditionally, leaders used 
riders to move controversial proposals through the legislative process while 
avoiding the need to construct coalitions in favor of the particular mea-
sures.5 By combining measures, the legislative leadership can force mem­
bers to accept a measure that might not survive alone because they want 
the entire bill (or another part of it) to pass. 
In recent times, however, rolling many measures into one bill has 
become more common, the resulting bills span a greater number of diverse 
policy areas, and significant policy change occurs through omnibus bills 
(Baumgartner et al. 1997; Mayhew 1991; Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1997; 
Smith 1989). Further, while riders are often attempted by members to kill 
legislative initiatives, omnibus bills are pursued in order to get something 
passed (Browne 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Sinclair 1997; Smith 
1989). The bigger bill has its own locus (or multiple loci) of attention and 
is more likely to have the broad support needed for passage. Omnibus bills 
are powerful for focusing attention away from controversial items to other 
main items that enjoy widespread support and/or are seen as necessary (like 
the budget). 
There is another critical difference between traditional agenda control 
methods and omnibus bills. Other procedures, such as the ordering of al­
ternatives and closed rules, are strategies aimed at building a coalition 
within Congress and feature a dynamic between leaders and members. But 
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omnibus bills also introduce a second legislative dynamic between Con­
gress and the president. Omnibus packages typically attract the president's 
interest because of their prominence (Sinclair 1997). Omnibus legislation 
can be a congressional tool used to discourage presidential vetoes (Oleszek 
1989; Sinclair 1995,1997; Smith 1989). 
Presidents who favor one part of an omnibus bill are forced to sign a 
larger bill that includes provisions they find distasteful. These two dynamics 
(between members and leaders and between Congress and the president) 
reflect the two major hurdles that bills must clear to be enacted as designed 
in the Constitution.6 
Omnibus bills provide one way to enact policies whose outcome in one 
or both of these two steps is doubtful or unclear. That is, the mechanism 
provides a way to manage uncertainty in the legislative process (Bach and 
Smith 1988; Browne 1995; Oleszek 1989; Smith 1989). The following 
instances of omnibus packaging illustrate these dual purposes of getting 
through the Congress and getting by the president. 
Getting through the Congress 
In the 97th Congress, House leaders, Banking Committee leaders and 
members, and the president all favored approval of U.S. contributions to 
four international development banks. However, funding for the develop­
ment banks was a very controversial issue on Capitol Hill. Several previous 
attempts had failed. Realizing these realities, the leaders attached this 
funding to the omnibus reconciliation bill. "Banking Committee members 
argued that bank funding—always an unpopular item on Capitol Hill— 
might not pass as separate legislation. Committee members argued, suc­
cessfully, that the only way to get the bank measure through Congress was 
to attach it to legislation that was certain to be passed" (Congressional 
Quarterly, Inc. 1982,142).The reconciliation bill (a major, required step of 
the annual budget process) subsequently passed overwhelmingly in both 
chambers, and the president signed it into law. 
Getting by the President 
In 1985-86, both the House and Senate favored several items that Presi­
dent Reagan publicly opposed (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1987). These 
measures included the reauthorization of the Small Business Administra­
tion, which Reagan had long sought to abolish. In the 99th Congress, 
leaders pursued another reauthorization of the Small Business Adminis­
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tration. Reagan almost immediately promised to veto the bill. To get around 
the specter of the presidential veto, congressional leaders in both chambers 
included a multiyear reauthorization of the Small Business Administration 
in an omnibus bill. Reagan favored other major components of the omni­
bus bill and therefore signed the bill into law, even though it contained the 
Small Business Administration measure he so strongly opposed. 
As these two case examples bear out, there are strong opinions by law­
makers (and presidents!) for and against the use of omnibus bills in law­
making. In fact, the same lawmaker (and president) may despise omnibus 
use at one point in time and be thankful for the omnibus method at another 
point. Proponents talk about omnibus bills as the only means to get things 
done. According to Rep. Edward Kruse (D-IN), "The new (omnibus) pro­
cedure offers hope in our efforts to promote efficiency and economy in gov­
ernment" (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1951,129). 
Opponents talk about the breakdown in democratic deliberation. 
"Others—generally those who disagree with the result—say no goal is 
important enough to shatter the time-honored regular legislative process" 
(Tate 1982,2379). Sen. Kenneth McKellar (D-TN) stated that "so far as I 
know, it [the omnibus procedure] is the most terrible experience I have had 
in my whole life" (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1951,130). 
Research Questions 
Despite the proliferation of omnibus legislation, the way it alters the 
coalition-building process, and the controversy that surrounds it on Capi­
tol Hill, political scientists have said little about its causes and effects. In 
this book, I shed light on these causes and effects by developing answers to 
several research questions: 
1. Why omnibus bills? What factors explain the move to omnibus leg­
islating? Why may some bills "hitch a ride on the omnibus" while 
most must go it alone in the legislative process? What factors led to 
Congress's first modern use of the mega-bill technique in the 81st 
Congress (1949-50)? Why are omnibus bills so much utilized in the 
health care policy domain? 
2. What are the effects ofomnibus bills?7 Does omnibus usage make our 
lawmaking apparatus more productive? Which branch benefits more 
from omnibus bill usage, the president or Congress? 
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Answering the Questions: Theories 
of Congressional Change 
Omnibus legislating provides a very powerful tool for majority party leaders. 
Moreover, omnibus legislating affects policy outcomes because omnibus 
bills contain provisions that might not pass if considered sequentially. 
Additionally, omnibus use alters the traditional lawmaking process in less 
than ideal ways from the standpoint of representation. Members partici­
pate little on these bills and are often unaware of what they are voting for 
on the floor. Therefore, understanding why omnibus bills are used (why 
leaders are empowered with the technique) is a critical question. In the 
language of David Rohde and John Aldrich (1998), what conditions led to 
this increased party leader power? 
Answering the "why?" question can teach us a great deal about legisla­
tive institutions, congressional change, and public policy making. Addi­
tionally, understanding what motivates omnibus legislating may inform our 
prescriptions about its use in the future. If omnibus bills serve purely polit­
ical goals (e.g., by distributing power to some members over others), then 
the sacrifices made in the representative process may not be worth it, and 
the omnibus technique should perhaps be reformed. Alternatively, if omni­
bus legislating improves in some way the capability of Congress as an insti­
tution, then there may be good reason to use the technique, even if some 
tenets of representation are compromised. This quandary is another form 
of the old legislative trade-off between representativeness and responsive­
ness (Shepsle 1988). 
Opinions on Capitol Hill differ along similar lines. Some decry the use 
of omnibus bills. "It [omnibus legislating] is a sad way to do business," said 
Rep. Jamie L. Whitten (D-MS) (Tate 1982, 2381). Former Sen. Howard 
Cannon (D-NV), in discussing the use of the omnibus method to enact a 
bill that he adamantly opposed, argued: "This maneuver is simply an effort 
to avoid open debate and fair consideration of this legislation" (Sarasohn 
1982,2382). In discussing the 1998 omnibus budget bill, political columnist 
George F.Will (1998) likened omnibus bills to "garbage pails" with too much 
refuse thrown in by the time the measures are enacted (C7). 
Others see omnibus bills in a positive light. Proponents argue that 
omnibus bills are a way to get things done in an otherwise impossible leg­
islative process. "The only way you can get things through is to package 
them," said Rep. Barber B. Conable, Jr. (R-NY) (Tate 1982, 2383). Leg­
islative scholar Walter Oleszek (1989) has argued that packaged bills are 
one way Congress "can develop coherent responses to public problems" (285; 
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see also Sinclair 1997,233). Congressman J. D. Hayworth (R-AZ), whose 
bill to convey a parcel of U.S. National Forest land to the small Arizona 
community of Alpine for a new school was enacted via an omnibus bill, 
offered a helpful analogy: "The legislative process is incredibly busy, par­
ticularly at the end of the year. It is a lot like the end of the semester in col­
lege when you know you have to get your homework turned in somehow. 
When we [members of Congress] have to get something done, omnibus 
bills help us get our homework turned in" (Member Remarks 1999). 
From this perspective, omnibus bills are indicative of the adaptability 
of congressional institutions to governing circumstances. Omnibus bills have 
made it possible to address tough national issues like deficit reduction while 
shielding individual members from blame (Arnold 1990). "I would not rec­
ommend a steady diet of big packages," commented former House Budget 
Committee Chair James R.Jones (D-OK). "But if we had not had recon­
ciliation we would not have made the budget cuts" (Tate 1982,2383). 
These two views concerning the underlying purpose of omnibus legis­
lating (politics or institutional efficiency) parallel a debate among scholars 
about congressional change. Scholars tend to pick one category of expla­
nation over another, change being driven either by politics or by collective 
institutional concerns (David King's 1997 study of committee turf wars is 
a notable exception). Traditionally, organizational theorists of Congress 
sought to explain changes in legislative rules and norms as congressional 
adaptations to a changing environment (Cooper 1977; Cooper and Brady 
1981; Cooper and Young 1989; Polsby 1968). In this way of thinking, insti­
tutions adapt to external changes in order to endure. For example, Joseph 
Cooper and Cheryl Young (1989) posited that the House gradually changed 
rules pertaining to bill introductions in the nineteenth century largely in 
response to changes in the size and complexity of the House legislative 
agenda. Nelson Polsby (1968) argued that as the responsibilities of the 
national government increased and as career paths led to longer terms of 
service, the House developed an organizational structure that emphasized 
a division of labor, routine modes of procedure, and respect for seniority. 
The intellectual core of the organizational approach to congressional 
change is reflected in Keith Krehbiel's (1991) prominent information 
theory of congressional committees. The informational perspective views 
the committee system in Congress as a solution to the collective institu­
tions dire need for information with which to make educated policy choices. 
While Krehbiel used a cross-sectional approach to test his theory and 
assumed institutional structures to be exogenous to policy making, his logic 
applies (under the auspices of the organizational approach) to institutional 
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change. In sum, organizational theorists of Congress and information 
theorists of committees view collective institutional concerns as paramount 
explanations of congressional behavior and change. 
In contrast, recent studies of legislative development tend to eschew 
the organizational/informational approach based on collective institutional 
concerns and instead envision changes in procedures more as pure polit­
ical struggles (Binder 1996, 1997; Binder and Smith 1997; Dion 1997; 
Gamm and Shepsle 1989; Katz and Sala 1996; Schickler 1998; Stewart 
1989).8 "Rational decision-making by institutional actors is of paramount 
importance, as the structure of institutions and the types of institutional 
change undertaken are means by which actors achieve particular ends" 
(Jenkins 1998,494). In this way of thinking, institutional changes serve to 
distribute power more to one group of legislators than to another. For 
example, Sarah Binder (1996) posited that short-term partisan goals—not 
secular trends, as suggested by many (Cooper 1977)—shape both the cre­
ation and suppression of rights for partisan and political minorities in the 
House from 1789 to 1990. Gerald Gamm and Kenneth Shepsle (1989) 
argued that Speaker Henry Clay worked for the development of a stand­
ing committee system in the House in an effort to hold together a coali­
tion after the War of 1812. 
Which factors drive the omnibus change? In the chapters that follow, 
readers will certainly see that there is some element of micro-level poli­
ticking present in omnibus legislating as decisions are made about what 
provisions get to be incorporated into a "must-pass" bill. Even a cursory 
reader of the Washington Post or New York Times could reach that conclu­
sion. As a means of coalition building, omnibus bills provide an effective 
way to enact party agenda items and distributive measures that would be 
likely to fail alone. 
What really come through in the chapters that follow, however, are 
collective institutional concerns—that is, how omnibus legislating improves 
congressional capability. At the level of the institution, omnibus bills pro­
vide a way around tough governing circumstances like deficit politics and 
increasing issue complexity, and they improve productivity on major policy 
outputs. At the micro level, omnibus bills provide an efficient way around 
the politics of jurisdictional gridlock in the committee system and a power-
fill means of averting the threat of the presidential veto. Hence, while omni­
bus packaging in any single circumstance conjures up images of political 
deal making, from a broader perspective the technique may be seen as 
successful congressional adaptation to a changing environment across the 
latter half of the twentieth century. 
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What this book suggests for theory building on congressional change is 
that the collective institutional concerns approach needs to be more fully 
incorporated into recent theoretical frameworks of institutional change that 
focus solely on the political struggles. If political scientists want to offer 
prescriptions about policy making and institutions to actors in the politi­
cal arena, we need to develop full explanations of changes that provide full 
answers. 
Rather than identifying with one theoretical approach to understand­
ing Congress (e.g., informational, partisan, distributive), this study suggests 
an important role for multiple theoretical perspectives and develops an 
integrated framework for understanding the omnibus change. This inte­
grated approach could be fruitfully applied to research on other institutional 
changes and could produce more fully informed scholarly discussions about 
congressional procedures. Political and institutional explanations of con­
gressional change are both important and relevant; they reflect key features 
and behaviors of the Congress. 
Summary of the Book 
Ten chapters make up the remainder of the book. Chapter 2, "The Nature 
of Congressional Change," discusses the nature of institutional change 
by critically reviewing the two previously discussed competing viewpoints 
on how congressional institutions develop. I argue that these are not 
competing explanations but two parts of a larger picture of institutional 
change. 
Chapter 3, "The Logic of Omnibus Legislation," presents a theoreti­
cal framework for understanding why omnibus legislation is used. I adopt 
an evolutionary approach that envisions institutions as being adaptive to 
(1) the political game among actors and (2) the broader political environ­
ment. At the micro level, I theorize that omnibus bills involve two games 
of bargaining that reflect the two steps that bills must go through to 
become law (i.e., assembling a coalition within Congress to pass legislation 
and averting a presidential veto). Games are thus played between (1) party 
leaders and members and (2) Congress and the president. The bargain 
between those with the resources to package bills (party leaders) and mem­
bers is mutually beneficial. 
Leaders gain more power in enacting legislation amidst uncertainty. 
Members gain two benefits as they delegate power to leaders and sacrifice 
legislative participation. First, they gain the potential to have distributive 
measures included in omnibus bills. Second, majority members (to whom 
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majority leaders are beholden) get a chance to get their most treasured items 
incorporated. By helping members at large, leaders aid member reelection, 
which helps ensure continuing majority status. 
The Congress-president omnibus game is also a bargain in which both 
sides benefit. Congressional leaders incorporate items that might be vetoed 
by the president if considered sequentially In exchange, the president 
sometimes benefits by gaining an opportunity to have presidential agenda 
measures incorporated. 
If leaders, members, and the president all receive some benefit in omni­
bus packaging, why not use omnibus bills all the time? Why not combine all 
policy and budget outcomes into one gigantic omnibus bill each year? While 
members and the president may obtain certain benefits from omnibus bills, 
they see omnibus legislating as a necessary evil. Omnibus packaging sacri­
fices individual member participation and influence and dilutes the power 
of the presidential veto. Because omnibus packages represent fragile bar­
gains, the bill designers (party leaders) are careful not to abuse the omnibus 
method. If they abuse the omnibus technique, members may vote the lead­
ers out of their positions, or the president may exercise the veto. Hence, the 
party leaders keep the use of the omnibus method within certain limits. 
I also consider the effect of macro-level political context factors that 
might increase uncertainty in lawmaking and thereby encourage omnibus 
use. These factors include deficit politics, divided government, bicameral 
differences, a more partisan legislative arena, the increasing complexity of 
the policy agenda, and committee jurisdictional fragmentation. This level 
of explanation helps us to understand the institutional incentives for omni­
bus usage. 
One hurdle to research on the omnibus change is the lack of a precise 
operational definition of omnibus legislation (Sinclair 1997,64). I develop 
a measure of omnibus legislation that captures the essence of the concept 
in chapter 4, "Studying Omnibus Lawmaking Systematically." To be des­
ignated omnibus measures, bills must cross a threshold of scope (spanning 
different policy areas) and size (length). I use the new definition to develop 
and plot quantitative indicators of omnibus use. These aggregate indica­
tors demonstrate that omnibus usage originated in the 81st Congress (1949­
50), increased gradually in the 1950s and 1960s, and finally proliferated 
greatly in recent decades. Chapter 4 also develops a method for determin­
ing which bills are attached to omnibus bills. The results of this process 
demonstrate that 16 percent of 3,190 seriously considered bills from 1979 
through 1994 were attached to omnibus bills while the remaining 84 per­
cent were not. 
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It is one thing to describe an institutional change like the rise of omni­
bus legislation and quite another thing to explain it (Mezey 1993). There­
fore, in chapters 5 through 8,1 move from description to explanation. In 
chapter 5, "Hitching a Ride on the Omnibus," I test the reasons why a few-
select bills are incorporated into omnibus measures while most are not 
through a multivariate analysis of 3,190 bills from 1979 through 1994. In 
chapter 6, "Explaining the Move to Omnibus Legislating," I examine the 
factors that explain the aggregate trends in omnibus legislating through a 
multivariate analysis of 1,180 major bills from 1949 to 1994. The explana­
tory tests in both chapters support the theoretical framework developed 
in chapter 3, which is based on expectations of success within Congress 
and at the president's desk, together with contextual factors. These empir­
ical results suggest that omnibus legislation is a way to manage uncertainty 
in legislative institutions in order to get things done. Leaders, members, 
and the president all gain something from striking omnibus bargains. 
Omnibus legislation is assembled within certain limits observed by the 
actors. It is not used all the time, and particularly prominent attachments 
are unlikely. Finally, omnibus use is more likely under particular contex­
tual circumstances. Consistent with scholars' arguments, a tough budgetary 
situation and divided government increase the likelihood of omnibus 
usage. The strongest contextual impact, however, is that of increasing issue 
agenda complexity and committee fragmentation. In sum, the omnibus 
change appears to have occurred in a way that benefits the actors politi­
cally and helps legislative institutions adapt to challenging governing 
circumstances. 
Once institutions start down a particular path, they tend to stay on it. 
The very essence of path dependency is that subsequent decisions about 
institutional design are constrained by previous ones (Binder 1997; King 
1997). What started Congress down the path of omnibus use? In chap­
ter 7, "The Birth of Omnibus Legislating," I examine closely the first mod­
ern use of the mega-bill procedure in 1949-50 to venture an answer to 
this question. The findings suggest that collective institutional concerns— 
not politics—underlay the genesis of omnibus legislating. The discussions 
on the use of the first omnibus bill resemble the arguments on "improving 
congressional capability" that were advanced in deliberations on the 1946 
reorganization of Congress. In his classic work The Legislative Process in 
Congress, George Galloway (1953) summarized the efficiency logic for 
the new method nicely: "This big money bill represents a forward step in 
appropriation procedure in that, by bringing all the general supply bills 
together into a single measure, it gives Congress and the country a picture 
14 Chapter 1 
of the total outlay contemplated for the coming fiscal year. The new pro­
cedure also permits a comparison of total proposed appropriations with the 
latest available estimates of total Treasury receipts" (619-20). 
In chapter 8, "Getting around Gridlock I: Making Health Care Policy 
through Omnibus Bills," I study the increasing trend toward making much 
of our nations health care policy through attachments to omnibus measures, 
especially budget reconciliation bills (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1980­
1997). I argue that the principal reason for this trend is the jurisdictional 
quagmire concerning health care on Capitol Hill. Some 22 congressional 
committees have a slice of the health care agenda. It is a formidable task to 
gain agreement among a large number of committees who guard their turf 
with jealousy and venom (King 1997). As a way to get things done in frag­
mented institutions, therefore, health care policy is increasingly made as 
attachments to "must-pass" omnibus packages. I discuss as well the pos­
itive and negative aspects of this trend for making substantial change in 
health care policy. 
In chapters 9 and 10,1 move from the "Why omnibus?" question to an 
examination of two potential implications of omnibus legislating: the effects 
of the omnibus change on legislative productivity and on presidential-
congressional relations. In chapter 9, "Getting around Gridlock II: The 
Effect of Omnibus Utilization on Legislative Productivity," I examine 
whether the omnibus method positively affects legislative productivity in 
our system of shared powers, as suggested by proponents of the technique 
in Washington and academia. I find omnibus legislation to be a way to gain 
theoretical leverage on a perplexing question of lawmaking in American 
politics. If the system produces roughly equivalent raw numbers of land­
mark enactments regardless of party control (Mayhew 1991) yet many more 
important failures occur in divided than in unified government (Edwards, 
Barrett, and Peake 1997), what evens things out and brings constancy in 
lawmaking? Because omnibus bills are a way to get things done amidst leg­
islative uncertainty (gridlock), I argue that they provide part of the answer. 
To test this hypothesis, I replicate both Mayhew's (1991,1995) prominent 
analysis of landmark enactments and George Edwards, Andrew Barrett, 
and Jeffrey Peake's (1997) broader ratio measure that considers failures as 
well as enactments, and I introduce an independent variable for omnibus 
utilization. I find omnibus usage to be a positive and significant indepen­
dent influence on legislative productivity. 
Scholars have long analyzed the impact of various institutional changes 
in our national government on presidential-congressional relations, includ­
ing the growth of government since the New Deal (e.g., Sundquist 1981) 
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and the congressional reforms of the 1970s (e.g., Kinney 1995). What 
effect does the omnibus change have on presidential-congressional power? 
My theoretical framework suggests that omnibus usage engages the Con­
gress and the president in a legislative game in which both may gain some 
benefit. This argument leads to empirical expectations that are strongly 
supported in chapter 5's analysis of the omnibus attachment process. How­
ever, an important question remains for further analysis: Do omnibus bills 
strengthen the Congress's hand vis-a-vis the president compared to typical 
major bills? I turn my focus to this question in chapter 10, "The Omnibus 
Change and Presidential-Congressional Relations." 
The conventional wisdom suggests that presidents lead on omnibus 
bills—a conclusion reached from President Reagans legislative success when 
Congress employed the method in the 97th Congress (1981-82). In con­
trast, I argue that theory leads us to expect Congress to dominate more on 
omnibus bills than the president. To test this hypothesis, I analyze branch 
preponderance on all 87 omnibus bills from 1979 through 1994 and on a 
control group of 263 typical major bills. I find that Congress dominates 
more than the president on omnibus bills as compared to a control group 
of typical major bills. 
Chapter 11, "Evaluating Omnibus Legislating," presents conclusions of 
the book, including a broad discussion of the nature of institutional change 
in light of the findings of the previous chapters. I argue that any overarch­
ing theory of institutional change must include both strategic behavior on 
the part of political actors and institutional adaptation to a changing polit­
ical environment. Congress, like other social systems, adapts to the needs 
of its members and to the governing environment. It is thus both repre­
sentative and responsive. 
I also discuss the value of omnibus legislating. Omnibus bills alter tra­
ditional lawmaking and the representative process in important ways. Are 
they good for democratic legislative institutions? I argue that if used in 
moderation, omnibus legislating improves congressional capability While 
omnibus legislating has its drawbacks as far as democratic deliberation is 
concerned, it also has value because it allows our lawmaking institutions to 
accomplish things that would not be possible through traditional methods 
in an increasingly complex political environment, and in a system that allows 
for fragmentation by constitutional design. 
The Nature of Congressional Change: 
Literature and Theory 
Studying Institutional Dynamics 
The study of institutional arrangements in Congress is an "on-again, off-
again" enterprise. Several early studies examined institutional change, in­
cluding research on committees (McConachie 1898), legislative methods 
(Harlow 1917), and party government (Hasbrouck 1927). These works 
probed important questions with detailed description but did not identify 
and explain with theory the broad patterns of institutional change. An 
"off-again" period began after World War II. During this period, political 
scientists became more interested in explaining individual-level political 
behavior than institutions. 
The last few decades are an "on-again" period, beginning with Polsby s 
(1968) study of the institutionalization of the House and including many 
other scholarly works on the topic (Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000; 
Binder 1997; Binder and Smith 1995; Binder, Smith, and Lawrence 1997; 
Cooper 1977; Cooper and Brady 1981; Cooper and Young 1989; Dion 
1997; Dodd 1997; Gamm and Shepsle 1989; B.Jones, Baumgartner, and 
Talbert 1993; Katz and Sala 1996; King 1997; Sinclair 1997; Wright 1997). 
However, studies of institutions are still scarce in comparison to the vol­
umes of research on individual member behavior. 
While scholars consider them to be important determinants of policy 
outcomes, institutional arrangements are portrayed in two vastly different 
lights. To some, institutional arrangements are exogenous factors to con­
gressional decision making that are determined a priori (e.g., Krehbiel 
1991; Shepsle and Weingast 1987). In contrast, this book follows the lead 
of recent research that considers institutional arrangements and mecha­
16 
 17 The Nature of Congressional Change
nisms—while not easily changed—to be endogenous potential objects of 
choice. This literature asks why we have the institutional arrangements that 
we do and how they change. 
To illustrate the distinction between these two views of institutional 
arrangements, let us consider committee jurisdictions. The "exogenous 
institutions" proponents consider committee jurisdictions to be rigid. In 
contrast, King (1994) conceived of jurisdictions as "turbulent battle grounds 
on which policy entrepreneurs seek to expand their turf" and as "heavy with 
policy consequence" (48). In a study that pertained to omnibus legislation, 
Sinclair (1997) found that many successful bills do not follow the textbook 
bill-becomes-a-law diagram. She emphasized the increasing importance of 
special rules—what she termed "unorthodox lawmaking." If institutional 
arrangements were entirely exogenous, all bills would be treated the same 
once the legislative game began. Sinclair showed that this increasingly is 
not the case. 
Once we accept institutional change as an important topic of research, 
we must consider which changes are the most important and worthy of our 
attention as scholars. 
Which Changes Should We Study? 
King (1994) drew a distinction between formal institutional reforms and 
more informal, incremental changes. Formal changes, such as the Legisla­
tive Reorganization Act of 1946 (e.g., R.H. Davidson 1990; Perkins 
1944), the 1970s reforms (e.g., R.H. Davidson 1992; Rieselbach 1994; 
Rohde 1991), and the Republican reforms in the 104th Congress (e.g., 
R.H. Davidson 1995; Evans and Oleszek 1995), have received much atten­
tion from political scientists. But informal and incremental changes, such 
as changes in committee issue jurisdictions (King 1994), changes in rules 
pertaining to bill introductions (Cooper and Young 1989), and the devel­
opment of minority rights (Binder 1996; Dion 1997), are less scrutinized. 
Writing within an edited volume entitled Remaking Congress, which 
probed the reforms that followed the 1994 election, Leroy Rieselbach (1995) 
stated that 
contrary to its critics' charges, Congress changes constantly. Change 
usually comes quietly, noticed only by the closest observers of the legis­
lature: a rules change here, a new precedent there, the gradual erosion of 
customary ways of conducting business Reform—intentional efforts to 
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reshape institutional structures and processes—is not the only, and perhaps 
not the most significant, type of organizational change. Change, a broader 
notion, can affect basic institutional patterns. . . . Of the two, change 
appears more pervasive and fundamental. (9-10, italics in original) 
To illustrate Rieselbach's point, again consider committee jurisdictions. 
Scholars traditionally presumed that they were determined infrequently 
when the Congress was reformed, as in the 1940s reorganization and the 
1970s reforms (see, e.g., Smith and Deering 1990). Using a longitudinal 
design, King (1997) presented evidence that the more infrequent and per­
haps more salient formal changes in committee jurisdictions mostly for­
malize what has already been happening incrementally through day-to-day 
bill referral precedents: "The overwhelming tendency is for institutional 
reforms to codify common law claims to turf that build up between the 
sporadic reforms" (57). 
In a study of the development of minority rights in the House and Sen­
ate across the history of the chambers, Binder (1996) presented evidence that 
institutional change occurs gradually with the institutions path being a major 
factor. Binder and Smith (1995) reviewed the reforms adopted by the House 
and Senate in the Republican-controlled 104th Congress. They found that 
"both houses acted in a manner consistent with their acquired procedural 
tendencies" developed over respective, unique histories. "The House remains 
strongly majoritarian, and the Senate remains individualistic" (71). 
Richard Hall and Gary McKissick (1997) presented evidence that com­
mittee reforms implemented by the new Republican majority, which were 
targeted to increase committee participation, did not produce the desired 
effect. "The behavioral change we might reasonably attribute to institu­
tional reform is not trivial, but neither is it dramatic or profound. When set 
against the claims of reformers and close observers, in fact, the practical 
effects appear underwhelming" (26). 
In sum, the literature suggests that institutions do not typically change 
in one big leap at a time. Yet political scientists tend to focus on such changes. 
The more frequent—and more important—changes are the informal and 
incremental, including the move across the latter half of the twentieth 
century to omnibus legislating. This discussion suggests that researchers 
should not study institutional changes in quick snapshots; rather, they 
should employ a longitudinal approach to attain the most accurate portrait 
of institutional change. "[Diachronic analysis] provides a basis for under­
standing congressional change and for building more general theories of 
legislative change" (Cooper and Brady 1981, 988). 
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Hence, the "Why omnibus legislating?" question should be examined 
across time. A snapshot of omnibus legislating will provide an incomplete 
picture of the move to omnibus legislating. 
Which Factors Explain Institutional Change? 
Describing institutional change is one thing. Explaining change, on the other 
hand, is much more difficult and controversial (Mezey 1993). Most previ­
ous work has been labeled descriptive by critics, lacking precision in expla­
nation (Cooper and Brady 1981; Hibbing 1988). When explanation has 
been attempted, it has often been in the form of anecdotal discussion rather 
than generalizable evidence. Despite this state of affairs, explanations of 
institutional change have developed, and several recent works have begun 
to systematically link explanations with changes (Baumgartner, Jones, and 
MacLeod 2000; Binder 1997; Binder, Smith, and Lawrence 1997; Cooper 
and Young 1989; Hibbing 1988; Katz and Sala 1996; King 1997). 
Scholarly opinions differ sharply on how institutional change occurs. 
Two schools of thought have developed. One of these approaches—the 
organizational theory of institutional change—holds that changes result 
from macro-level strains on the institution that require an adaptive response 
for the good of the institution to make it more efficient (Cooper 1977; 
Cooper and Brady 1981; Cooper and Young 1989; Polsby 1968). A second 
school of thought—the purposive theory of institutional change—posits 
that institutional changes are the result of short-term actions of purposive 
and goal-oriented individuals (Binder 1997; Binder and Smith 1997; Gamm 
and Shepsle 1989; Katz and Sala 1996; Mayhew 1974; Stewart 1989). In 
one approach, environmental factors lead to change based on institutional 
concerns. In the other, changes originate from the political actions of goal-
oriented persons within the institutions. 
The Organizational Perspective on Institutional Change 
Organizational theory has its roots in studies of public bureaucracies and 
corporate firms (e.g., Haas and Drabek 1973). This approach focuses on 
demand and structural strains producing institutional changes that are 
necessary to improve the productive capacity of an organization. Accord­
ing to Cooper (1977), who applied organizational theory to Congress, "Strain 
may be conceived as weaknesses or discrepancies in an organization s pro­
ductive capacity relative to its role in its environment. . . . Strain is an 
endemic feature of organizational life" (154). 
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There are two types of strain: demand and structural. "Demand strain 
pertains to the pressure that environmental expectations exert on produc­
tive capacity, to gaps between environmental expectations and organizational 
outputs that derive from the stringency of environmental demands" (Cooper 
1977,153-54). Stress is an advanced form of strain, and organizations adapt 
to it by changing to improve their productive capacity. 
Cooper (1977) argued that congressional vulnerability to demand strain 
and stress, to discrepancies between productive capacity and environmental 
expectations, is high: 
Demand strain can easily intensify, given the broad and multi-faceted 
nature of Congress's role Congress is charged with making the basic 
or determining decisions on governmental policy and with serving as a 
prime guardian of executive performance. . . . Congress not only must 
determine where collective action is needed and define and control the 
content of such action, but must also perform these functions through 
collegia! decision-making and majority rule. It must provide for both 
consent and action. This is no easy task. (155) 
Several trends in this century have exerted stress on Congress, particularly 
"the huge expansion in the scope of national responsibilities and federal 
activities since 1901 and especially since 1932. [This] has multiplied the 
qualitative and quantitative burdens of congressional work" (Cooper 1977, 
156). Congress adapted to this stress by expanding its productive capacity, 
including a reorganization of the committee system, the introduction of 
subcommittees, and staff augmentation. In addition, Congress moved to 
limit opportunities for minority obstructionism (Cooper 1977). 
Structural strain, the second type, is internal strain that results in part 
from demand strain. It too may lead to stress and institutional adaptation. 
To illustrate, the expansion of workload and issue complexity in Congress 
is a demand strain. Increasing partisanship in Congress is a structural strain 
that partly results from the external strains of workload and complexity, 
which create a more complicated policy-making milieu where party unity 
and leadership are needed to get things done.1 
A handful of scholars have employed an organizational perspective 
in their work. Nelson Polsby (1968) studied the institutionalization of the 
House of Representatives and conceived of Congress as an adaptable 
institution. In particular, he discussed changes in the broader society dri­
ving change within the institution. He argued that as the responsibilities 
of the national government increased and as career paths led to longer 
terms of service, the House developed an organizational structure that 
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emphasized a division of labor, routine modes of procedure, and respect 
for seniority. This new institutionalization served to make things more 
predictable. 
Cooper and Young (1989) studied changes in House rules regarding 
bill introduction in the nineteenth century. Free introduction of bills in the 
House in the contemporary period was not an original feature of the House. 
The authors studied this change and found that "current practice was nei­
ther originally intended nor quickly attained. It was rather something that 
took a century to emerge and to be formally enshrined in the rules" (67). 
Such a gradual change "requires a more sophisticated treatment than simply 
positing some direct and immediate relationship between preferences and 
structure" (68). The authors presented evidence that the House gradually 
changed these rules partly because of the self-interest of members but largely 
in response to changes in the size of the House agenda. 
The above works embrace the external strain of size/workload but 
give only perfunctory treatment to the degree of issue agenda complexity 
as a separate strain. Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod (2000) studied the 
coevolution of issues and structures in Congress from World War II to the 
present. They argued that organizations tend toward entropy, specifically a 
more complex issue agenda with new issues and redefined old issues.2 This 
situation puts strain on legislative institutions designed in an earlier era. 
Congress adapts to this demand of increasing issue complexity through a 
malleable and changing system of committee jurisdictions. The authors pre­
sented evidence from all congressional hearings by issue area from 1947 to 
1994. They found a strong relationship, controlling for the alternative expla­
nations of workload and staff size, between complexity of the congressional 
agenda and the overlap of congressional committee jurisdictions. 
Eric Uslaner (1993) studied the decline of comity in Congress. 
Comity refers to adherence to the norms of courtesy and reciprocity within 
a "regular order." Such norms were very apparent in the work of Donald 
Matthews (1963) on the 1950s Senate. However, civility and reciprocity 
have declined and bickering and rudeness have increased since that time. 
This trend can have negative implications for policy making, including 
stalemate and bad compromises. Uslaner (1991) addressed and dismissed 
three alternative explanations of the decline of comity mainly because their 
application is not generalizable beyond a single case: the 1970s reforms, 
the media factor, and an influx of new members. He then focused on trends 
in the country generally, stating that "the decline of comity in Congress 
reflects the decline of comity in the country. Congress is first and foremost 
an institution of interest representation" (59). 
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In a book exploring the causes and cures for gridlock, David Brady and 
Craig Volden (1998) touched on what was then the growing stress brought 
on government by the terrible budgetary situation of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Deficit politics presented an additional stress on legislative institutions 
struggling to get things done. The authors argued that understanding 
budget pressures and the preferences of members of Congress (and the 
supermajority requirements of the filibuster and veto) produces a better 
framework for explaining policy outputs than a party control framework 
(divided or unified). 
Summary. The organizational approach, despite its theoretical poten­
tial for explaining congressional change and for evaluating the performance 
of Congress across time, has not really caught on. Little work has followed 
in this tradition. This lack of research may result from the same forces that 
led to little work on institutional change: the level of analysis is the insti­
tution, rather than individual members, the behavior of whom scholars 
may think more interesting.3 
Some consider organizational theory an awkward intellectualfit for Con­
gress because it requires thinking of it as one monotonic being (Patterson 
1981). In addition, while some of the above works consider individual-level 
behaviors as alternative explanations (e.g., Cooper and Young 1989), most 
works exclude such an explanation. To think of Congress as being caused 
by its environment requires to some degree a leap of faith because it leaves 
out lower levels of analysis and explanation, such as individual purpose. 
Purposive Explanations of Institutional Change 
Purposive scholars argue that institutions reflect more the political calcula­
tions of individual members and parties than the demands of the external 
environment. "[Institutions] are chosen by individuals to accomplish par­
ticular purposes" (Gamm and Shepsle 1989, 40). Purposive explanations 
are of two varieties: (1) pertaining to the politics of partisan advantage (e.g., 
Binder 1997) and (2) pertaining to the reelection motivation in the distrib­
utive tradition (Katz and Sala 1996; Mayhew 1974; Stewart 1989).4 
Partisan Theories. Do environmental factors, as envisioned in organi­
zational theory, drive institutional change? Binder (1997) asked the truly 
insightful question: If workload drives change (Cooper and Young 1989), 
and workloads increased in a similar manner in both chambers in the nine­
teenth century, why did the House develop into a majoritarian institution 
while the Senate grew into an institution in which individuals and the 
minority called the shots? Binder was clearly onto something. She elabo­
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rated an alternative, partisan explanation positing that changes in the rules 
pertaining to minority rights in the House and Senate from 1789 to the 
early 1990s reflect mostly the politics of partisan advantage. "Rules, in 
other words, may be said to reflect the prevailing balance of forces within 
an institution" (8). Her empirical evidence supported this partisan theory 
of procedural choice. Collective institutional concerns, which were tested 
through the use of a workload variable, received little support. 
Binder put forth a powerful alternative explanation for congressional 
change, and her evidence was wide-ranging in scope and impressive. How­
ever, her test of the rival hypothesis (the organizational explanation) had 
shortcomings. First, she reduced the organizational explanation to "work­
load" alone, even though several other potential external or demand strains 
may drive change, such as complexity apart from workload (Baumgartner, 
Jones, and MacLeod 2000; Cooper 1977; Cooper and Brady 1981). 
Second, Binder's workload measures were less than ideal, something 
she acknowledged: "A single perfect measure of the level of demands on 
Congress over time does not exist" (218). The author was hindered in try­
ing to develop a measure of size of the agenda for the entire history of the 
Congress, from 1789 to 1990. She produced a measure that tapped into the 
number of days in the session and the number of public laws produced. Of 
course, counting public laws in recent times understates the actual work­
load because Congress has resorted to passing fewer, but larger, bills into 
law (hence this book). Additionally, counting laws does not capture the 
oversight activities that take up a great deal of the agenda (Aberbach 
1990). This may be viewed as stringent criticism given the obstacles that 
the author overcame to produce any measure at all. However, it is an impor­
tant criticism because the resulting measures for Binder's partisan variables 
are quite sound and are in the same equations with the less-than-ideal 
workload measure. This leaves open the question of the impact of organi­
zational explanations on the development of minority rights. 
Binder, Smith, and Lawrence (1997) attempted to explain the rise in 
Senate filibustering from 1917 through 1996. Many works have offered 
loose explanations for filibuster trends. However, none has pitted the rival 
explanations against one another in a multivariate fashion. The authors 
attempted to do this by considering an organizational explanation (exter­
nal demands and time constraints), a partisan explanation, and a spatial 
explanation for the likelihood of filibustering. They found rather balanced 
support for the effect of organizational explanations and the strategic con­
text of the Senate on the propensity tofilibuster. The authors, however, gave 
several caveats in the conclusion of the paper for why their results might 
24 Chapter 2 
not be quite right. It appears that they had not anticipated a significant 
finding for the organizational variables. They went to some length to crit­
icize their measure of external demands (growth in government) and a 
short time series (1917-1996) as possible reasons for these findings and for 
a weaker-than-anticipated finding for the spatial perspective. 
Distributive Explanations. The second variety of purposive explana­
tions is distributive, following in the tradition of Mayhew's (1974) parsi­
monious theory of Congress. Mayhew's simplifying assumption was that 
members of Congress are single-minded seekers of reelection. In review­
ing the institutional structure he observed as an American Political Science 
Association Congressional Fellow in the early 1970s, Mayhew wrote, "The 
organization of Congress meets remarkably well the electoral needs of its 
members. To put it another way, if a group of planners sat down and tried 
to design a pair of American national assemblies with the goal of serving 
members' electoral needs year in and year out, they would be hard pressed 
to improve on what exists" (81-82). 
While Mayhew (1974) did not test his theory of institutional design 
beyond extended theoretical discussion, others have applied his assumptions 
to how institutions evolve. Gamm and Shepsle (1989) sought explanations 
of the emergence of the standing committee system in the House and Sen­
ate from 1810 through 1825. It was in this period of time that the two 
chambers "underwent dramatic and lasting transformations in their orga­
nizational arrangements.... By 1825 each chamber had a fully developed 
system of standing committees" (39). The authors considered a rational­
ist approach and an organizational imperatives approach. Utilizing histor­
ical evidence that they described as incomplete, they found some support for 
both. The authors were most forceful, however, in advancing the rational­
ist perspective. They described in some detail the potential role of Henry 
Clay in the committee system's development, arguing that he probably 
sought the committee changes in the House in an effort to hold together 
a coalition after the War of 1812. "Despite our lack of success in rummag­
ing through the past—we uncovered no diary confession, no clinching news­
paper account, nor any evidence from congressional records—we find it 
implausible that Clay did not figure prominently in the transformation of 
the organization of the House" (61). 
Jonathan Katz and Brian Sala (1996) studied the development of com­
mittee seniority norms from 1874 through 1928. They developed and tested 
an electoral rationale for the norm of committee assignment property 
rights. Their assumption, based on the reelection motive, implied that mem­
bers of Congress develop institutions and norms of behavior that serve their 
The Nature of Congressional Change 25 
electoral interests. They found that Australian ballot changes "induced new 
'personal vote7 electoral incentives, which contributed to the adoption of 
'modern* congressional institutions such as property rights to committee 
assignments" (21). 
Katz and Sala's analysis shared with Binder's (1997) the shortcoming 
of a lack of a good test of the rival organizational perspective. To test the 
organizational perspective, they suggested that change should have occurred 
after the revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910-11 because "institution­
alists place considerable emphasis on the revolt" (26). Hence, to take the 
authors' argument to its logical conclusion, any event given attention by 
scholars who embrace an organizational theory perspective is by definition 
a rival organizational explanation. Yet organizational explanations by def­
inition are carried out across time and hence do not lead to an exogenous 
shock explanation of change like the Cannon revolt dummy variable em­
ployed by Katz and Sala. 
Charles Stewart (1989) sought explanations of House budgeting reforms 
from 1865 to 1921. The author creatively merged quantitative measures 
with historical evidence in building rational choice models of the reforms. 
He found two motivations at work. First, he found a distributive situation 
not unlike that described by Mayhew (1974) for the 1970s Congress. 
According to the author, members in the late 1800s (like those in the May-
hew model) also preferred localistic policy and benefits over policy making 
for the common good. This desire affected the budget reforms, many of 
which had the aim of decentralizing the budgeting process. At the same 
time, the author ascribed a supporting role for broader social and economic 
changes, which increased the demand for spending. While a mix of these 
factors were offered, Stewart, like Gamm and Shepsle (1989), was most 
forceful in discussing the influence of the distributive motivations of mem­
bers of Congress on budgeting process changes. 
Summary. The recently developed purposive approach to institutional 
change has added a critical dimension to the body of theory on institutional 
change. Many scholars have sensed that when institutional studies focus 
only on aggregate dynamics, something is being left out—human agency 
(Gamm and Shepsle 1989). However, these scholars have not explained 
away the organizational approach. Many of these works give short shrift to 
the organizational explanation. 
Moreover, there are limits to the argument that organizational behav­
ior is the simple sum of purposive, lower-level behavior. To illustrate, if 
congressional structures were simple aggregations of individual behavior, 
why would the majority party give the minority party any rights at all? If 
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members were utility maximizers, then the majority party would simply 
ignore the minority party, give them no rights at all, entirely exclude them 
from the legislative process, and give them no money for constituent ser­
vice and perquisites. Of course, this does not happen in congressional insti­
tutions, which makes us turn to alternative explanations, including the path 
of the institution (Binder 1997), tradition (Matthews 1963), and external 
explanations. This discussion suggests that both organizational and purpo­
sive explanations are probably at work in institutional change. 
Toward a Broader Conception of Institutional Change 
While organizational and purposive theories are traditionally considered to 
be competing approaches, I posit that organizational and purposive factors 
together drive institutional change. This is not an entirely original point. 
Some scholars have stated that institutional change results from a combi­
nation of organizational and purposive factors (Cooper and Young 1989; 
Gamm and Shepsle 1989; R.H. Davidson 1995; Smith 1989; Stewart 1989). 
However, stating that both explanations have a role and carefully attempt­
ing to integrate the two are different things indeed. 
In a broader conception, then, organizational explanations—in addi­
tion to contributing to institutional change directly—operate as a context 
in which the purposive explanations influence congressional evolution. This 
is not unlike the evolutionary science perspective, in which species change 
is partially a product of the environment (analogous to organizational expla­
nations) in addition to and interacting with contact with others and day-to-
day behavior (analogous to purposive explanations). There is not—and 
ought not to be—a school of thought that says the evolution of a species 
is driven by the environment and a rival school of thought saying it is the 
product of day-to-day contact and behavior. Perhaps there should not be 
this debate over congressional change either. Yet there seems to be. 
Purposive scholars maintain that institutional changes are the simple 
result of purposive behavior rather than—or more than —the result of sec­
ular trends (Binder 1996; Mayhew 1974). Organizational scholars allow 
for what they call "internal factors." However, these factors are not as well 
conceived as the external factors and certainly not as well envisioned as the 
internal explanations developed by the purposive scholars. 
What form would an integrated theory of competing explanations 
take? The missing link is the relationship between the organizational fac­
tors and the purposive factors. As in the case of evolution, they do not exist 
in isolation. It is fruitful at this juncture to return to Cooper s (1977) mostly 
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overlooked conception of structural strain in the organizational theory frame­
work. Structural strain occurs within the institution and may result from 
demand (or external) strain. Structural strain can lead to stress and then 
change. However, since it is partially the result of external factors, it indi­
rectly carries the potential additional impact of the external factors. 
In summary, environmental factors, in addition to affecting institu­
tional change directly, affect the internal or purposive factors. In studies of 
congressional partisanship and party leadership, for example, scholars have 
found that external forces (such as electoral factors) directly affect parti­
sanship levels and the strength of party leadership. Further, the electoral fac­
tors indirectly affect partisanship through various internal factors (Brady, 
Cooper, and Hurley 1979; Cooper and Brady 1981; Hurley and Wilson 
1989). This logic suggests that partisanship, which is considered by pur­
posive scholars to be independent (Binder 1997), is partially the result of 
external factors. 
Other scholars have hinted at this potential relationship without explic­
itly testing it. In their study of the effect of issue complexity on jurisdic­
tional dynamics at the committee system level of analysis, Baumgartner, 
Jones, and MacLeod (2000) suggested that such a relationship is one step 
back in the causal diagram from the micro-level decisions about committee 
referrals. Binder (1997) suggested a conditional relationship between work­
load and partisan policy preferences in affecting the establishment or sup­
pression of minority rights. "The influence of changes in external demands 
on minority rights might . .  . be conditional on underlying political condi­
tions" (8). However, the relationship is not empirically tested. 
Sinclair (1997) documented the increasing number of bills with mul­
tiple referral to committees and special rules, which she termed "unortho­
dox lawmaking." While she primarily sought to document this trend, she 
offered some suggestions about what might be driving the change, includ­
ing both political and environmental factors. On the political side, she argued 
that the House Democrats in the 1980s were so far across the ideological 
spectrum from conservative President Ronald Reagan that gridlock was a 
natural consequence. Something was needed—unorthodox lawmaking— 
to get items passed into law over Reagan s veto. The author also pointed to 
an environmental rationale for the change, specifically a confluence of de­
mands for policy change and the growing threat of deficit politics. "Unortho­
dox lawmaking represents successful adaptation to a tough environment" 
(233). 
Larry Dodd (1997) employed Allison's (1971) models of the Cuban 
missile crisis to discuss congressional change, specifically the Republican 
28 Chapter 2 
takeover of both Houses of Congress in the 1994 election. Dodd asked 
how we can have such major change when many of our theories tell us that 
Congress has evolved to perpetuate itself (hence, a Democratic majority 
should have persisted). In employing one of Allisons models (the social 
learning model), the author envisioned the change as one of social learn­
ing of broader societal changes. In this way of thinking, purposive behavior 
is grounded in broader and changing contexts. 
Fiona Wright (1997) took Brady and Vbldens (1998) deficit politics 
context one step further. She argued that broad changes in the 1970s 
gradually altered the calculations of members as they struggled to adapt to 
the new deficit politics. In studying the House budget process, she found 
that increased partisanship could be at least partly explained by the responses 
of politicians to the pressures and dilemmas of deficit politics. 
This discussion suggests that scholars ought to incorporate micro-level 
politics and macro-level environmental factors into a broader, evolutionary 
model of institutional change. Congress, like other political institutions 
and social systems, adapts to multiple and competing forces from within 
(members, interests) and without the institution (the governing environ­
ment). Further, this discussion suggests that scholars ought to look for the 
independent effects of external factors and interactive effects with internal 
factors. 
Conclusion 
The literature on congressional change considers institutional arrangements 
as more than ex ante agreements struck before the policy-making game 
begins. Institutions change, and since institutional arrangements affect 
public policies, we need to understand how they change. Early in the chap­
ter, I distinguished between gradual changes and less frequent, more salient 
changes (reforms). Political scientists tend to study the reforms when the 
more important type of change may be the gradual change that occurs 
between reforms (Binder 1997; King 1997; Rieselbach 1995). Therefore, 
studies of institutional change ought to include a longitudinal component. 
Next, I presented and critiqued the organizational (efficiency) and pur­
posive (redistributive) explanations of institutional change, which scholars 
tend to pit against one another. The literature suggests that both types of 
explanations have a role in explaining institutional change. 
Finally, I argued that the competing organizational and purposive expla­
nations work in tandem to drive institutional change. Scholars have too often 
considered these competing, independent explanations instead of examin­
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ing an indirect link between the two. One purpose of this book is to add to 
this scholarly literature by examining the move to omnibus legislating. As 
the discussion above suggests, it will do this by including a longitudinal 
design as part of the test, by carefully examining the effect of both organi­
zational and purposive explanations on the omnibus change, and by explor­
ing how the two explanations work together in a broader conception of 
institutional change. I will now fill out that conceptualization of the move 
to omnibus legislating. 
The Logic of Omnibus Legislation: 
An Integrated Theoretical Framework 
As chapter 2 made clear, two schools of thought have developed on how 
institutions change in American politics. One group of scholars emphasizes 
micro-level explanations of institutional change that are rooted in human 
agency and activity. Another emphasizes macro-level factors in explaining 
institutional change. 
A major shortcoming of the literature on congressional change is the 
fact that these two approaches have proceeded somewhat separately. Studies 
looking to one type of explanation over another are oversimplified and under-
specified; they lack the appropriate rival hypotheses. If political scientists 
want to offer prescriptions about policy making and institutions to actors 
in the political arena, we need to develop full explanations of changes that 
provide full answers. 
This study includes an important role for multiple theoretical perspec­
tives and develops an integrated framework for understanding the omnibus 
change. This approach could fruitfully be applied to research on other insti­
tutional changes and could produce more fully informed scholarly discus­
sions about congressional procedures. 
Institutional developments, such as the increasing use of omnibus leg­
islation, are partly the result of the behavior of political actors aiming to 
carry out their goals. However, political actors do not operate in a vacuum; 
they participate in a unique and potentially changing environment. Hence, 
it is vital to place actors in their political context, a context that can affect 
and condition the actors'behaviors and incentives. Congress (like other social 
systems) evolves and endures by adapting to competing demands, includ­
ing the internal balance of forces and the governing environment. 
In this chapter, I develop an evolutionary theoretical framework for 
explaining omnibus usage that includes a micro-level and macro-level 
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conceptualization. Including a political actor focus (micro level) and an insti­
tutional focus (macro level) in the framework will help us to understand 
the individual and institutional incentives for the omnibus change. 
My general theoretical approach is to treat the rise of omnibus use as 
an institutional change to be explained by individual incentives of coalition 
building at the micro level, environmental constraints on congressional 
institutions at the macro level, and interaction between the micro and macro 
levels. At the micro level, it is critical to consider the expectations of suc­
cess for bills in the legislative process. Two steps must be cleared to enact 
policy. First, a coalition must be assembled within Congress to pass legisla­
tion. Second, a presidential veto must be averted.1 The logic of packaging 
billsflows from expectations of success for bills in each of these two essen­
tial steps and requires my framework to consider the party leader-member 
relationship and the congressional-presidential relationship. How does 
omnibus lawmaking help these actors in achieving their goals? 
I also place these two relationships or dynamics in a proper context by 
giving careful thought to the potential impact of political context factors, 
such as deficit politics, divided government, partisanship, bicameral differ­
ences, issue complexity, and workload, on omnibus usage. These contexts may 
affect omnibus usage directly and condition the effect of the micro-level 
dynamics between members and leaders and Congress and the president 
on omnibus usage. Such macro-level contexts represent a group of expla­
nations that scholars have considered the most with regard to omnibus leg­
islation (Baumgartaer et al. 1997; R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 1998; Oleszek 
1989; Sinclair 1997; Smith 1989). In contrast, explanations of omnibus use 
have lacked a precise micro-level basis. 
Figure 3.1 presents a graphical outline of this basic framework. Incor­
porating both micro and macro levels into my framework (and linking them) 
Omnibus Bill? 
Leaders-members Congress-
dynamic president dynamic 
Political 
Circumstances 
Figure 3.1 Theoretical framework 
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represents an advancement in the theoretical development of explaining 
institutional change in the legislative studies subfield of the discipline. 
Linking these two approaches also provides the fullest explanation of the 
rise of omnibus legislation. 
The Micro Level: Two Institutional Dynamics 
Omnibus bills involve two political actor dynamics that correspond to the 
two-step process that bills must go through to become law: one dynamic 
between congressional leaders and members and the other between Con­
gress and the president. Omnibus bills provide a way to enact policies whose 
outcome in one or both of these two steps is doubtful or unclear. That is, 
the mechanism provides a way to manage uncertainty in the legislative 
process (Bach and Smith 1988; Browne 1995; Oleszek 1989; Smith 1989). 
Therefore, at the very least, we expect bills in the process that face opposi­
tion within Congress or at the president's desk to become attached to omni­
bus bills.2 
Leaders and Members 
I discuss first the relationship between those with the resources to pack­
age bills (congressional leaders) and members at large. What do leaders and 
members have to gain from omnibus legislation? How are their goals ad­
vanced? Leaders accrue certain benefits from omnibus use. They gain more 
power with omnibus bills and, because they assemble omnibus bills, are 
afforded the opportunity to advance party agenda items. Both of these (more 
power and pushing an agenda) are principal goals of party leaders (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993; R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 1998; Sinclair 1995). 
Why do members allow leaders to package bills? Members surrender 
the right to consider items one at a time so leaders can get legislative items 
passed that face uncertainty in the very busy legislative process. In allow­
ing packaging to occur, members are disadvantaged in three main ways. 
First, they are giving the leaders a powerful means of enacting items. This 
tool undoubtedly strengthens the position of leaders in the legislative 
process (Sinclair 1992,1998). 
Second, in allowing leaders to package bills, members are giving up 
traditional channels of deliberation. On omnibus items, rank-and-file mem­
bers seldom are included in the minutiae of lawmaking (Smith 1989), and 
they have a severe informational disadvantage on the floor (Oleszek 1989; 
Sinclair 1997; Smith 1989). 
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Third, omnibus bills are so vast that election opponents may pick what­
ever part of an omnibus bill they want to hammer the incumbent with in 
a campaign. Sinclair (1997) documented the role of Rep. Marjorie Mar-
golies-Mezvinsky (D-PA) in helping pass the 1993 Budget Reconciliation 
package critical to the Democrats and President Clinton. Thefinal vote was 
218 to 216. Congresswoman Margolies-Mezvinsky was a "pocket vote" 
only to be used if absolutely needed. She favored the legislation personally, 
but her district was heavily Republican. She promised to oppose tax 
increases in any form. Her vote was ultimately needed, and she cast the vote 
that tipped the scales. However, her challenger hammered away at this vote 
in the 1996 campaign, and she was defeated.3 
What do members gain while they are disadvantaged? After all, a bar­
gain suggests that both sides benefit; what incentives do members have to 
allow omnibus packaging by leaders? Members are driven by many goals, 
but primarily by reelection (Fenno 1973; Hall 1996; Mayhew 1974) and 
the desire to enact their policy preferences (Fenno 1973; Hall 1996). In 
exchange for allowing packaged bills by leaders, members obtain two major 
benefits that aid in achieving these overarching goals of reelection and 
making public policy. These benefits help us to see why members accept 
the costs associated with omnibus use. 
First, omnibus bills aid members' reelection chances; they provide a 
way to create distributive logrolls to secure particularized benefits. Mayhew 
(1974), Fiorina (1977), and Arnold (1979) have discussed the many features 
of congressional institutions that contribute to reelection of incumbents. 
The omnibus mechanism partly serves the needs of incumbents through 
the use of distributive or pork barrel politics. Members may put up with 
omnibus bills if the mechanism provides some distributive benefit that will 
aid reelection. Because omnibus bills nearly always succeed, members get 
a surefire way to get distributive items that might be opposed if pursued 
sequentially incorporated into omnibus bills. 
Why are omnibus bills needed to generate such logrolls? Nearly all 
members of Congress seek pork barrel items. Yet there is not universal sup­
port for all such measures. There is always the potential in the legislative 
game for a low-demand majority to defeat a distributive measure pushed by 
a high-demand minority. Hence, distributive logrolls are susceptible to reneg­
ing hazards (Weingast and Marshall 1988). One way around this enforce­
ment problem is to package distributive items into a massive omnibus bill 
(Masten 1997). Leaders do this because member reelection, which is aided 
by distributive successes, ensures continuing majority status. 
Second, through the omnibus bill attachment process, majority members 
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obtain a potential vehicle for enacting policies they care about. Among other 
things (position taking and credit claiming; see Mayhew 1974), members 
want to enact their bills. In institutions with large continuing agendas and 
therefore a scarcity of attention, members find it difficult to get their bills 
noticed and moved forward. The overwhelming majority of bills fail before 
getting a hearing (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1996). One way to get 
around the traditional and extremely challenging typical legislative chan­
nels is to get your provision included in an omnibus bill. Leaders are elected 
by majority members and hence are willing to provide this benefit to 
majority members more than to minority members. 
The electoral benefit for members associated with getting distributive 
projects for their district and for majority members in getting their bills 
moved forward outweighs the one main electoral cost of omnibus bills (hav­
ing future opponents hammer the member on one part of the omnibus bill). 
These "goodies" also provide a potential rebuttal to charges raised about 
other parts of the omnibus bill. 
Leaders have another main goal that is served in their bargain with 
members on omnibus legislation. That is, leaders want to stay leaders. They 
are elected by members in their party and ultimately derive their power 
from them. Because of this arrangement, power is tenuous for leaders. A 
leader who is powerful one year mayfind a challenge to that power in another 
year. 
Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) provides an excellent case in point. 
Regarded by many as an important factor in the Republican takeover of 
Congress in the 1994 elections, Gingrich rode a wave of enthusiasm into the 
speakership. The Contract With America provided an identifiable policy 
agenda for his party, and he enjoyed high party unity. In 1995 and 1996, 
he was regarded as one of the most powerful Speakers in recent memory 
(R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 1998). However, by 1997, his leadership was 
called into question by fellow Republicans, and he was nearly the target of 
a coup. By 1997, he was seen by some as too dictatorial a speaker and too 
willing to cave in to the centrist demands of President Clinton. A scandal 
involving improper receipt of book royalties confounded problems for the 
Speaker. The final factor that led to his demise was the poor showing by 
Republicans in the 1998 elections. In the course of three years, Gingrich 
went from being one of the most powerful Speakers of our time to giving 
up his office. When it was clear he would be defeated in the House Speaker 
election by Congressman Livingston (D-LA), Gingrich resigned the speak­
ership and his seat in the House of Representatives. Legislative leadership 
power is tenuous. 
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Because of this situation, leaders approach the omnibus bargain with 
members carefully. If they abuse the bargain, members may vote them out 
of their positions. It is not surprising, then, that members at large in the 
majority party gain the legislative goodies mentioned above in omnibus 
bills. Giving members what they want helps members' reelection chances, 
which promotes the leaders' goal of retaining majority status. 
Congress and the President 
A second omnibus bargain occurs between Congress and the president (really 
between congressional leaders and the president). Congress may include 
measures that the president opposes in order to avert a veto. What does the 
president gain in this game? Why does the president participate in omnibus 
bargains? Why hold his nose and sign these measures into law? Why not 
just veto everything? 
Scholars of presidential-congressional relations assume that presidents, 
like members of Congress, want to enact their policy preferences (e.g., 
Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989). Beyond that assumption, the 
motivations of presidents in policy making are less studied than the 
much-discussed motivations of members of Congress. First-term presidents 
surely want to get reelected. Getting something done in policy making may 
aid a president's reelection prospects (in the case of first-term presidents). 
There is also some indication that presidents care about their historical 
legacy. Enacting policies they prefer and promises they make may lead to a 
favorable historical rating of their presidency. 
Presidents understand that our legislative institutions were designed to 
block items rather than enact policy. One important thing presidents can 
gain from omnibus bills is the possibility of having their own agenda items 
made attachments to omnibus bills. This alternate route gets the president 
around having his bills go it alone in the legislative process and perhaps get 
blocked. The president, like members of Congress, faces a presumption 
of failure for bills introduced in Congress (Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998). 
While the president is more likely to succeed in the legislative process than 
a typical member of Congress, only one-fourth of presidential proposals 
are enacted into law in a form still recognizable to the president (Peterson 
1990). In congressional committees, presidential drafts are less successful 
than legislation pushed by the given committee and subcommittee leaders 
(Larocca 1995). Presidents therefore have something potentially very help­
ful to gain in omnibus bargains if they can bargain to have their own agenda 
items incorporated. 
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Congress (in the form of the leaders and their members), on the other 
hand, is willing on occasion to incorporate the president s legislative items 
in order to avert a veto of items Congress wants that are contained in omni­
bus bills.4 
Why Not Use Omnibus Bills All the Time? 
If leaders, members, and the president all receive some benefit in omnibus 
packaging, why not use omnibus bills all the time? Why not combine all 
policy and budget items into one gigantic omnibus bill each year? While 
members and the president obtain certain benefits from omnibus bills, they 
see omnibus legislating as a necessary evil. When packaging occurs, indi­
vidual member participation and influence are lost and the power of the pres­
idential veto is diluted. Because omnibus packages represent fragile bar­
gains, the bill designers (party leaders) are careful not to abuse the omnibus 
method. If they abuse it, members may vote the leaders out of their posi­
tions or the president may exercise the veto. Hence, the party leaders keep 
the omnibus method within certain bounds.The fear of retaliation suggests 
that there will be some limit to the overall amount of omnibus packaging 
that occurs. Leaders are not likely to package bills all the time. 
Omnibus bills incorporate attachments that might not survive the leg­
islative process alone. There may also be a limit to how large an attachment 
may be before members retaliate or the president exercises the veto. On 
particularly prominent bills, members want to have the opportunity to par­
ticipate in the process and understand the policy content. Omnibus bills 
are typically fast-tracked and do not allow for meaningful member partic­
ipation. Further, the details of omnibus bills are typically not understood 
by members. If large-scale policy changes were incorporated into omnibus 
bills regularly, members would miss opportunities to participate. Similarly, 
presidents want to see large-scale policy changes considered sequentially 
so that they can consider them carefully and use the veto most effectively. 
There is probably some limit to how large omnibus attachments may be 
before members or presidents retaliate. Leaders thus are less likely to incor­
porate mammoth measures into omnibus packages because members and 
the president will want traditional input on such items. 
Summary 
At the political actor or micro level, my framework includes two institu­
tional dynamics or games that help us understand why omnibus utilization 
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occurs. The bargain between those with the resources to package bills 
(leaders) and members at large is mutually beneficial. Leaders gain more 
power in enacting legislation amidst uncertainty and may advance party 
agenda items through omnibus bills. Members gain two main benefits. 
First, they get a chance to have distributive measures included in omnibus 
bills. Second, majority members get a chance to get their most valued items 
incorporated. By helping members at large, leaders aid member reelection, 
which helps ensure continuing majority party status. 
The omnibus dynamic between Congress and the president also pro­
duces a bargain in which both sides benefit. Congressional leaders incorpo­
rate items that might be vetoed by the president if considered sequentially. 
In exchange, the president benefits by gaining an opportunity to have 
measures incorporated. 
If all parties benefit to some degree (even while they give up something 
in the bargains), why not use the omnibus method all the time? Because 
these are fragile bargains, the bill builders (party leaders) are careful not to 
abuse the omnibus method. If they do, either of the bargains may break 
down. Party leaders may be removed from office by members or see a veto 
by the president. Omnibus bills almost never fail; the bargains get worked 
out. The party leaders keep the omnibus method within certain bounds by 
not overusing it and by resisting the incorporation as attachments of very 
prominent measures that members and the president wish to consider 
sequentially. I shall now place these two institutional dynamics in a proper 
and changing political context. 
The Macro Level: Contextual Factors That May Affect 
Omnibus Usage and Condition the Micro-Level Effects 
It is important to consider the political context in a theoretical framework 
of omnibus usage because political actors do not operate in a vacuum. Our 
analysis of the two micro-level dynamics does not tell us why omnibus use 
is higher today than in 1955. The micro-level dynamics operate—and 
political actors participate—in a particular and changing environment. This 
point brings us to the second component of the theoretical framework, the 
macro-level analysis, which will help us understand the institutional incen­
tives that drive omnibus use. 
Certain contextual circumstances complicate the legislative process, 
placing strain on congressional institutions and making it more likely that 
actors will turn to nontraditional tools such as omnibus legislating to 
make policy. Circumstances that challenge the capabilities of our legislative 
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institutions include deficit politics, divided party control, bicameral differ­
ences, partisanship, issue complexity and committee fragmentation, and 
burgeoning congressional workloads. At the level of the institution, changes 
such as omnibus legislation are needed to adapt to such challenges so that 
institutions may endure. To date, contextual circumstances—not strategic-
level bargains—have been most mentioned by scholars as causes of the 
omnibus revolution (Baumgartner et al. 1997; R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 
1998; Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1997; Smith 1989). These five factors can 
be categorized as political explanations (divided government, bicameral 
differences, partisanship [minority obstructionism]), institutional concerns 
explanations (issue complexity, workload), or a hybrid of the two (deficit 
politics). 
However, just as political actors do not exist in a vacuum, environ­
mental constraints are not separate from micro-level political activity. 
Including both levels of explanation and linking them is critical. They are 
linked in that the environmental circumstances mentioned by scholars may 
condition the micro-level explanations of institutional change. In such 
challenging environmental scenarios, bargains are more likely to be struck 
between leaders and members and between Congress and the president to 
get things done. Thus, omnibus usage becomes more likely through an 
interaction of contextual and micro-level factors. 
Deficit Politics 
At the top of almost everyone's list as a cause of the omnibus revolution 
is budget deficit politics (R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 1998; Oleszek 1989; 
Sinclair 1997; Smith 1989). Indeed, an examination of deficit trends 
shows spikes in deficit spending at the beginning of the 1970s and again 
at the start of the 1980s, periods of time when omnibus use climbed. 
How does deficit politics strain congressional institutions? In the face 
of large budget deficits, it becomes quite difficult to get anything new 
done (Brady and Volden 1998; C. Jones 1994; Sinclair 1995,1997; Wright 
1997). Any single new initiative that requires funding faces a "we cannot 
afford it" response. The proponents have a higher threshold to clear in 
demonstrating the importance of a program if it will contribute to an even 
higher deficit. Alternatively, the proponents can try the unpopular strategy 
of suggesting cuts elsewhere that would pay for the new program. 
One way for the players (leaders and members, Congress and the pres­
ident) to conduct business in such a challenging environment is to use omni­
bus bills. "The need for omnibus measures in the first place is the result of 
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a spending policy gridlock and highly constrained spending choices" (Smith 
1989,57). When an individual initiative is tacked onto an omnibus bill, the 
scrutiny on it decreases dramatically as policy makers focus on the core issue 
of the entire package. 
Therefore, we expect more omnibus use in periods of tight financial 
resources and less omnibus use in periods of slack resources. Is deficit pol­
itics a political or an efficiency explanation of omnibus use? I believe it could 
be either. Using omnibus bills in periods of high deficits may be a way to 
make tough choices about spending (Oleszek 1989). Alternatively, omni­
bus use in deficit periods provides a way to create distributive logrolls— 
alliances that might fall apart if bills were considered sequentially. 
Divided Government 
Another challenging contextual circumstance for lawmaking arises from 
divided government (Sinclair 1997). When the president is from the 
opposition party of the majority party in Congress, it is likely that the 
president (who typically comes from the ideological mainstream of his 
party; see Bond and Fleisher 1990) will oppose many of the initiatives for­
warded from the majority party and veto them. Moreover, presidential 
items are more likely to be blocked in Congress, since the opposition party 
controls the institutional levers of power. This predicament presents a par­
ticularly heightened sense of uncertainty for both branches and increases 
the likelihood that omnibus bargains will be struck. Table 3.1 shows the 
incidence of unified and divided government during the period of this 
study. Divided party control occurs more regularly later in the series (from 
1970 to the present), the period of time in which omnibus use climbed 
ever higher. 
Bicameral Differences 
Congress consists of two legislative chambers. Yet another challenging sit­
uation confronts policy makers when the House and Senate have differ­
ences over policy (Hammond and Miller 1987; Riker 1992;Tsabelis 1995; 
Tsabelis and Money 1997). When the chambers are divided over policy 
preferences, legislative disagreement and ultimately gridlock can result. In 
a study of policy stalemate from 1947 through 1996, Binder (1999) found 
that the distribution of policy preferences between the chambers was a major 
determinant of gridlock (and therefore a lack of innovation). As a means 
of bargaining, omnibus bills might be employed in such a challenging 
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Table 3,1 
Incidence of Unified and Divided Party Control, 1949-1994 
Congress Years Party Division 
81st 1949-50 Unified 
82nd 1951-52 Unified 
83rd 1953-54 Unified 
84th 1955-56 Divided 
85th 1957-58 Divided 
86th 1959-60 Divided 
87th 1961-62 Unified 
88th 1963-64 Unified 
89th 1965-66 Unified 
90th 1967-68 Unified 
91st 1969-70 Divided 
92nd 1971-72 Divided 
93rd 1973-74 Divided 
94th 1975-76 Divided 
95th 1977-78 Unified 
96th 1979-80 Unified 
97th 1981-82 Divided 
98th 1983-84 Divided 
99th 1985-86 Divided 
100th 1987-88 Divided 
101st 1989-90 Divided 
102nd 1991-92 Divided 
103rd 1993-94 Unified 
104th 1995-96 Divided 
105th 1997-98 Divided 
106th 1999-00 Divided 
situation. Each chamber could potentially get what it wanted in omni­
bus bills, but each would also have to accept some of the other chamber's 
initiatives. 
Partisanship: Ripe Conditions for Minority Obstructionism 
Minority obstructionism provides a challenging governing situation for 
legislative institutions. Certain governing conditions are riper for minority 
obstructionism than others. The most ideal conditions for the majority 
party are when it is large and cohesive and the minority is small and het­
erogeneous, as is the case during realignments (Brady 1988). Under such 
circumstances, the majority party can use traditional legislative channels to 
push through their favored policies. In contrast, a more daunting legisla­
The Logic of Omnibus Legislation 41 
tive task faces the majority party when the majority party is small (a narrow 
majority) and less unified and the minority is larger and unified. In these 
times we expect the majority party to look for special legislative procedures 
for moving their agenda by an obstructive minority. Indeed, partisanship 
has increased markedly in the 1980s and 1990s (Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, and 
Hanna 2000; Rohde 1991), the same period of time in which omnibus use 
soared. Hence, unified minorities now march in lockstep to block majority 
party policy making. 
Issue Complexity and Fragmentation 
Deficit politics, divided government, and the recent upswing in partisanship 
on Capitol Hill are topics discussed by political pundits and scholars alike. 
The increasing complexity of the national policy agenda is a less studied 
and understood phenomenon. Issue complexity refers to the degree of con­
centration of congressional attention to particular issues. An issue agenda 
is more complex when attention is dispersed across many issues and less 
complex when attention is devoted to a few main issues. 
In their studies of congressional hearings, Baumgartner, Jones, and 
MacLeod (1998) demonstrated the increase in issue complexity that had 
occurred in Congress since 1947. They found that "legislative activity was 
concentrated in a smaller number of issue-areas in the early post-war period. 
Increasingly, congressional attention has become spread thinner among a 
wider range of topics than in the past, suggesting greater competition for 
access to the congressional agenda" (13). In a study of legislative produc­
tion, Baumgartner et al. (1997) showed an increase in omnibus use across 
the same time period. They suggested that the increasing complexity of the 
issue agenda since World War II was related to the rise of omnibus usage, 
arguing that "omnibus bills provide a way to get things done in an increas­
ingly complex issue environment" (1). 
Increased issue complexity manifests itself in committee fragmenta­
tion. The basic setup of the congressional committee system was developed 
in the 1946 reorganization of Congress, when, as Baumgartner et al. (1997) 
showed, just a few main issues were on the agenda. Since that time, several 
new issues have appeared on the agenda that do not fit into one commit-
tee's jurisdiction. These issues include health care and environmental policy. 
As a result, issues are increasingly considered in more than one principal 
committee. Issues increasingly "spill over" several committees. This juris­
dictional fragmentation becomes a structural strain on the institution. 
While sharing issues between committees allows institutions the flexibility 
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to address new and expanding issues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; King 
1997; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995), it also makes coordination a 
big challenge. 
When a member pushes a bill in a fragmented issue area (with juris­
diction spread across several committees), it is likely that one of the com­
mittees weighing in will oppose it, a common by-product of jurisdictional 
wrangling. In a highly fragmented committee system, omnibus bills are a 
way to make policy because they centralize authority, getting party leaders 
away from the committee bickering. As King (1997) argued, "One cannot 
come to terms with the reasons for crafting these 'mega bills'without address­
ing the jurisdiction game and its impact on the institution' (139). 
Workload 
An increasing workload is a final potential strain on a lawmaking institu­
tion that may introduce uncertainty into lawmaking. An increased work­
load creates more pressure through increased demands on time. Members 
find it harder and harder to accomplish their own work and the work of the 
institution. 
According to many scholars in the congressional organizational theory 
tradition (Cooper 1977; Cooper and Young 1989), this state of affairs cre­
ates a situation where a legislative technique is needed to make lawmaking 
more efficient. Omnibus bills are larger and processed more quickly than 
traditional bills; thus, they may be a more efficient way to conduct legisla­
tive business. According to this logic, we expect higher levels of omnibus 
use when the congressional workload increases. 
A caveat is in order regarding these workload expectations. One way 
of dealing with the challenges of increased workload might be simply to 
increase staff support on Capitol Hill overall and/or in a particular issue 
area with greater workload. But the deficit, partisanship, and issue com­
plexity challenges do not lend themselves to any similarly straightforward 
response. Therefore, while organizational theorists provide sufficient argu­
ment to examine the potential relationship between omnibus use and work­
load, I suspect the relationship to be weaker than for the other contextual 
circumstances. 
Conclusion 
This chapter developed a theoretical framework for understanding omni­
bus use that includes and links the micro level and the macro level and both 
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politics and efficiency dimensions. The micro-level logicflows from the two-
step process that bills must go through to become laws: passing Congress 
and the president's desk. This two-step process led me to consider carefully 
two bargains that take place in omnibus legislation, one between leaders 
and members and the other between Congress and the president. I also 
incorporated several contextual circumstances on omnibus usage: deficit 
politics, divided government, a more partisan legislative arena, issue com­
plexity, and an increasing workload. In its entirety, this framework leads to 
several empirical expectations that are more carefully stated and tested in 
chapters 5 and 6. Next, I develop a definition of omnibus legislation and 
systematic indicators with which to test the logic of omnibus use and some 
of the effects of omnibus legislation in later chapters of the book. 
Studying Omnibus 
Lawmaking Systematically 
omnibus: (1) a usually automotive public vehicle designed to carry 
a large number of passengers; (2) a book containing reprints of a 
number of works; (3) of, relating to, or providing for many things 
at once; (4) containing or including many items. 
—Merriam-Webster (1993, p. 811) 
Studying omnibus legislation systematically requires an operational defin­
ition and measure of omnibus legislation. This chapter does three things. 
First, I provide a definition of omnibus bill and identify all such packages 
since the 81st Congress (1949-50). I begin with the 81st Congress because 
it included the first such "mega-bill" (Chamberlain 1946; Congressional 
Quarterly, Inc. 1951; Nelson 1953). Second, I develop two quantitative 
indicators of omnibus use across time in order to show the longitudinal 
trends in omnibus use. Third, I employ a method to identify the attach­
ments to omnibus bills for the period from 1979 to 1994. The 1979-1994 
time period allows the use of many outstanding on-line data sources, such 
as LEGI-SLATE. 
The trend data demonstrate that omnibus lawmaking started at mid-
century and increased in recent decades. The omnibus attachment data 
show that a significant number of bills get through the typical gauntlet of 
lawmaking on Capitol Hill by becoming attached to omnibus bills. These 
trends suggest the need for examination of the causes and effects of omni­
bus legislation, which will be pursued in subsequent chapters. 
This chapter is quite detailed, but it is among the most important in 
the book. Therefore, I ask the reader to indulge me. This chapter is critical 
because a precise definition of omnibus legislation has eluded political sci­
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entists (and congressional staffers and researchers), even though many dis­
tinguished scholars in American politics argue that the development of 
omnibus legislation is one of the most important recent changes in the 
legislative process.1 
What Is am Omnibus Bill? 
Scholars have offered similar ideas of what constitutes "omnibus legisla­
tion." Sinclair (1997) summarized the general concept well: "Legislation 
that addresses numerous and not necessarily related subjects, issues, and 
programs, and therefore is usually highly complex and long, is referred to 
as omnibus legislation" (64). Quite similar statements are offered by many 
other legislative scholars (Baumgartner et al. 1997; Cameron et al. 2000; 
R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 1994, 1998; Mayhew 1991; Oleszek 1989; 
Smith 1989). As discussed above in chapter 1, omnibus bills are typically 
assembled to get something passed. The big bill has its own locus of atten­
tion (nucleus) and is more likely to have the support of important players 
in the legislative process. Omnibus bills are powerful in that they divert 
attention from controversial items of certain substantive policy areas to other 
main items that enjoy widespread support or are necessary or both. The 
controversial items, if considered alone, would face opposition within Con­
gress or at the president's desk. Omnibus bills provide a way to evade this 
opposition and enact the policies; they provide greater certainty (Bach and 
Smith 1988). 
What are the options for defining omnibus bill? One option is to use 
the name of the bill. However, this straightforward approach is problem­
atic. The term omnibus can be used arbitrarily. At the introduction stage of 
the process, members of Congress may call a bill whatever they choose. 
Members may simply label a bill "omnibus" to make it sound more impor­
tant. Moreover, several omnibus bills, like certain budget reconciliation bills 
and continuing appropriations measures, do not have the word omnibus in 
their title. 
Because of this situation, it is not wise to rely on news services to 
identify omnibus bills, since they report what the bill was called rather than 
relying on a precise definition. I checked several bills with the label omnibus 
in annual editions of Congressional Quarterly (CQ) Almanac and on LEGI­
SLATE, an on-line service used by many scholars. Some such bills are 
omnibus in the sense scholars intend above (large and spanning many pol­
icy areas), while other bills are quite specific to one narrow policy area. 
This state of affairs poses a challenge. Relying on political observers to 
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identify omnibus use could lead to substantial error, since they report what 
the bill was called rather than relying on a precise definition. It also points 
to the need for the development of a reliable measure of omnibus legislation. 
Accordingly, my goal is to take an alternative route to simply using the 
name of the bill by providing a behavioral definition of omnibus legislation 
that follows from the concept.2 
Omnibus bills differ from typical major bills in their scope (number of 
substantive policy areas spanned), their size, and, following from scope and 
size, their complexity, Sinclair (1997) has emphasized scope and size, while 
Roger H. Davidson and Walter Oleszek (1998) have focused on size. Com­
plexity is a characteristic that follows from the other two. My definition 
captures these key attributes of scope and size. I define omnibus bill as any 
piece of major legislation that (1) spans three or more major topic policy 
areas or 10 or more subtopic policy areas and (2) is greater than the mean 
plus one standard deviation of major bills in words. Several elements of this 
definition require further explanation. What is major legislation? What is 
a major topic policy area? What is a subtopic policy area? Defining major 
legislation provides a group of bills from which to isolate the omnibus bills. 
Defining major topic policy area and subtopic policy area provides one of the 
tools to distinguish omnibus bills from other major bills by ascertaining 
how many policy areas they span. The other tool for distinguishing omni­
bus bills from other major bills is the size of the bill as measured in words. 
Defining Major Bill 
The term majoris inherently subjective, varying by what people deem to be 
important. Nonetheless, political scientists have found fairly objective means 
of identifying categories of major bills considered. 
Mayhew (1991) undertook two sweeps (one of congressional wrap-ups 
in the New York Times and Washington Post and one of retrospective judg­
ments of policy analysts) to determine landmark enactments, resulting in 
about 12 bills per Congress from 1947 through 1990. Casting a broader 
net than Mayhew, Sinclair (1997, 8) defined major on the basis of a list of 
important legislation provided by the CQ Weekly Report, resulting in roughly 
50 bills per two-year Congress. In a recent work on domestic agenda set­
ting that examined whether the president or party leaders get more of their 
items on the legislative agenda, Taylor (1998) employed a definition of 
major quite similar to Sinclair through CQ sources. This process resulted 
in numbers of cases per Congress that were similar to Sinclair's, but for a 
longer time series. In an even more ambitious undertaking, Edwards, Bar­
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rett, and Peake (1997) identified all failed bills reported in the CQ Almanac 
(about 86 per two-year Congress) before paring them down to a smaller list 
of roughly 13 important failures comparable to Mayhew's landmark suc­
cesses. Employing the largest of nets, Baumgartner et al. (1997) studied 
all statutes and, relying on CQ Almanac, other legislation covered; they 
came up with some 520 cases per Congress. 
How should one define major to get an appropriate list of important 
bills that would include all omnibus bills? Although all omnibus bills may 
not be landmark enactments in a Mayhew sense, omnibus bills are quite 
prominent (R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 1998; Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 
1992,1997; Smith 1989). Hence, we would expect them to be found in a 
list of important bills compiled in the CQ Weekly Report and to receive 
prominent coverage in the CQ Almanac. Several scholars have used these 
sources to identify samples of important bills for analysis (Baumgartner 
et al. 1997; Cameron et al. 2000; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; 
Sinclair 1997; Taylor 1998). The CQ Almanac has featured somewhat 
consistent coverage since 1948 (Baumgartner et al. 1997; Cameron et al. 
2000). The CQ Weekly Report, on the other hand, has varied in its title 
and its length. 
I used a two-pronged approach to get a list of major bills from which 
to classify omnibus bills. First, I used the top 10 percent of covered bills 
in CQ Almanac from Baumgartner and Jones's Policy Agendas Project data 
set.3 Second, I checked that list of bills against the same list from CQ Weekly 
Report that Sinclair (1997) used to identify major bills in her study of 
unorthodox lawmaking (about 50 per Congress). If the CQ Weekly Report 
contained bills not in the top 10 percent of CQ Almanac bills, I also 
included those bills (only a few such cases). This procedure yielded 1,180 
major bills from 1949 through 1994 (an average of 51 major bills per 
Congress). 
Defining Major Topics and Subtopics 
Now that we have identified the major bills, we need to figure out which 
ones are omnibus measures. According to my definition, this first requires 
a determination of how many policy areas each bill spans. What is a major 
policy area? Several different topic-coding schemes have been developed by 
political scientists to classify legislation and, more recently, congressional 
hearings, ranging from the general to the highly specific (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993; Baumgartner et al. 1997; Clausen 1973; Sinclair 1977, 
1982; Wildavsky 1966). The most general of classifications is that used by 
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Table 4.1 
Major Topic Areas of Public Policy 
Macroeconomics 
Civil rights, minority issues, and civil liberties 
Health 
Agriculture 
Labor, employment, and immigration 
Education 
Environment 
Energy 
Transportation 
Law, crime, and family issues 
Social welfare 
Community development and housing issues 
Banking,finance, and domestic commerce 
Defense 
Space, science, technology, and communication 
Foreign trade 
International affairs and foreign aid 
Government operations 
Public lands and water management 
Table 4.2 
Subtopics of Health Care 
General (includes combinations of subtopics) 
Health care reform, health care costs, insurance costs, and availability 
Medicare and medicaid 
Regulation of prescription drugs, medical devices, and medical procedures 
Health facilities construction and regulation, public health service issues 
Mental illness and mental retardation 
Medical fraud, malpractice, and physician licensing 
Elderly health issues 
Infants, children, and immunization 
Health manpower needs and training programs 
Military health care 
Alcohol abuse and treatment 
Tobacco abuse, treatment, and education 
Illegal drug abuse, treatment, and education 
Specific diseases 
Research and development 
Other 
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a selection of entries. The trade-off, then, is between heterogeneity of 
topic categories on the one hand, and the multiplication of thousands of 
code categories, each of which might have so few entries that no analy­
sis at that level of specificity would be possible. (Baumgartner, Jones, and 
MacLeod 1998,3) 
Hence, the underlying criterion is to group substantively similar items 
together, while avoiding having so many different categories that the sys­
tem becomes unhelpful for analysis. 
Baumgartner and Jones initiated the topic-coding system by having two 
different coders assign topic codes to the same set of congressional hear­
ings (and later legislative stories). Problem areas were discussed and worked 
out, which enabled intercoder reliabilities to rise to over 95 percent at the 
topic level and 90 percent at the subtopic level. Shortly after the coding 
process was established, I joined the project and began topic-coding CQ 
stories and statutes using the same system. Intercoder reliabilities on those 
data sets were even higher than on the hearings. A second process was 
undertaken on the congressional hearings, CQ stories, and U.S. statutes 
data sets to ensure validity of the topic-coding system. After each data set 
was completed, the entire data matrix was sorted by topic and subtopic, 
and the topic coders, along with Baumgartner and Jones, reviewed all entries 
for topic codes against the textual summary provided on each case. This 
process was a way to make certain that each subtopic was homogenous. "After 
coding over 28,000 cases from 46 annual editions of the CQ Almanacs (and 
70,000 hearings in a previous project), we are confident that our topic and 
subtopic codes produce useful and homogenous groupings" (Baumgartner, 
Jones, and MacLeod 1998, 6). 
Once again, the underlying criterion was to place substantively similar 
items together. The main topic areas contain items that are generally sim­
ilar, while the subtopic areas contain items that are specifically similar. Hence, 
the degree of homogeneity is greater at the subtopic level than the major 
topic level. 
The topic categories in Table 4.1 place some categories together in 
broad topics that some might argue should be separated from one another. 
For example, "foreign affairs" and "foreign aid" (i.e., war and peace) are 
together in a topic category. War and peace are generally similar because 
both are foreign matters. However, they cover specifically different aspects 
of a more general area of public policy. Thus, they are separated at the 
subtopic level. Hence, the true homogeneity is at the subtopic level. To 
ensure homogeneity, therefore, I used the subtopics as well as the topics 
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to determine how many policy areas a bill spans. This approach made it 
possible for me to code the presence of disparate policy areas in a way that 
was consistent with the conceptual definition of omnibus legislation. 
This important discussion goes to the heart of the trade-off between 
creating a manageable number of policy categories while retaining some 
degree of homogeneity. Any scholar attempting to develop policy categories 
faces this challenge. The Baumgartner-Jones scheme of 19 major topics 
and 224 subtopics handles this trade-off better than the other available 
topic-coding systems, such as the Clausen five-area topic scheme, which 
are lower in numbers of policy categories and thus contain higher degrees 
of heterogeneity within the categories. 
In sum, the next step in the coding process was to determine how many 
different substantive major policy areas and subtopic areas each of the 1,180 
major bills spanned. To accomplish this step, I carefully read legislative 
summaries and histories of each bill from the Congressional Information 
Service and the CQ Almanac. I looked for the number of different substan­
tive major policy areas and subtopic areas that the bills spanned. Those bills 
that in my judgment spanned three or more major policy areas or 10 or 
more subtopic policy areas met one of the necessary conditions for being 
included in my population of omnibus bills.4 Appendix 2 lists the topic and 
subtopic categories from which I worked. Appendix 2 will aid scholars 
hoping to use this topic-coding scheme for replication of the current study 
or for their own research. 
To summarize thus far, I identified the top 10 percent of the most-
covered bills in CQ Almanac (double-checked with the CQ Weekly Report's 
list of important legislation). From those 1,180 bills, I carefully read legisla­
tive summaries to determine how many major topic and subtopic policy 
areas the bills spanned. Those spanning three or more major policy areas or 
10 or more subtopic policy areas met one of the necessary conditions to be 
included in my population of omnibus bills. 
Measuring Size 
The second condition to be met for omnibus classification was size. I mea­
sured size as the number of words in each of the bills. From 1979 through 
1994, this information was easily obtained from the on-line service LEGI­
SLATE. I used the count of words in the last version of the legislation. For 
earlier years, I did one of two things to get the length of the bill in words. 
For those bills that became law, I identified the sections in the U.S. Code 
containing the bill and counted the words therein (also done on line). For 
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the major bills that did not become law, I consulted CQ Almanac, which 
contained word for word the language of many major bills like these. Major 
bills clearing one standard deviation above the mean length of major bills 
met the size requirement. This entire procedure yielded 242 omnibus bills 
of the 1,180 major bills from 1949 through 1994. 
A Word about Regular Appropriations Bills 
Congress is required to complete action each year on 13 regular appropri­
ations bills to formally enact the budget. Many of these bills include bud­
gets for programs and areas that span many topical areas. However, these 
bills in their regular form do not represent a change in lawmaking that I 
am attempting to explain through definition of omnibus bills. Still, there 
is the potential that leaders will incorporate major policy enactments in 
regular appropriations bills, thereby reflecting a change along the lines of 
omnibus legislation. While such attachments are more common on recon­
ciliation and continuing appropriations bills (of which there are many in 
the population of omnibus bills) than on the 13 regular appropriations bills, 
I also examined in detail these bills, and if policy attachments distinct from 
the budget aspects met the "span" requirement and the entire bill met the 
size requirement, then the bill was designated omnibus. This designation 
was necessary for several defense appropriations bills in the 1980s and an 
energy and water development appropriations bill in the 1990s. 
Of the 1,180 major bills, 242 qualified as omnibus by the above def­
inition. In addition, 40 more major bills were attached to one of the 242 
omnibus bills. More precisely, these 40 bills were by themselves major (top 
10 percent of CQ Almanac coverage), and they were subsequently attached 
to an omnibus measure. In total, 282 major bills were omnibus related— 
either an omnibus measure or an attachment. 
Next, I used this operational definition to develop two indicators of 
aggregate omnibus usage per two-year Congress from 1949 through 1994. 
The first was a raw count of omnibus bills per Congress. However, this 
measure did not take into account the amount of other major legislative 
activity undertaken (the denominator). Therefore, a second variable was the 
proportion of major bills that were omnibus bills per Congress. 
Documenting the Omnibus Change since World War II 
In chapter 2,1 followed King (1994,1997) in drawing a conceptual distinc­
tion between formal institutional reforms and more informal, incremental 
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changes. Formal changes receive much attention from political scientists, 
including the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (e.g., R.H. David­
son 1990; Perkins 1944), the 1970s reforms (e.g., R.H. Davidson 1992; 
Rieselbach 1994; Rohde 1991), and the Republican reforms in the 104th 
Congress (R.H. Davidson 1995; Evans and Oleszek 1995). Less studied 
are informal and incremental changes, including changes in committee 
issue jurisdictions (King 1994), rule changes pertaining to bill introduc­
tions (Cooper and Young 1989), and the development of minority rights 
(Binder 1996; Binder and Smith 1995). I reviewed several pieces of recent 
literature that suggest that while reforms have impact, the more common, 
fundamental, and lasting changes may take place gradually over time (Binder 
1997; Binder and Smith 1995; Hall and McKissick 1997; King 1994,1997; 
Rieselbach 1995). Such literature suggests that institutions do not typically 
change in major ways all at once. Yet political scientists tend to focus on the 
sudden, large-scale changes. 
What is the conventional wisdom on the nature of the omnibus change? 
Scholars have similarly focused on seemingly dramatic omnibus change in 
the 1980s (Mayhew 1991; Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1992,1995,1997; Smith 
1989). Conventional accounts point to 1980 (Smith 1989) or 1981 (Oleszek 
1989) as the breakthrough year of omnibus usage. In those years (and par­
ticularly in 1981), the budget reconciliation bill became a mammoth piece of 
legislation with dozens of component measures (Congressional Quarterly, 
Inc. 1981,1982). Scholars' explanations of the omnibus change have like­
wise focused on potential factors of those times. These explanations include 
the budget deficit situation and divided party control (Oleszek 1989; Sin­
clair 1992,1995,1997; Smith 1989). 
What do the descriptive data from this project show us when we look 
across time and employ a technical definition of omnibus legislation? First, 
our examination of lawmaking over a longer period shows us that, in sharp 
contrast to the conventional wisdom (Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1992,1995, 
1997; Smith 1989), omnibus legislation did not begin in the 1980s. Its use 
was not initiated suddenly, like a reform; rather, it developed gradually over 
several decades. This finding supports King's (1997) and Binder's (1997) 
argument that institutional change does not typically happen all at once in 
reform periods. Certainly, some periods are marked by more large-scale 
change than others (King 1997), but the nature of the institutional omni­
bus change appears to be more evolutionary. 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the move to omnibus legislating across the 
post-World War II period. It displays the number of omnibus bills per 
Congress from 1949 through 1994. As these data bear out, there has been 
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Figure 4.1 Number of omnibus bills per Congress, 1949-1994 
an increase in the use of omnibus packages.5 The first modern use of the 
omnibus procedure was in 1950 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1951), and 
the omnibus technique was employed on a regular basis leading up to 1981. 
Thus, it was already a proven method and available for use in 1981. There 
was a very slight decline and leveling off after the 101st Congress, but the 
omnibus technique is still employed more now than it was in the post-
World War II period. It is also important to note that this slight decline is 
misleading because omnibus bills have been larger since 1985 than before. 
Figure 4.2 displays the proportion of major bills that were omnibus in 
each Congress from 1949 (81st Congress) to 1994 (103rd Congress). The 
trend is very similar to that exhibited in Figure 4.1, a more or less grad­
ual increase in the use of omnibus legislation across most of the postwar 
period. 
It is important to weight for the prominence of legislation because 
omnibus bills are typically much larger than other major bills. Hence, Fig­
ure 4.2's depiction of the proportion of major bills that were omnibus bills, 
based on simple numbers of bills, probably understates the proportionate 
role of omnibus legislating. When legislation is roughly weighted for im­
portance, omnibus usage may be even greater. To roughly weight for the 
importance of the legislation, I measured the column-line coverage in CQ 
Almanac dedicated to each of the major bills (omnibus and nonomnibus 
alike).6 The proportionate contribution of omnibus bill legislation to law­
making, by this measure, is the total number of CQ Almanac column lines 
dedicated to omnibus bills as a proportion of the total column lines dedi­
cated to all major bills. With this weighted measure, there is still an increase 
in omnibus use from 1949 through 1994, and omnibus legislation takes 
on a greater role in major lawmaking than that suggested by Figure 4.2. 
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Congress 
Figure 4.2 Percentage of major bills that were omnibus per Congress, 1949-1994 
In Figure 4.2, the proportion of omnibus bills to major bills in general in the 
last few decades is between 15 and 30 percent. But if we weight for impor­
tance of the legislation, omnibus bills for that same period constitute 20 to 
40 percent of major lawmaking. From 1949 through 1980, about 15 per­
cent of the CQ Almanac coverage of major bills was omnibus bill coverage. 
From 1981 through 1994, 39 percent of the coverage of major bills was 
omnibus bill coverage. The dramatic gains in omnibus use in the 1980s 
suggest that scholars were at least half right in pointing to the 1980s in that 
new levels were reached. 
Legislative scholars have suggested that the use of these large omnibus 
bills drives down the total number of statutes being enacted; our system 
produces fewer but bigger laws (R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 1998; Oleszek 
1989; Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1996). Figure 4.3 demonstrates such 
an anticipated trend for statutory output. This count of statutes excludes 
commemorative legislation, such as proclamations declaring "National Can­
taloupe Week," in order to remove the many enactments that are not policy 
matters that have become more common in recent decades.7 During the 
1980s, the total statute count per Congress was generally between 600 and 
900. But since 1997, it has been about 400. Taken together, Figures 4.1 
through 4.3 tell a story of a congressional trend toward enacting bigger, 
multi-issue bills. 
Some might ask whether the existence of omnibus bills prior to 1981 
is an artifact of my definition of omnibus bill Such a critique would imply 
that three major areas or 10 subtopic areas lumped together was too low a 
threshold for designating a bill as omnibus. I would answer this concern 
with three points. First, because I required omnibus bills to clear a policy area 
threshold, some bills called omnibus did not meet the definition (e.g., many 
56 Chapter 4 
Congress 
Figure 4.3 Number of statutes per Congress, 1949-1994 
Congress 
Figure 4.4 Number of omnibus bills meeting threshold offive policy areas, 1949-1994 
water projects bills and bundled private bills). Therefore, I have, if anything, 
understated rather than overstated the prevalence of the omnibus tech­
nique. Furthermore, the water projects bills and bundled sets of private bills 
occur across the entire time series. 
Second, my definition requires bills to meet a size criterion in addition 
to a scope criterion. Third, most omnibus bills from 1949 through 1979 
comfortably cleared the policy areas threshold. The proportion of omnibus 
bills comprising only three policy areas was 21 of 84, or 25 percent, from 
1949 to 1980 and 18 of 80, or 23 percent, from 1981 to 1994. Figure 4.4 
shows the number of omnibus bills per Congress as defined by a higher 
threshold of five major policy areas. This trend is quite similar to the 
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trend in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The one difference is that there is less of a 
drop-off in omnibus usage at the end of the period. This exercise demon­
strates that omnibus bills early in the period are not an artifact of my omni­
bus definition. 
Hitching a Ride on the Omnibus, 1979 to 1994 
How many bills become attached to omnibus bills? To answer this ques­
tion, it is necessary to isolate a group of bills that receive enough serious 
consideration so that they might become attached to omnibus bills. What 
is the proper population of bills that are candidates for attachment to omni­
bus packages? Most bills are never seriously pushed or considered in Con­
gress (R.H. Davidson and Oleszek 1998; Oleszek 1989). Including all of 
the thousands of bills introduced in a Congress in the sample of potential 
omnibus attachments will distort the results. On the other hand, consider­
ing only the most major of bills (such as the 1,180 major bills for the period 
1949 through 1994 that we studied to isolate the omnibus bills) misses 
many of the bills that are attached to omnibus bills. What is needed is a 
subset of bills that are "seriously considered" and hence are potential can­
didates for inclusion as an attachment on an omnibus bill. 
Fortunately, CQ has identified in its annual editions of the Almanac a 
subset of seriously considered bills from which potential omnibus attach­
ments will emerge. From 1949 through 1994, CQ had over 12,000 write-ups 
on legislation and other congressional matters in the Almanacs (Baumgartner 
et al. 1997). As I discussed above, several other scholars have used CQ to 
focus on different subsets of bills that receive serious consideration in Con­
gress (Bader 1997; Baumgartner et al. 1997; Cameron et al. 2000; Edwards, 
Barrett, and Peake 1997; Sinclair 1992,1995,1997; Taylor 1998). 
My first coding task, which I have already described above, was to 
determine which major bills qualified as omnibus bills (required to meet a 
dual threshold of scope and size). The next task was sorting out which bills 
were attached to these omnibus bills—to "unpack" the omnibus bills. To 
determine which bills were attached to the omnibus bills, I looked in two 
places in the same data source. For each bill receiving a separate CQ Almanac 
story from 1979 to 1994,1 reviewed the written summary or summaries to 
determine whether the measure was attached to an omnibus bill.8 Second, 
I carefully studied the lengthy CQ Almanac stories of the omnibus bills 
themselves to make certain each of the bills discussed there was in my 
population of "seriously considered" legislation. Examining in detail the 
CQ omnibus bill summary was important because some of the omnibus bill 
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Table 4.3 
Bills Hitching a Ride on the Omnibus, 1979-1994 
Attached to Omnibus Unattached Total Bills 
N % N % N % 
511 16.0 2,679 84.0 3,190 100 
attachments did not receive separate write-ups in the CQ Almanac? For 
the period from 1979 to 1994, this process yielded 3,190 seriously consid­
ered bills. 
To illustrate this attachment-coding process, let us consider the 1992 
Urban Aid Tax Bill. I found in initial coding of the bill that the bill met the 
size requirement and spanned five major policy areas and 29 subtopic 
policy areas within those five major areas. To code attachments for that 
Congress, I read summaries of every bill that received a separate CQ Almanac 
story and found that four such bills were incorporated into the Urban Aid 
Tax Bill. I then looked in detail at the CQ Almanac summary of the Urban 
Aid Tax Bill and found two other bills that became attached. In total, six 
attachments are in the data set for the Urban Aid Tax Bill. 
Table 4.3 shows the breakdown on bill attachments to omnibus bills 
from 1979 to 1994. We see that about 16 percent of 3,190 bills considered 
got to "hitch a ride on the omnibus."10 Because omnibus bills typically suc­
ceed, 98 percent of bills attached to omnibus bills became law. It appears 
that omnibus bills provide a viable and important alternative route to enact­
ment for bills introduced in Congress. This finding is important because 
entrepreneurs pushing the other 84 percent of bills have to overcome a pre­
sumption of failure for bills introduced (Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998). 
The vast majority of these bills will not survive the legislative gauntlet; only 
28 percent become law. 
Because scholars have noticed a prevalence in omnibus usage in recent 
decades, the longitudinal trends displayed in Figures 4.1 through 4.4 make 
sense and were anticipated. Frankly, however, I did not expect to find such 
a high proportion of bills that become attached to omnibus bills. There­
fore, when tabulating these results, I was further convinced of the impor­
tance of shedding light on the topic of omnibus legislation. 
Which policy areas are most prevalent in omnibus attachments? Table 4.4 
displays the principal policy areas from which omnibus attachments ema­
nate. This table shows substantial variation across topics. The largest pro­
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Table 4.4 
Omnibus Attachments by Policy Topic Area, 1979-1994 
Major Topic Name N % 
Health 66 12.9 
Defense 54 10.5 
Government operations 43 8.3 
Macroeconomics 38 7.5 
Law, crime, and family issues 38 7.5 
International affairs and foreign aid 33 6.4 
Social welfare 32 6.2 
Transportation 30 5.9 
Agriculture 26 5.1 
Environment and energy 26 5.1 
Banking and domestic commerce 26 5.1 
Labor and employment 19 3.8 
Community development and housing 19 3.8 
Education 16 3.2 
Foreign trade 15 3.0 
Space, science, and technology 14 2.7 
Public lands and water management 14 2.7 
Civil rights, civil liberties, and minority issues 2 0.3 
Totals 511 100 
portion of omnibus attachments is in health policy. Nearly 13 percent of the 
attachments, or 66 of 511, were health items. The next largest category is 
defense. Over 10 percent of the attachments, or 54 of 511, were defense 
measures. Other categories with many attachments are government oper­
ations, macroeconomics, and law/crime issues. 
The use of omnibus legislation in these high-attachment areas has as 
much to do with legislative strategy as it does with the nature of the top­
ics. Health care policy is the most fragmented policy area on Capitol Hill 
(Baumgartner et al. 1998). Hence, insulating health items in "must-pass" 
omnibus measures provides a way around committee turf battles (King 
1997). I consider the case of health care policy in more detail in chapter 8. 
The macroeconomics and government operations categories include items 
pertaining to the federal budget that are typically presented to members in 
the form of omnibus budget bills. Defense (and transportation and agri­
culture) are distributive policy areas in which members seek to gain partic­
ularized benefits for their districts. These "pork" items are bundled in 
omnibus bills to prevent specific defense contracts, agricultural subsidies, 
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or public works projects from being defeated or eliminated. The use of 
omnibus legislation to move distributive items guarantees logrolling (please 
see chapter 3 for more discussion of a distributive logic of omnibus use). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I developed an original definition of omnibus legislation 
that follows from the conceptual discussion of omnibus legislation by other 
scholars. I then used the definition to develop systematic indicators of 
omnibus usage from which to display trends in omnibus usage since World 
War I  I 
Next, I showed the basic trends of omnibus lawmaking in the period 
since World War II. The trend data suggest that the omnibus change took 
place over several decades, more gradually than scholars have assumed. While 
the 1980s saw new peaks of omnibus usage, that decade was a continua­
tion of a trend that began in the 1949-50 Congress. Since most scholars 
have looked to the 1980s as the origination of the omnibus change, their 
explanations of the omnibus change have likewise focused on potential 
factors of those times (e.g., deficits and divided government). An omnibus 
upswing did occur in the 1980s, and thus such factors should be examined, 
but it is important to think about other factors since World War II (like issue 
complexity and committee fragmentation) and to focus upon the first use 
of omnibus legislating in the 81st Congress (to be explored in chapter 7). 
I also developed a method for identifying the attachments to omnibus 
bills from 1979 to 1994. The attachment data demonstrate that a significant 
proportion of bills (16 percent) get around the typical gauntlet of lawmak­
ing on Capitol Hill by becoming attached to omnibus bills. We also see that 
more omnibus attachments come from health care policy than from any 
other policy area (more focus on the health care case follows in chapter 8). 
These descriptive data suggest the need for a closer look at the causes and 
effects of omnibus legislation, to which I turn in the following chapters. 
Hitching a Ride on the Omnibus 
In 1982, several members of Congress and leaders sought to revive a dor­
mant airport development program that had failed to be reauthorized in 
the previous Congress. The previous act had expired in 1980. Lawmakers 
had failed in numerous prior attempts to bring the airport improvement act 
to the floor for two reasons. First, there was controversy over the program's 
direction (Sarasohn 1982). Second, if considered alone, the bill was re­
quired to take a circuitous route through the committee system. Five House 
and four Senate committees had to be coordinated to secure such an air­
port development program. 
To get the bill through the legislative process, Senate Majority Leader 
Robert Dole (R-KS), together with Commerce Committee Chairman Bob 
Packwood (R-OR), attached the measure to an omnibus tax bill with wide­
spread support making its way through Congress. Norman Mineta (D-CA), 
chairman of the House Public Works Aviation Subcommittee, said the 
procedure helped insulate the controversial airport measure: "Frankly, it was 
a good way to do it. We would otherwise have had contentious amendments 
offered" (Sarasohn 1982,2382). 
Three years later, in the 99th Congress (1985-86), congressional leaders 
and the president deadlocked on health care policy. President Ronald Rea­
gan promised vetoes of several individual bills related to child vaccinations 
and the Medicare program, while favoring other established programs in 
the health care policy domain that were being considered in the legislative 
process. To get the opposed programs by the president, leaders packaged 
numerous bills into a large and complex omnibus health measure. Express­
ing major reservations about provisions in the bill, the president nevertheless 
signed it (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1987). 
These cases illustrate how omnibus bills provide congressional leaders with 
a tool to enact policies whose outcome in one or both of the lawmaking 
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steps (passing the Congress, as in the first example, or the president, as 
in the second) are doubtful or unclear. Scores of other such examples greet 
readers weekly in the national media and in publications produced by 
"Congress watchers" such as Congressional Quarterly (CQ). There is much 
uncertainty in a legislative process that involves (among other challenges) 
thousands of bill introductions, a sizable existing agenda, political egos, turf 
battles, and ideological bickering. 
Indeed, congressional leaders assemble legislative coalitions in the face 
of legislators' multidimensional preferences and challenging institutional 
arrangements. Leaders employ a number of strategies to gain approval of 
measures whose support on an up-or-down basis maybe questionable. Three 
key tactics are (1) the ordering of alternatives in committee and on the 
floor; (2) in the House, the use of closed rules limiting the acceptance of 
amendments once the legislation leaves the committee; and (3) the unifi­
cation of diverse measures within a single large bill, or omnibus legislating. 
While significant bodies of literature exist on leadership use of the order­
ing of alternatives (Bach 1990; Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Denzau and 
Mackay 1983; McKelvey 1976; Romer and Rosenthal 1978; Wilkerson 
1990) and the closed rule (Bach 1981, 1990; Bach and Smith 1988; 
Baron 1991; Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Beth 1994; Binder 1997; Cox 
and McCubbins 1997; Dion 1997; Dion and Huber 1996; Fiorina 1987; 
Schickler and Rich 1997; Sinclair 1995; Weingast 1989), we have next to 
no systematic studies of the omnibus strategy. 
Legislative leaders behave strategically and attempt to assemble leg­
islative coalitions that will succeed. Leaders are more successful in some 
cases than others. Evidence suggests that they are close to perfectly strate­
gic in constructing omnibus bills; over 98 percent of the 242 omnibus bills 
identified from 1949 to 1994 were enacted. Hence, measures that become 
attached to them almost always become law. In contrast, the overwhelm­
ing majority of standard bills fail at some point in the legislative process 
(Oleszek 1989). In sum, there is essentially no variation to be explained be­
tween successful and unsuccessful omnibus bills. The important question is 
what gets attached—the focus of this chapter. Why may some bills circum­
vent the legislative gauntlet by being incorporated into omnibus packages? 
The cases at the beginning of this chapter offer principal reasons why 
some bills are incorporated by leaders into omnibus packages. These illustra­
tions also suggest dual motives that may underlie omnibus usage. The airport 
development program was bundled with the tax bill to squelch controversy. 
However, the tactic also was a way around having nine different committees 
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in two different chambers weigh in on it. The first rationale suggests poli­
tics, the second efficiency. The health care omnibus bill was indeed a way 
to get by the president—again politics. Health care, however, is the most 
fragmented of issues on Capitol Hill, with scores of committees having 
a claim to jurisdiction (Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 1999). Bundling 
health care policies centrally and moving them to the floor suggests an effi­
cient alternative to jurisdictional wrangling. These differing political and 
efficiency rationales exemplify two schools of thought that have developed 
on the nature of congressional change and legislative organization, one 
emphasizing efficiency and the other politics. Both of these approaches 
inform my theoretical framework of omnibus usage. 
The balance of this chapter includes three sections. I next develop 
empirical expectations from the theoretical framework of chapter 3. The 
measures and methods are described in the subsequent section. I then test 
the hypotheses with logit analyses of the omnibus attachment process from 
1979 to 1994. The results suggest a mix of political and collective institu­
tional concerns underlying the omnibus assembly process. 
Empirical Expectations of Omnibus Packaging 
Recall that my general theoretical approach is to treat the rise of omnibus 
legislation as an institutional change to be explained by individual incen­
tives of coalition building at the micro level and environmental constraints 
on congressional institutions at the macro level. At the micro level, omnibus 
bills involve two dynamics or bargains, one between leaders and members 
and the other between Congress and the president. These two dynamics, 
interaction among leaders and members and between Congress and the 
president, are associated with the two major hurdles that bills must clear 
to be enacted. Omnibus bills provide a technique to clear both hurdles. To 
provide logic for why certain bills are attached to omnibus measures and 
others are not, I develop alternative explanations of omnibus packaging based 
on these two steps and environmental factors. 
Leaders and Members 
I focus first on the relationship between party leaders and members-at-
large. This discussion yields four distinct expectations for omnibus pack­
aging. What do leaders and members gain from omnibus legislation? How 
are their goals advanced? Congressional leaders—charged with making the 
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lawmaking process work—use omnibus packages to move forward bills that 
face opposition. Hence, bills facing opposition in Congress are more likely than 
other bills to be attached to omnibus packages. 
The other principal goals of party leaders are gaining power and push­
ing a policy agenda (Bader 1997; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Sinclair 1995). 
With this tool, leaders are afforded an opportunity to advance party agenda 
items. Therefore, party agenda items are more likely to be attached to omnibus 
bills than other bills. 
Members' primary goals are reelection (Arnold 1990; Fenno 1973; 
Hall 1996; Mayhew 1974) and the desire to enact their policy preferences 
(Fenno 1973; Hall 1996). In exchange for allowing packaged bills by 
leaders, members obtain two major benefits in omnibus bills that aid in 
achieving these goals. 
First, omnibus bills provide a means of distributive logrolling to secure 
particularized benefits. There is the potential in the legislative game for a 
low-demand majority to defeat a distributive measure pushed by a high-
demand minority. One way around this is to package distributive items 
into a massive omnibus bill. Leaders do this because member reelection, 
which is aided by distributive successes, ensures continuing majority status. 
Hence, distributive items are more likely than other bills to be attached to omni­
bus bills. 
Second, through the omnibus bill attachment process, majority mem­
bers obtain a vehicle for enacting policies they care about. Members want 
to get their bills passed and find this difficult in busy institutions. If they 
can get their bills attached to an omnibus package, they sidestep the tradi­
tional legislative channels. Leaders are elected by majority members and 
hence are willing to provide this benefit to majority members more than 
to minority members. Therefore, bills sponsored by majority members are 
more likely to be attached to omnibus bills than measures introduced by minor­
ity members. 
Congress and the President 
A second bargain occurs between Congress and the president. This discus­
sion yields two distinct expectations for omnibus packaging. In order to 
avert a veto, Congress may include in omnibus bills measures that the pres­
ident opposes. What does the president gain? One important thing presi­
dents can gain from omnibus bills is the possibility of having their own 
agenda items incorporated as attachments to omnibus bills. This alternate 
route enables the president to get around having his bills go it alone in the 
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legislative process, perhaps getting blocked. Presidents, therefore, have 
something to gain in omnibus bargains if they can bargain to have their 
own agenda items incorporated. 
Congress is willing on occasion to incorporate the president's legislative 
items in order to avert a veto of items Congress wants that are contained 
in omnibus bills. Therefore, we have two seemingly contradictory expecta­
tions for omnibus attachments. First, bills opposed by the president are more 
likely to become attached to omnibus bills than other bills. Second, presidential 
agenda items are more likely to be attached to omnibus bills than other bills. 
If everyone benefits, why not use omnibus bills all the time? Why not 
combine all policy and budget outcomes into one gigantic omnibus bill each 
year? Although members and the president may benefit from their use, 
they see omnibus legislating as a necessary evil. When packaging occurs, 
members lose opportunities for participation and the power of the presi­
dential veto is diluted. A limit may exist on how large attachments can be 
before members retaliate or the president exercises the veto. On particu­
larly prominent bills, members want the opportunity to participate in the 
process and to understand the policy content. If large-scale policy changes 
were incorporated into omnibus bills regularly, members would miss oppor­
tunities to participate. Similarly, presidents want large-scale policy changes 
to be considered sequentially so that they can use the veto most effectively. 
Hence, leaders are unlikely to incorporate mammoth measures because 
members and the president will want traditional input on such items. Hence, 
the more prominent the bill, the less likely it is to be attached to an omnibus bill 
Governing Circumstances 
Leaders, members, and the president do not interact in a vacuum. Certain 
contextual circumstances complicate the legislative process. In such scenar­
ios, it becomes necessary to find creative ways to make policy, thus making 
omnibus use more likely. Circumstances that challenge the capabilities of 
our legislative institutions include deficit politics, divided party control, ripe 
conditions for minority obstructionism, issue fragmentation in the com­
mittee system, and burgeoning congressional workloads. The discussion of 
the theoretical framework in chapter 3 yields the following six expectations 
for omnibus packaging. 
Bills considered in periods of tight financial resources are more likely to be 
attached to omnibus bills than bills considered in periods of slack resources. 
Bills considered in divided government are more likely to be attached to 
omnibus bills than bills considered in unified government. 
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Bills considered in Congresses in which the policy distance between the House 
and Senate is great are more likely to be attached to omnibus packages than bills 
considered when the policy distance between the chambers is small. 
Bills considered when the majority is narrow and heterogeneous and the 
minority is large and unified are more likely to be attached to omnibus bills than 
bills considered when the majority is large and unified and is minority is small 
and heterogeneous. 
Bills from more fragmented issue areas are more likely to be attached to omni­
bus bills than bills from less fragmented areas. 
Bills from issue areas with large workloads are more likely to become attached 
to omnibus bills than bills from issue areas with small workloads. 
Data and Method 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is whether the 3,190 bills seriously considered in 
Congress from 1979 to 1994 were attached to an omnibus bill (coded 1) or 
not (coded 0). The dependent variable was aggregated by Congress; I did 
not conduct separate House and Senate analyses. These data were aggre­
gated because I found it impossible to break them down to distinct House 
and Senate attachment processes. At this level of analysis and stage of the 
process (in contrast to clearly delineated units of analysis like hearings and 
floor votes), lawmaking is a rather tangled business. There are several dif­
ferent ways in which leaders attach bills to omnibus packages, and separate 
attachment need not occur in both chambers. For example, Senate leaders 
may attach a bill to a House omnibus measure when the Senate is consid­
ering the House version, and vice versa. Lawmaking is not confined to the 
component institutions for neat, clean analysis to be followed by a confer­
ence committee (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997, 552). Various types 
and sequences of legislative construction within and between chambers are 
possible (C. Jones 1995; Rogers 1998). This point is especially valid for 
omnibus bills because they are prone to revision through the stages of the 
legislative process (Sinclair 1997). 
Independent Variables 
Leaders-Members Dynamic. For coding several independent variables 
("opposed in Congress," "party agenda item," "presidential agenda item," 
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"president opposed," and "distributive measure"), I used the CQ Almanac 
write-ups of bills. CQ provides in-depth information about the substance 
of legislation, bill proponents and opponents, who will benefit from the 
bill, and detailed chronologies of the process that bills followed. Several 
scholars have used these summaries to code a variety of variables for bills 
(Bader 1997; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Sinclair 1997; Taylor 1998). 
These variables require some judgment on the part of the coder (based on 
a careful reading of the CQ write-up) to discern which value a particular 
variable should take for a given bill. CQ's accessible, detailed, and clear 
summaries make such judgments less subjective. 
Omnibus legislating provides a way to enact bills that will fail alone 
in the legislative process. Bills that face opposition in Congress are more 
likely to be attached to an omnibus package than other bills. To code the 
"opposed in Congress" variable, I read the CQ write-up for each bill care­
fully. I coded 1 for those bills whose write-ups indicated a locus of opposi­
tion and 0 otherwise. Party leaders assemble omnibus bills and are expected 
to incorporate items on the party agenda. I coded the "party agenda item" 
variable as 1 if the bill was a majority party agenda item and as 0 otherwise 
from a careful reading of the CQ write-up (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 
1980-1995). There were only a few such items per Congress that met this 
criterion. In contrast, a larger proportion of bills were sponsored by a major­
ity member. Leaders are also expected to incorporate majority member bills. 
I coded the "sponsor majority" variable as 1 if the sponsor of the bill was 
a majority member and as 0 otherwise. I obtained this measure from the 
Library of Congress Thomas database. For some two dozen cases not list­
ing a sponsor, I checked LEGI-SLATE. 
Omnibus bills may provide a mechanism for enforcing distributive log-
rolls. For an indicator of "Distributive Measure," bills distributive in nature 
were coded as 1 and others were coded as 0 from a close reading of the CQ 
write-ups (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1980-1995).These measures typ­
ically consisted of traditionally distributive items like defense, transportation, 
science, and water projects. 
I argue that leaders will not abuse the omnibus method for fear of retal­
iation. Participation-deprived members might protest the incorporation of 
very large policy items into omnibus bills. In acting strategically to main­
tain their positions and the omnibus tool, leaders are less likely to attach 
very prominent bills to omnibus packages and more likely to attach smaller 
items. I measured the bill prominence variable by determining the number 
of column lines dedicated to the bill in annual CQAlmanacs (Congressional 
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Quarterly, Inc. 1980-1995). The number of column lines was coded for 
each CQ story as part of Baumgartner and Jones's Policy Agendas Project 
(Baumgartner et al. 1997). 
I included a control for whether a bill was a regular appropriations 
measure (there are 13 of these annually) because there is some indication 
that regular appropriations bills have been especially likely to become 
attached to omnibus measures by budget process design in the period 
since 1975 (Oleszek 1996; Smith 1989). Congress packaged these bills 
on four occasions in the 16 years (eight Congresses) included in my analy-
sis.1 Regular appropriations bills constituted 10.1 percent of the 511 
attachments to omnibus bills in my sample. For the appropriations vari­
able, bills were coded 1 if they were regular appropriations measures and 
0 otherwise. 
Congress-President Dynamic. Congressional leaders may act strate­
gically to veto-proof bills facing presidential opposition by attaching 
them to omnibus bills. I coded bills facing presidential opposition as 1 
and the others as 0. While accepting certain items they dislike in omnibus 
packages, presidents bargain to have their own agenda items incorporated 
in the must-pass bill. I coded bills as 1 if they were presidential items and 
as 0 otherwise. Both variables ("presidential opposition" and "presidential 
item") were coded from a careful reading of legislative summaries in CQ 
Almanac (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1980-1995). CQ provides great 
detail on the president's dealings with Congress on specific pieces of 
legislation. 
Governing Circumstances. I expected several governing circumstances 
to affect omnibus packaging. Bills considered in some periods are more likely 
to become attached to omnibus packages. My measure for the budget 
deficit was the average budget deficit or surplus, defined as a percentage of 
outlays for the twofiscal years of each Congress from the Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1996 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996). 
Unified government occurs when the houses of Congress and the 
president are controlled by the same political party. Divided government 
exists otherwise and was measured as a dummy variable (1 = divided, 0 = 
unified). To clarify, when the president's party controls only one of the 
chambers of Congress, this case is coded as divided. 
To measure the policy distance between the House and Senate, it is 
necessary to have measures of member ideology to compute a median for 
the chamber. Thankfully, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) have made their 
W-NOMINATE data publicly available. These data (the first dimension 
version) give a position for each member along a Left-Right continuum. 
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To measure the policy distance between the House and Senate per two-year 
Congress, I followed Binder (1999) in using the absolute distance between 
the House and Senate medians. 
To operationalize legislative potential for minority obstructionism, I used 
a measure developed by Hurley, Brady, and Cooper (1977). The authors 
produced a statistical measure of "legislative potential for policy change" 
that took account of the size and cohesion of the majority and minority 
parties. I measured party size as the percentage of members in the chamber. 
Cohesion is average party unity on party votes (votes on which a majority 
of one party opposes a majority of the other party). The measure is: 
(Majority Size x Majority Cohesion) — (Minority Size x Minority Cohesion) 
The measure assumes a high value when the majority is large and cohesive 
and the minority is small and heterogeneous. The measure assumes a low 
value when the majority is narrow and less unified and the minority is larger 
and unified. Conditions are ripe for policy change by the majority party in 
the former and ripe for minority obstructionism in the latter. Therefore, the 
lower the value of the variable, the more likely it is that bills will become 
attached to an omnibus bill (negative relationship). 
I used Policy Agendas Project data sets to produce measures of issue 
area fragmentation and issue area workload. I hypothesized that bills from 
fragmented issue areas were more likely to be attached to omnibus packages 
than bills from concentrated areas. To operationalize this expectation, one 
must know the state of fragmentation in the various issue areas and under 
which issue category each of the 3,190 bills belongs. I used Baumgartner 
and Jones's jurisdictional clarity index for each of 19 major topic areas to 
determine the degree of fragmentation.2 The index score ranges from a 
high of 100 to a low of 0; high scores represent tight jurisdictions in one 
or a few committees, and low scores represent an issue spread across many 
committees. I subtracted these values from 100 so that more dispersed issue 
areas would take a higher value than concentrated areas. In sum, each bill 
takes one of 19 values for the issue area fragmentation variable based on 
the fragmentation of its issue area. 
It is a challenge to identify a measure that fully taps the workload of 
Congress. An ideal measure of workload would include committee activity 
because committees are the workshops of Congress. I measured issue area 
workload as the number of committee hearings held in the issue area to 
which the bill belongs. This measure was produced from data in the Policy 
Agendas Project congressional hearings data set. 
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Methods 
The dependent variable is dichotomous (attached to omnibus or not). The 
model, therefore, lends itself to logistic regression or probit analysis. Re­
sults with either logit or probit are essentially the same. I used logit analysis 
because of ease of computation and presentation of substantive probabilities. 
To show substantive effects, I present the change in probability of being 
attached to an omnibus bill under different values of the independent vari­
ables (Greene 1993, 638-41). For dummy variables (e.g., status of party 
affiliation of the bill sponsor), I report the change in probability from .5 
if the variable goes from 0 to 1. For interval variables (e.g., bill prominence 
and committee fragmentation), I report the change in probability from .5 
if these variables change one and two standard deviations. Since the logit 
curve is steepest at .5 probability, these estimates indicate the maximum 
impact these variables can have. 
My data were time-series cross-sectional—one large data matrix with 
observations from all of the eight Congresses "pooled" together. It was, how­
ever, cross-sectionally dominant, containing nearly 400 observations for 
each of the eight time increments. The logit technique I used assumes tem­
poral independence. To use a phrase from a recent statistical essay, I "took 
time seriously' to make sure that my findings were not the spurious result 
of hidden time variation (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998,1260). Such hid­
den variation can drive up / scores, potentially leading to the acceptance 
of hypotheses that are not really supported. I checked for this potential 
problem by introducing, as Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) suggested, a 
dummy variable for each Congress. I found that no one Congress of the 
eight was significantly independent from the others.3 
Findings 
The first pair of columns (for model 1) in Table 5.1 present a logit analysis 
of the effects of independent variables on the omnibus attachment process. 
The results of the analysis support my empirical expectations about the two 
dynamics of omnibus legislation and contextual factors. 
The base expectation that omnibus bills provide a way around opposi­
tion is strongly supported. Bills facing opposition in Congress are 30 per­
cent more likely than other bills to be attached to an omnibus bill. Those 
facing presidential opposition are 39 percent more likely to gain attachment. 
These maximum impacts (p's) are among the strongest in the model. 
Other variables for party leader and member incentives for omnibus 
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Table 5.1 
Logit Models of the Omnibus Attachment Process, 1979-94 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Expected b b 
Variable Direction (t) Ap (t) Ap 
Leader-Member Dynamic 
Opposed in Congress + 1.374*** .30 L204** .26 
(4.38) (2.96) 
Party agenda measure + 1.253** .27 1.231** .26 
(2.57) (2.71) 
Distributive measure + 1.000*** .23 .965** .23 
(4.19) (3.81) 
Sponsor majority? + .785*** .19 .786*** .19 
(3.34) (3.74) 
Appropriations + 2.079*** .39 2.054*** .39 
(6.40) (6.73) 
Congress-President Dynamic 
President opposed + 2.094*** .39 2.063*** .39 
(6.30) (5.57) 
Presidential bill + 1.065*** .24 1.078*** .25 
(3.93) (3.89) 
Boundary Effect 
Prominence of bill — -.005* -.44 -.004* -.45 
(-2.07) (-.48) (-2.17) (-.49) 
Political Contexts 
Deficit politics + .248* .13 .236* .12 
(2.08) (.20) (2.01) (•20) 
Divided government + .684*** .17 .675*** .16 
(4.18) (3.94) 
Bicameral differences + .736* .16 .750* .18 
(1.88) (1-73) 
Legislative potential for — -.017* -.23 -.016* -.23 
minority obstructionism (-2.97) (-.28) (-1.83) (-.28) 
Issue area fragmentation + .025** .36 .027** .38 
(2.87) (.41) (2.72) (.43) 
Issue area workload + .002 .003 
(1.22) (1.24) 
Interactive Effects 
Distributive measure x + — — 1.572** .33 
Sponsor majority? (2-54) 
Party agenda measure X + — — 1.834** .37 
President opposed (2.71) 
Deficit politics x + — — .184* .19 
Bill opposed in Congress (2.06) 
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Table 5.1 
{continued) 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Expected b b 
Variable Direction (t) Ap (t) Ap 
Deficit politics x + — — .056 
President opposed C86) 
Divided government x + — — .845** .19 
President opposed (2.77) 
Issue fragmentation x + — — .051* 2S 
Bill opposed in Congress (2.19) (.35) 
Issue area workload X + — — .039 
Bill opposed in Congress (1-15) 
Deficit politics x + — — .349** .24 
Distributive measure (2.57) (29) 
Constant -4.069*** -3.723*** 
(-5.97) (-5.81) 
Percentage in modal category 83.98 83.98 
Percentage correctly predicted 89.08 89.79 
Proportional reduction in error .32 .36 
Model X2 469.3*** 498.6*** 
N of cases 3,190 3,190 
Note: The dependent variable was coded 1 if the bill was attached to an omnibus measure 
and 0 if not. 
*/<.O5, **/><.01, ***/><. 001, one-tailed; two-tailed test used for constant. 
use also significantly increase the chances that a bill will be attached to an 
omnibus package. Party agenda designation increases the chances of attach­
ment by over one-fourth. Distributive measures and majority member-
sponsored bills are about one-fifth more likely to be attached to omnibus 
bills than other bills. 
The results suggest that the president has an incentive to enter an 
omnibus bargain. Presidential draft designation increases the chances of 
attachment by about one-fourth. As expected, the control for appropria­
tions bills is significant. General appropriations bills are 39 percent more 
likely to be attached to omnibus bills than other bills. 
The results also suggest that omnibus employment operates within 
certain limits. The expectation that leaders will refrain from attaching par­
ticularly prominent bills to omnibus packages because of fear of member 
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and presidential retaliation is quite strongly supported. When the promi­
nence of the bills moves from the mean to one standard deviation above, 
the probability of attachment is reduced 44 percent (48 percent from the 
mean to two standard deviations above). This substantive impact is the 
strongest in the model. 
Political circumstances affect the probability that a bill will be attached 
to an omnibus package. When budget deficits increase from the mean to one 
and two standard deviations above it, bills are 13 percent and 20 percent 
more likely to gain attachment.4 This finding is consistent with scholars7 
arguments about the rise of omnibus legislation (Oleszek 1996; Sinclair 
1997; Smith 1989). It is a significant finding, yet somewhat modest in 
impact compared to findings for other variables. 
Issue fragmentation in committee provides the more substantial con­
textual finding. Bills from issue areas fragmented across many committees 
are significantly more likely to be attached to omnibus bills. When issue 
area fragmentation increases from the mean to one standard deviation above 
it, bills are 36 percent more likely to gain attachment (at two standard devi­
ations, the odds increase an additional 5 percent). 
As expected, divided government significantly affects omnibus usage. 
Bills considered in times of divided government are 17 percent more likely 
to be attached to omnibus bills than bills considered in times of unified 
government. Additionally, House and Senate differences (bicameral dif­
ferences) increase the likelihood that bills will be attached to an omnibus 
bill by 14 percent. This finding is consistent with Binder's (1999) evidence 
that bicameral disagreements lead to legislative gridlock. Omnibus bills 
help congressional chambers avert such a stalemate. 
The existence of conditions ripe for minority obstructionism also in­
creases the chances of hitching a ride on the omnibus. When the "legisla­
tive potential for minority obstructionism" variable moves from the mean 
to one standard deviation below, bills are 23 percent more likely to be 
attached to omnibus bills. Finally, the issue area workload variable misses 
significance. Bills from issue areas with large workloads are no more likely 
to be attached to omnibus bills when other factors are considered. 
Interactive Effects 
Many readers have by now considered the possibility of interactive effects 
between independent variables in the model. When bills satisfy dual con­
ditions, they might be especially likely to gain attachment to an omnibus 
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bill. To gauge this possibility, I ran a second omnibus attachment model 
and introduced several interactive terms into the analysis. I considered two 
types of interactions. 
The first type of interaction I considered was between variables at the 
strategic or micro level of analysis (variables from the leader-member and 
Congress-president discussions). Two such interactions make omnibus 
attachment especially likely. First, party leaders have an incentive to help 
majority members bring pork projects to their district. Hence, distributive 
bills sponsored by majority members are especially likely to be attached to omnibus 
bills. Second, party leaders may include party agenda items in omnibus pack­
ages when the president opposes them. Therefore,^?*/)/ agenda items that face 
presidential opposition are especially likely to be attached to omnibus packages. 
Second, I considered the linkage between the micro level (strategic or 
political actor level) and the macro level (political contexts). The two insti­
tutional dynamics and the contextual factors probably have joint impact. 
When certain micro-level and macro-level conditions exist, bills meeting 
both will be especially likely to be attached to omnibus bills. Given the 
number of variables in the baseline model, the number of micro-macro 
level interactions could be endless. Therefore, I chose a select few on the 
basis of the stage of lawmaking in which the contextual effects ought to 
exhibit an impact (the members-leaders stage or the Congress-president 
stage). Deficit politics manifests stress in all stages of lawmaking. Divided 
government strains relations between Congress and the president. Issue 
fragmentation and workload are congressional problems. Since omnibus 
bills at their base are a way to get around opposition, I linked the context 
variables with the appropriate opposition variable ("opposed in Congress" 
or "president opposed").5 
I also included an interaction between the deficit politics and distrib­
utive item variables. Scholars have argued that the proliferation of deficits 
makes it harder to create distributive logrolls (e.g., Smith 1989). Congress 
has trouble defending particularistic items to the public while deficits 
climb ever higher. Omnibus legislating keeps distributive lawmaking alive 
by providing a way to hide such items behind the larger, more visible 
nucleus of the omnibus bill. Hence, distributive bills considered in periods of 
high deficits are more likely to be attached to omnibus bills than other bills. 
The second pair of columns (for model 2) in Table 5.1 present the 
results. Overall, the interactions appear to help the robustness of the model. 
The proportional reduction in error increases from 32 percent to 36 per­
cent and the model chi-square climbs from 469 to 499. The strategic-level 
interactions receive strong support. Distributive bills sponsored by majority 
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members are 33 percent more likely than other bills to gain incorporation 
into omnibus bills. Party agenda items that face presidential opposition 
are 37 percent more likely than other bills to be attached to omnibus pack­
ages. These maximum potential impacts are in addition to the increased 
probability produced by the individual variables that survives from the 
baseline model. 
The expectation of additional interplay between contextual and micro-
level factors receives some support. Some of the interactions of the con­
textual factors with the main bill opposition variables additionally affect 
the chances of becoming attached to an omnibus bill. When budget deficits 
worsen and bills are opposed by the president, bills are 19 percent more 
likely to gain attachment. When bills are opposed by the president in divided 
government, the chances of becoming attached to an omnibus bill increase 
19 percent. When issue fragmentation increases from the mean to one 
standard deviation above it and bills are opposed in Congress, it is 28 per­
cent more likely that they will hitch a ride. Moving the issue fragmenta­
tion value to two standard deviations increases the probability an additional 
7 percent. Finally, when the deficit politics variable increases from the 
mean to one standard deviation above it and a bill is distributive, the bill is 
24 percent more likely to become attached to an omnibus bill. 
Two of the interactions do not reach standard levels of statistical sig­
nificance. When budget deficits worsen and bills are opposed by the pres­
ident, there appears to be no additional probability that bills will hitch a 
ride. When workload increases and bills are opposed in Congress, there 
appears to be no additional interactive effect either. Still, the significant 
interactive term findings suggest that some interplay exists between the 
micro- and macro-level components of the model. 
Discussion 
In this chapter, I sought to shed light on the use of omnibus legislation by 
investigating why some bills may circumvent the legislative gauntlet by gain­
ing attachment to omnibus bills while most must "go it alone." I developed 
alternative explanations of omnibus packaging based on the two steps of 
lawmaking (passing Congress and the president's desk) and by considering 
the impact of environmental factors. 
My analysis of the omnibus attachment process from 1979 to 1994 sup­
ported several of the empirical expectations developed from the theoreti­
cal framework of chapter 3. These results suggest that leaders, members, and 
the president all gain something in striking omnibus bargains. Omnibus 
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legislation is put together within some limits drawn by the actors; particu­
larly prominent attachments are less likely to be attached. The actors also 
find omnibus bills more useful in particular contextual circumstances. Con­
sistent with scholars' arguments, a tough budgetary situation and divided 
government increase the likelihood of omnibus usage. However, the strongest 
contextual impact is increasing issue fragmentation between committees, 
an explanation not much considered by scholars or political pundits. 
These findings suggest two implications for our understanding of law­
making and institutional change. First, they suggest that the use of omni­
bus legislation benefits actors in the process politically and permits our 
lawmaking institutions to adapt to tough governing circumstances. Scholars 
studying congressional change have tended to pick one category of expla­
nation over another, either politics or institutional adaptation. The evidence 
in this chapter suggests an important role for multiple explanations. At the 
micro level, omnibus bills serve the goals of partisan politics (omnibus bills 
are a powerful tool of party leaders and the majority party), efficiency 
(omnibus legislating provides a way around jurisdictional gridlock), and 
logrolling (omnibus bills help create distributive logrolls). At the level of 
the institution, omnibus packaging provides a way to adapt to difficult 
governing circumstances like deficit politics and issue fragmentation. 
This study suggests that these competing explanations might be linked in 
a broader theory of institutional change. 
Second, this chapter joins other studies that demonstrate the impor­
tance of studying lawmaking in Congress in stages before the floor (e.g., 
Hall and Wayman 1990; Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998; Taylor 1998). 
Omnibus legislating in effect inserts an important decision about policy 
outcomes (what will be incorporated into a must-pass bill) into the prefloor 
legislative process. Once attached, a bill is almost certain to succeed; the 
floor vote on an omnibus bill is a formality. Despite recent advances by 
legislative scholars who are investigating the mysteries of prefloor policy 
making, floor vote studies continue to dominate legislative scholarship. 
Given the on-line resources available today, researchers should focus 
more of their attention on prefloor lawmaking in Congress. For example, 
a staggering 86 percent of bills fail in the first step of the process, between 
committee referral and committee hearings (Oleszek 1996). Which theo­
ries of congressional organization best explain why 14 percent of bills move 
on to committee consideration and the others do not? We need to exam­
ine with more zeal questions such as this about the earlier stages of the 
legislative process to gain a fuller understanding of how policy is made in 
Congress. 
6

Explaining the Move to 
Omnibus Legislation 
In 1930, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Trade Act, a major piece of 
legislation that raised U.S. tariffs on over 20,000 durable items to record 
levels and lengthened the Great Depression.1 
The tariff legislation originated in the House as a single bill and was 
processed through a single standing committee, Ways and Means. Hear­
ings were held for 43 days and five evenings in the period from January 7 
until February 25,1929. More than 1,100 witnesses appeared in all. Prior 
to full House approval on May 28,1929, the legislation was debated on 
the floor for 19 hours and six minutes.2 
Hearings on the Senate version of the bill were held by the Senate 
Finance Committee from June 13 through July 18, 1929. In addition to 
these hearings, executive sessions of the Finance Committee were held 
throughout the summer to discuss the tariff bill. Debate on the bill in the 
full Senate began on September 12, 1929. The final floor vote occurred 
several months later on March 24,1930. By June 13,1930, conference reports 
were approved by both chambers. The final House vote was 222 to 153. 
The final Senate vote was 44 to 42. 
Fifty-eight years later, Congress enacted the massive Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988.3 "A dramatically worsening trade and 
investment deficit in the 1980s encouraged many in Congress to fashion a 
comprehensive policy to stabilize and improve the American position.... 
This was an issue requiring enormous scope since trading problems involve 
the nation's economic, political, and social structure" (C.Jones 1994,231). 
In contrast to the 1930 trade act, which was processed as a single mea­
sure through a single standing committee, the 1988 measure was the result 
of bundling scores of different bills emanating from numerous different 
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House standing committees and many more subcommittees. In total, the 
omnibus trade bill spanned the jurisdictions of 14 House committees, 13 
House subcommittees, and nine Senate committees. 
While one has to look hard to find participation of party leaders in the 
1930 act (see Schattschneider 1935; Chamberlain 1946 does not men­
tion the role of party leaders), the majority party leadership ran the trade 
policy-making process in the 1980s. Coordination was necessary to guide 
the activities of the numerous committees involved and to bundle the bill 
between committee and thefloor. While floor consideration lasted for weeks 
in the House and months in the Senate on the 1930 act and altered the bill 
in important ways, the 1988 omnibus trade bill was considered on the House 
floor for one day (under a special rule) and on the Senate floor (designed 
by the founders to be more deliberative than the House) for four weeks. 
Little changed in the 1988 omnibus trade bill on the floor; the prefloor 
process directed by the party leaders was where the important decisions were 
made about the content of policy. 
A common feature of omnibus legislating is supermajority support on 
final floor passage. Such wide margins exist because so many actors favor 
at least some part of the grand compromise reflected in the omnibus pack­
age. The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act was no different; 
both votes on final passage involved majorities approaching 90 percent. 
The final votes on the omnibus trade bill were 376 to 45 in the House and 
85 to 11 in the Senate. These margins stand in sharp contrast to closer votes 
taken on the final versions of the 1930 trade bill (222 to 153 in the House 
and 44 to 42 in the Senate). 
These brief case histories of two major trade acts set apart 58 years in time 
show how much the legislative process has changed. Why did it change? 
What occurred between 1930 and 1988 that changed so dramatically the 
process by which laws are made? I take up those questions in this chapter 
by exploring the factors that explain the aggregate trends in omnibus leg­
islating from 1949 to 1994. 
Scholars typically discuss the omnibus revolution and its causes from 
an aggregate or macro-level perspective (Baumgartner et al. 1997; R.H. 
Davidson and Oleszek 1994,1998; Oleszek 1989; Smith 1989). The typ­
ical question raised is: Why have omnibus bills proliferated? The analysis 
in this chapter addresses this broad question directly and provides a second 
test of the theoretical framework of chapter 3. The micro-level incentives 
to package bills explored in chapter 5 in the "hitching-a-ride analysis" from 
1979 to 1994 arguably hold across most of the twentieth century. That is, 
 79 Explaining the Move to Omnibus Legislating
the attachment focus is helpful for explaining why some bills were attached 
while most were not once omnibus use had proliferated. A longitudinal 
test, however, is definitely needed to isolate the factors that drove the move 
to omnibus legislating in the first place. Additionally, there is a strong rela­
tionship between this chapter and the previous one: factors that contribute 
to an increased use of omnibus legislation in the aggregate should also 
contribute to an increased likelihood that any one policy proposal will be 
incorporated into an omnibus bill. 
I next review the empirical expectations from the theoretical framework 
as they relate to aggregate trends in omnibus use. Then I present the data, 
method, and findings. 
Macro-Level Explanations of the Move to 
Omnibus Legislating 
At any one point in time, the coalition-building process operates under a 
particular set of governing or contextual circumstances. Looking across 
time, we see that contextual circumstances change. Political actors seeking 
to build support for the trade legislation in 1930 faced a very different set 
of contextual circumstances than the actors did in 1988. In 1930, the pol­
icy agenda was comparatively small and simple, the committee system was 
set up parsimoniously to process such a comparatively simple agenda, 
unified government existed (Republicans controlled both branches), and 
deficits were not a pressing issue. 
In contrast, the contextual circumstances in 1988 (divided government, 
an enormous and complex issue agenda, a fragmented committee system, 
and looming budget deficits) complicated the legislative process and made 
it particularly necessary for congressional institutions to find creative ways 
to make policy. Hence, changes such as omnibus legislation were needed to 
adapt to such tough circumstances so that institutions might endure. In such 
scenarios, the political actors have more to gain by striking omnibus bar­
gains as a way to get what they want. 
The budget situations in 1930 and 1988 were entirely different. Deficits 
were not an issue in 1930. In contrast, the 1980s were shadowed by loom­
ing deficits. Deficit politics severely constrains lawmaking and makes it 
harder to get anything done. This factor tops many scholars' lists as a cause 
of the omnibus revolution and represents one way that the contexts of the 
1930 and 1988 trade acts were different. One way for the players (leaders­
members, Congress-president) to conduct business in such an environment 
is to use omnibus bills. 
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Deficit Politics Hypothesis: Omnibus use will be higher in periods of 
tight financial resources than in periods of slack resources.4 
Another challenging contextual circumstance for lawmaking arises when 
the branches of the national government exhibit divided party control. Such 
was the case in 1988 but not in 1930. Under divided government, Congress 
tends to oppose the president's initiatives and the president blocks the 
majority party's items. Omnibus bargains are expected to be struck in this 
environment of uncertainty 
Divided Government Hypothesis: Omnibus usage will be higher in 
periods of divided government than in periods of unified government. 
A formidable governing situation occurs when the House and Senate 
differ in their policy preferences. When the chambers exhibit such dis­
agreement, gridlock may result. Omnibus bills may be employed in such 
an arrangement as a means of bargaining. Each chamber can potentially 
get what it wants in omnibus bills, but it also has to accept some of the 
other chamber's initiatives. 
Bicameral Differences Hypothesis: Omnibus use will be higher when 
the policy distance between the House and Senate is greater and will 
be lower when the policy distance between the chambers is small. 
Minority obstructionism provides a challenging governing situation 
for legislative institutions. Certain governing conditions are riper for minor­
ity obstructionism than others. The most ideal conditions for the majority 
party are when the majority party is large and cohesive and the minority is 
small and heterogeneous. In that case, the majority party can push through 
its favored policies. In contrast, a more daunting task faces the majority 
party when the majority party is small and not unified and the minority is 
larger and unified. In these times we expect the majority party to look for 
special legislative procedures for moving their agenda by an obstructive 
minority. 
Legislative Potential for Minority Obstructionism Hypothesis: 
Omnibus use will be higher when the majority is narrow and 
heterogeneous and the minority is large and will be lower when 
the majority is large and unified and the minority is small and 
heterogeneous. 
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A less studied but important contextual factor is the complexity of the 
policy agenda. Issue complexity refers to the degree of concentration of con­
gressional attention to particular issues. An issue agenda is more complex 
when attention is dispersed across many issues (like the crowded policy 
agenda facing Congress in 1988) and less complex when attention is devoted 
to a few main issues (as in 1930, when trade and agriculture were the main 
issues; see Chamberlain 1946). A more complex issue agenda is more com­
plicated to process as a whole than one focused on just a few issues. 
The way increased issue complexity manifests itself is in committee 
fragmentation. The congressional committee system was developed in the 
1946 reorganization of Congress, when, as Baumgartner, Jones, and Mac-
Leod (2000) showed, just a few main issues were on the agenda. Since that 
time, several new issues have appeared on the agenda and do not fit into 
one committee's jurisdiction. These issues include health care and environ­
mental policy. Moreover, certain established issues like trade policy have 
expanded and been redefined. As a result, issues have increasingly been 
considered in more than one principal committee. Issues increasingly 
"spill over" several committees. This jurisdictional fragmentation becomes 
a structural strain on the institution. While sharing issues between com­
mittees allows institutions the flexibility to address new and expanding 
issues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; King 1997; Talbert, Jones, and Baum­
gartner 1995), it also makes coordination a big challenge. In a highly frag­
mented committee system, omnibus bills are a way to make policy because 
they centralize authority with party leaders. Hence, they provide a better 
way to coordinate legislative activities than traditional lawmaking in the 
face of increasing issue complexity and committee fragmentation. 
Issue Complexity Hypothesis: Omnibus use will be higher when the 
agenda complexity is high and lower when it is low. 
The congressional workload was decidedly lighter in 1930 than in 1988. 
Increasing workload is a final strain on a lawmaking institution that may 
introduce uncertainty into lawmaking, bringing more pressure through 
increased demands on time. This scenario creates a situation where a leg­
islative technique is needed to make lawmaking more efficient. Omnibus 
bills are larger and are processed more quickly than traditional bills; thus, 
they may provide an efficient way to conduct legislative business. 
Workload Hypothesis: Higher levels of omnibus use are expected 
when the congressional workload increases. 
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Data and Method 
The dependent variable is the proportion of major bills that are omnibus 
bills per two-year Congress from 1949 to 1994 (see chapter 4 for details of 
measurement). 
Level of Aggregation 
I conducted separate analyses for the House and Senate even though the 
dependent-variable values varied little by chamber (most omnibus bills had 
companion measures). I did separate chamber runs for two reasons. First, 
the House and Senate have different rules (the House more majoritarian, 
the Senate more individual and minority rights oriented) that may yield 
different results. Second, the total number of cases was 23. Therefore, 
modeling the chambers separately helped reduce the total degrees of free­
dom because separate House and Senate values for an independent variable 
were not needed in the same model. I will now discuss the operationaliza­
tion of the independent variables not already discussed in chapter 5.5 
Issue Complexity 
Issue complexity refers to the degree of concentration of congressional atten­
tion to particular issues. Using the Baumgartner and Jones topic categories, 
a measure of issue concentration by Congress can be computed on the basis 
of all congressional hearings that constitutes the measure for issue complex­
ity in the longitudinal analysis (Baumgartner et al. 1997). Each congres­
sional hearing was coded into a major issue topic category. The measure of 
topic concentration is a Herfindahl score (see Hardin 1998), based on the 
sum of squares of the proportions of statutes or stories or column lines in 
each topic area. A high score reflects congressional attention dedicated to 
a few topics, as was the case just after World War II. A low score indicates 
congressional attention spread more evenly across all topics. I subtracted 
these values from 100, so high scores reflect greater issue complexity. 
Workload 
My measure of House and Senate workload per two-year Congress taps 
committee activity as well as floor activity. The chief way that committees 
accomplish their consideration of policy is through committee hearings. I 
operationalized the House and Senate workload by a composite measure 
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of committee hearings and floor activity. The measure ranges from 0 to 1. 
Up to .5 is for floor activity, and up to .5 is for committee activity. Floor 
activity was measured as the number of floor votes in the House or Senate 
per Congress and committee activity as the number of committee hearings 
in a particular Congress in each chamber. The highest of the floor votes of 
the 23 Congresses from 1949 to 1994 received a full .5. The value from the 
other 22 Congresses was divided by the highest value to produce a propor­
tion of the highest value (from 0 to 1). This proportion was then divided 
in half. The same procedure was used for the hearings for the other .5 of 
the composite. The two halves of the composite were added together for 
each Congress to produce the final value of the variable. 
Methods 
Since the dependent variable is continuous, the House and Senate models 
had the potential to be estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) regres­
sion analysis. However, tests for serial autocorrelation in both the House 
and Senate models were positive and significant.6 Therefore, I used maxi-
mum-likelihood iterated generalized least squares. Advanced time-series 
methods (Box-Tiao and ARIMA models) were not advisable because 
the total number of observations was 23 (23 two-year Congresses, 1949­
1994). 
In addition to potential autocorrelation problems, it is important to 
check for heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. As Peter Kennedy (1992) 
advised, I checked for the former through visual inspection by plotting the 
residuals on a graph. This plot revealed similar magnitudes of the residuals 
regardless of the values of different independent variables, indicating no 
problem of heteroskedasticity. I checked for problems of multicollinearity 
in two ways. First, I ran simple correlations between the variables. Damo­
dar Gujarati (1995) pointed to a .8 correlation between two independent 
variables as a threshold above which collinearity becomes a particular prob­
lem (335). The highest pairwise correlation I have is less than .5. 
As a second check for multicollinearity problems, I regressed each inde­
pendent variable on the other independent variables, as suggested by Rus­
sell Davidson and James MacKinnon (1984). This exercise produced only 
one notable finding. Over half of the variance in the divided government 
variable is explained by the other variables in the model. However, this in 
no way approaches perfect multicollinearity (R. Davidson and MacKinnon 
1984). Lawrence Kliens (1962) rule of thumb suggests that multicollinear­
ity may be a troublesome problem only if the R2 from an auxiliary regression 
84 Chapter 6 
is greater than the overall R2 of the model (101). The highest R2 I obtain 
in an auxiliary regression is .51. The model R2 values shown below are 
greater than .80. 
Findings 
Table 6.1 presents the results of the second test of my theoretical frame-
work—the House and Senate longitudinal analyses that seek explanations 
of aggregate omnibus usage per Congress from 1949 to 1994. The macro-
level part of the theoretical model I developed in chapter 3 receives solid 
support. This particular test is an important one for gauging the impact of 
the contextual variables because we expect many of them to be time vari­
ant (the better tests of the dynamics between members-leaders and Con-
gress-president are found in the omnibus attachment model in chapter 5). 
All in all, these findings suggest that the changing political context 
is an important explanation of the move to omnibus legislation and 
deserves a place in the theoretical framework. Several of the contextual 
Table 6.1 
Models of House and Senate Omnibus Usage per Congress, 
1949-1994 
House Senate 
Expected 
Independent Variables Direction B B / 
Budget deficit - .378** -2.496 -.374** -2.561 
Divided government + .126 1.959 .110* 1.924 
Legislative potential for - -.384** 2.671 -.262* 2.234 
minority obstructionism 
Bicameral differences + .223* 1.754 .246* 1.863 
Issue complexity + .365** 2.504 .395** 2.795 
Workload + .131* 2.406 .118 1.528 
(Constant) -.227* -2.176 -.194* -2.276 
R2 .871 .846 
Adj. A2 .858 .818 
F statistic 24.438 .000 23.097 .000 
N of cases 23 23 
; The dependent variable in both models is the proportion of major bills per Congress 
that are omnibus bills (see chap. 4 for details of measurement). Models estimated with 
maximum-likelihood iterated generalized least squares. 
m
*p < .05. p < .01. ***/> < .001. 
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factors that we expected to affect omnibus lawmaking received support, 
including the budget deficit, divided government, bicameral differences, 
potential for minority obstructionism, and issue complexity. Additionally, 
the findings suggest a mix of politics explanations (change as a means of 
distributing power) and efficiency explanations (benefiting the operation 
of the institution). 
However, the institutional explanations overall are stronger, especially 
the variable tapping into increasing issue complexity/committee fragmen­
tation of congressional institutions. Issue complexity had a strong contex­
tual coefficient in both of the longitudinal regression models. As the 
complexity of House and Senate issue agendas increases, omnibus bills are 
more likely to be used. This finding is consistent with Baumgartner et al/s 
(1997) argument that the rise of omnibus legislation is related to the increas­
ing issue complexity facing Congress in the post-World War II era. 
As many legislative scholars have argued (R. H. Davidson and Oleszek 
1998; Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1997; Smith 1989), the specter of deficit 
politics appears to be part of the answer to the "Why omnibus?" question. 
As deficits climb, so too does omnibus use. 
The variables concerning the legislative potential for minority obstruc­
tionism are also significant. The more challenging the coalitional circum­
stances for the majority party (i.e., a narrow and/or heterogeneous majority 
governing against a large and/or cohesive minority), the more likely it is that 
omnibus bills will be used as a way to get things done. This finding was 
stronger for the House than for the minority rights-oriented Senate. This 
difference may result from the fact that obstructionism in the Senate is less 
dependent on coalition size (any Senator may filibuster) than the House. 
Statistically speaking, divided government is significantly more likely to 
result in omnibus use than unified government. However, the low values of 
the its suggest that the substantive effect is marginal. Finally, the congres­
sional workload variable is significant in the House model but not in the 
Senate model. This finding makes sense because the House has more mem­
bers and is a larger institution than the Senate. Various workload pressures— 
bill introductions, committee hearings, recorded roll call votes—are greater 
in the House than in the Senate (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1996). 
In summary, the findings support the contextual expectations of the 
theoretical framework. Omnibus bill use is related to several of the chal­
lenging contextual circumstances, and political as well as efficiency rationales 
for the change are supported. Since several such governing circumstances 
have confronted Congress, the political actors have found omnibus bills to 
be a useful tool for getting things done. 
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As scholars have suspected, deficit politics, divided government, and 
increased potential for minority obstructionism are all related to aggregate 
omnibus use. Issue complexity also exhibits a strong relationship with 
omnibus use. This finding, together with the strong issue fragmentation 
finding in the "hitching-a-ride" model (chapter 5), suggests that the increas­
ing issue complexity of the congressional agenda is a strong influence on 
omnibus legislating. 
Discussion 
Omnibus legislating is a powerful legislative technique whose use has ex­
panded on Capitol Hill in the post-World War II era. Several scholars 
argue that the rise of omnibus legislation is one of the most important 
changes in recent decades. Much major lawmaking is undertaken with this 
method, and a significant proportion of legislative initiatives in Congress 
see the light at the end of the legislative process because they become 
attached to omnibus bills. Omnibus bills alter the traditional lawmaking 
process in many ways, affect the processing of issues, and alter the set of 
policy outcomes produced. The purpose of this chapter was to explain the 
move across time to omnibus legislating. The findings of a longitudinal test 
support the framework and suggest dual motives driving omnibus use: 
politics and efficiency. Where does this leave us? 
I think if we ponder in chronological order the unfolding of the omni­
bus change and the effects of that change to issue processing in Congress, 
a strong argument may be made for the coevolution of issues and institu­
tional structures (Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000). Institutional 
structures are not entirely exogenous. Important decisions about how insti­
tutions are set up are made endogenously. Similarly, issues are not entirely 
endogenous to institutions. The grouping of issues facing congressional 
institutions affects institutional development. That is, issues and institutions 
affect one another in a relationship that unfolds across time. 
Issue complexity and the issue fragmentation that results when new 
issues and redefined old ones are again and again forced into the categories 
of a committee system that was developed in the 1940s (Baumgartner et 
al. 1997) have created a governing challenge for political actors in Con­
gress. Omnibus legislation provides one way to more efficiently process leg­
islation centrally with the party leaders rather than leaving some matters to 
be settled by scores of committee barons who guard their committee's turf. 
Thus, the finding that the issue complexity variable was strongly significant 
in the longitudinal analysis should not surprise. 
 87 Explaining the Move to Omnibus Legislating
The second step is also consistent with the coevolution of issues and 
structures framework. Once adopted as a viable institutional mechanism, 
the omnibus method dramatically affects the processing of issues. Issues 
that have become too controversial and stand no chance in the legislative 
process may be veto-proofed in an omnibus bill. This changes the com­
position of policy outcomes from what would be produced if bills were 
processed sequentially. 
Next in the temporal sequence, the entrenched new technique affects 
the balance of power in Congress. The omnibus technique empowers party 
leaders. Party leaders' ability to bundle bills is a powerful policy tool. 
Omnibus lawmaking is detrimental to the power of committee chairs. 
Omnibus bills rarely go through authorizing committees. Hence, the com­
mittee chairs never see omnibus provisions of policy that are pertinent to 
their committee's jurisdiction. Put another way, the tough governing cir­
cumstances increasingly present across the post—World War II period 
created institutional conditions requiring stronger central authority among 
party leaders. One of the tools needed to exercise this authority was omni­
bus legislating. 
Rohde's (1991) theory of conditional party government (see also Rohde 
and Aldrich 1998) argues that stronger party leadership is needed more 
under certain conditions than others. In the case of omnibus legislation, 
the committee fragmentation that has increasingly characterized the con­
gressional committee system (together with other factors like divided gov­
ernment) has created a situation where strong party leadership is needed by 
Congress. 
The Birth of Omnibus Legislating: 
Why the 81st Congress Bundled 
the Budget 
Once institutions start down a particular path, they tend to stay on it. The 
very essence of path dependency is that subsequent decisions about insti­
tutional design are constrained by previous ones (Aldrich 1995; Binder 
1997; King 1997). Congressional development is no exception. Legislative 
scholars increasingly emphasize the importance of an institution's path. 
Binder (1997) demonstrated the important effect of inherited proce­
dures on the adoption of new rules of minority rights and majority rule 
across the history of the House and Senate. She documented the Senate's 
desire to become more majoritarian like its sister chamber (by seeking the 
adoption of chamber rules that would limit minority obstructionism) in the 
latter nineteenth century. However, Senators lacked a previous-question 
motion like that of the House with which to move such decisions through 
the process. Therefore, numerous Senate efforts failed. Many decades ear­
lier, Senators, with little thought about future consequences, had removed 
the previous-question motion procedure from the Senate rules because it 
was being minimally used. Thus, a quickly made decision in the early 1800s 
affected Senate changes sought in the late 1800s. Inherited rules matter. 
Along similar lines, King (1997) demonstrated that committee juris­
dictional change is typically made through common-law advances (via bill 
referrals to committee) and not through exogenously determined reforms. 
More specifically, most new bill referrals are built off existing ones. Later, 
in formal reforms, the common-law changes are codified. By this same 
logic, the stage was set for further omnibus use once the first mega-bill was 
passed. Omnibus legislating was then seen as a viable method for moving 
policy through a difficult legislative process. 
Public policy scholars also appreciate the importance of path depen­
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dency in policy decision making (Bosso 1987; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
For example, when a city initially decides to improve transportation policy 
through one method (e.g., more freeways or more mass transit), the city 
ventures down a path where more of the same is likely. Houston picked free­
ways and has continued that approach through a massive growth period. 
New York chose mass transit (first the subway and then buses as well) and 
has largely stayed on that path. 
More specifically, path dependency occurs because the costs associated 
with creating a new method are too high to bear when a proven method 
already exists. Formal structures (as in the case of urban transportation or 
formal changes in minority rights in Congress; Binder 1997) and/or infor­
mal ones (as in the case of jurisdictional change in the congressional com­
mittee system; King 1997) are in place that increase the opportunity costs 
to veer from the path. If policy makers veered entirely off track in these 
areas, tremendous costs would be associated with new efforts. Urban pol­
icy makers would be required to recreate an urban transportation system 
from the ground up. Members of Congress would have to write a new book 
of rules. Congress would be required to formally adjust the jurisdictions of 
all committees. 
The rise of omnibus legislating over the post-World War II period pro­
duced similar formal and informal structures that increased the opportunity 
costs to diverge from the technique. On the informal side, congressional 
chambers and their members have become accustomed to some bundling 
of bills in the legislative process as a means of getting something done in 
a chaotic political process. The omnibus technique helps Congress get some 
lawmaking done that might not otherwise get done, and players on the Hill 
now just see it as a part of what they do (Staff Interviews 2000). 
This informal omnibus structure is not something you can pick up and 
look at, like a book of legislative rules or a master plan for urban trans­
portation. In this regard, the informal structure on omnibus legislation is 
like the informal policy subsystems that abound in Washington. Subsys­
tems are not formal structures. However, they are very powerful in the 
policy-making process. There are opportunity costs associated with leaving a 
subsystem because the entire process of gathering information, agreeing on 
strategy, making policy, and implementing it for the particular policy area 
would need to be redesigned. Such a scenario presents great risk to all 
involved, who are not sure whether they will fare as well in a new environ­
ment. Similarly, crime policy makers on the Hill, who have become increas­
ingly reliant on the omnibus technique, are uncertain of how things would 
go if they proceeded with dozens of smaller component crime bills. 
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Formal structures also increase the opportunity costs of diverging from 
the omnibus technique. Some of the omnibus bills passed each year are 
required as part of the official congressional budget process, such as bud­
get reconciliation. As chapter 8 will show for the case of health care policy, 
omnibus budget bills are important vehicles for significant policy change. 
The importance of path dependency suggests a research agenda for the 
legislative studies subfield that includes the examination and explanation 
of initial institutional developments, both formal and informal (Gamm and 
Shepsle 1989; Jenkins 1998; Katz and Sala 1996; Polsby 1968; Schickler 
1998). I add to such an agenda in this chapter by studying the initial con­
gressional decision to employ an omnibus bill or mega-bill. The first mega-
bill passed the 81st Congress of 1949-50 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 
1983; Fisher 1993; Nelson 1953).1 
Many scholars point to the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA) as the watershed omnibus event. While OBRA was created near 
the beginning of a period of high omnibus use and was itself longer than 
any other omnibus bill in the current study (perhaps the fall 1998 bundled 
appropriations bill was longer), it was by no means the start of omnibus 
legislating. As I show in chapter 4, after the initial mega-bill in 1949-50, 
the omnibus technique was employed on an increasing and regular basis up 
to 1981. Thus, omnibus legislating was already a proven method and avail­
able for use in 1981. Path dependency is further illustrated by the fact that 
omnibus use continues in our current years of budget surpluses at rates sim­
ilar to those of omnibus use during the deficit-prone 1980s and early 1990s. 
As we saw in chapter 6, deficits (along with issue fragmentation and divided 
government) produced strains on Congress that required increased omnibus 
use. When one of these stresses subsides, path dependency suggests that 
omnibus use will not taper off, and indeed it has not. 
Along these lines, William Riker (1980), a major proponent of con­
ceiving of institutions as creatures of change, suggested that once an insti­
tution is operating on a certain path, change is not easy: "If institutions do 
generate an outcome in which everyone loses, it is reasonable to expect some 
new and less distasteful institutions—which is to say that even the most 
fundamental institutions lack equilibria, although it may take generations to 
alter them [italics in original]" (445). 
Therefore, it is important to study the first omnibus bill because once 
omnibus use started and was successful, it set the stage for further use. From 
this perspective, the most important decision was in 1950 when the first 
omnibus bill was put together and passed. Understanding the "why" of omni­
bus legislating requires more than identifying the longitudinal trends across 
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the post-World War II period and the motivations that drive the contem­
porary omnibus bundling process. It requires an examination of the path 
initially taken. 
Why did Congress opt for an omnibus bill in the 81st Congress? To 
answer this question, I display two levels of analysis for the reader that coin­
cide with the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3. First, I focus 
on the micro level of lawmaking and discuss, from an individual-actor per­
spective, various reasons why the method was employed. Second, I consider 
the broad institutional context present in and around 1949-50. The find­
ings and discussion that follow suggest that collective institutional concerns, 
rather than politics, underlay the use of the first mega-bill. 
Legislative Background 
The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950 was at the time the single largest 
money bill in American history.2 The impetus for the omnibus budget pro­
cedure came in the Senate. On February 17,1949, Senators Harry Flood 
Byrd of Virginia and Hugh Butler of Nebraska introduced Senate Con­
current Resolution 18 to amend the joint rules of Congress. The core of 
the brief resolution can be boiled down to the following phrase: "All appro­
priations for eachfiscal year shall be consolidated in one general appropri­
ation bill to be known as the 'Consolidated General Appropriation Act of 
' (the blank to be filled in with appropriate fiscal year)" (U.S. Senate 
1949,1). 
According to committee testimony given by Senator Byrd, an omnibus 
budget plan was needed to improve in many ways the efficiency and econ­
omy of the process (U.S. Senate 1947). First, an omnibus budget bill would 
require the Congress to view the entire sphere of income and expenditures. 
This broader view would allow a matching up of the two sides of fiscal 
affairs and would be less likely to produce an annual budget deficit. The 
1946 reorganization of Congress required an overall expenditure limit 
(much like present-day annual budget resolutions). Senator Byrd argued that 
keeping the budget under the mandated ceiling would be impossible unless 
the entire budget was viewed as one (rather than being dealt with in tradi­
tional piecemeal fashion through the consideration of twelve individual 
appropriations) .3 
Second, Senator Byrd argued that the omnibus method would prove 
to be faster than the traditional process. Congress typically finished its 
consideration of the 10 to 12 separate appropriations measures well after 
the fiscal year commenced (at that time July 1). The new method would 
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feature a great amount of deliberation as 10 different subcommittees con­
sidered individual chapters of the bill. The difference in time would come 
once the bill was bundled in full committee. At that juncture, discussions 
(both in committee and on the floor) would be fewer and from a broader 
perspective than the nit-picking that slowed down the traditional piecemeal 
process. On a related point, Senator Byrd suggested that consolidating the 
spending bills would reduce the duplication in the bills that led to the bulk­
iness of the individual appropriations. 
Third, Senator Byrd argued that the omnibus budgeting plan would 
strengthen Congress in relation to the president. The existing budget 
process, he maintained, favored the president to the detriment of the 
Congress. There was no congressional means of assessing the big picture 
of the federal budget. According to Senator Byrd, there was no means to 
evaluate budget bills "by relative merits, importance, or cost in view of the 
wholefiscal situation" (U.S. Senate 1949,11). "Under existing arrangements, 
Senator Byrd maintained, intelligent economizing was left to the executive 
branch" (Nelson 1953). Hence, when expenditures outpaced income in the 
individual appropriations bills, presidents were the ones to examine the big 
picture and decide where to cut. This de facto presidential authority did not 
sit well with congressional leaders, who were generally concerned with the 
abdication of congressional duties to the president in the years after Pres­
ident Franklin Delano Roosevelt considerably strengthened the presidency4 
Fourth, Senator Byrd posited that logrolling would be reduced. The 
omnibus plan would focus Congress's and the public's attention on the 
entire budget and would therefore reduce the influence of particularistic 
pressure groups on individual appropriations. "The new procedure also 
allows Congress to see the claims of spending pressure groups in relation 
to the total nationalfiscal picture and thus to appraise their relative worth" 
(Galloway 1953,620). Finally, Senator Byrd argued that many other coun­
tries and American political institutions were effectively using a one-bill 
appropriation. The countries included England, France, and Sweden. The 
vast majority of American states used such a plan, and many governors sup­
ported the omnibus plan for the national government (U.S. Senate 1947, 
1949). 
The Push for an Omnibus Plan Resolution 
Senators Byrd and Butler alone attempted the resolution in the 79th and 
80th Congresses, but to no avail. "We knew the first measure was imperfect, 
but it served to stimulate thought on the subject," said Senator Byrd at 
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hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 18 in May 1949 (U.S. Senate 
1949,9). In the 80th Congress (1947-48), a Senate Rules and Administra­
tion subcommittee held hearings on a revised version of the omnibus method 
joint resolution (S. Con. Res. 6). The amended resolution addressed the 
issue of deficiency appropriations (today called supplemental and some­
times emergency), a topic absent from the version considered in the 79th 
Congress. Senators wanted assurance that supporting the omnibus plan for 
general appropriations would not disallow deficiency appropriations if they 
were needed at year's end. 
While the bill was not enacted in the 80th Congress, key strides were 
nonetheless made by Senators Byrd and Butler. The two Senators attended 
hearings on the resolution (S. Con. Res. 6) in March, May, and June 1947, 
with the important backing of several government agencies and political 
leaders. The Budget Bureau (now the Office of Management and Budget), 
the Department of the Treasury, and the General Accounting Office sup­
ported the omnibus plan and sent representatives to the hearing to answer 
questions from the Senators (U.S. Senate 1947). Moreover, "the consoli­
dated approach to appropriations had several influential proponents outside 
of Congress, including George Galloway, the late Harold Smith, former 
director of the Budget, and Marcellus C. Shield, former clerk of the House 
Appropriations Committee" (Nelson 1953,275). Subsequently, Senate Con­
current Resolution 6 was approved unanimously by both the subcommittee 
and the full Senate Rules and Administration Committee. However, the 
full Senate never took it up (U.S. Senate 1949). 
In the 81st Congress, eight other Senators signed on and actively 
supported the resolution. The new cosponsors included Senator Kenneth 
Wherry (R-NE), chairman of the Senate Rules and Administration sub­
committee that unanimously approved Senate Concurrent Resolution 6 in 
the 80th Congress when the Republicans controlled the Congress (Demo­
cratic control returned in 1949-50). Committee hearing testimony from 
1947 shows an exchange between Senators Byrd and Wherry in which Byrd 
seemed to allay the concerns of Wherry and win his support and compli­
ments for the omnibus budget plan (U.S. Senate 1947). Senator Wherry's 
chief concern pertained to deficiency appropriations; he wanted assurance 
that supplemental would be allowed under the new plan. Byrd assured him 
that the new plan did not outlaw them. 
A subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration 
held hearings on May 23 and 26,1949, on the new version of the omnibus 
plan (S. Con. Res. 18). Several supporters joined Senators Byrd and Butler 
at the hearing, including Senators Homer Ferguson of Michigan, Wherry, 
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Herbert O'Conor of Maryland, William Knowland of California, and Alex­
ander Wiley of Wisconsin.5 While the Senators on the subcommittee 
asked many questions, the hearing transcript shows a constant stream of 
supporters for the omnibus plan, including many Senators and executive 
branch agency heads (U.S. Senate 1949). Prior to its first usage in 1950, 
there is no evidence of anyone's actively opposing the omnibus plan. 
S. Con. Res. 18 passed the Senate on September 27,1949. By that time, 
the fiscal year 1950 budget process was already well underway (although 
running way behind). Hence, the Senators hoped the method would be 
used in 1950 on the fiscal year 1951 budget (Nelson 1953). 
Resolutions to change the joint rules of Congress require adoption by 
the House as well. However, the House never took up the Senate's resolu­
tion or any other similar omnibus resolution. "Representative (Clarence) 
Cannon (of Missouri, the chair of the Appropriations Committee) simply 
announced, on May 26,1949, that the House Appropriations Committee 
would employ the consolidated procedure in the next session of Congress. 
Formal House action [via an authorization] was unnecessary, he said, since 
the Committee had authority to decide for itself upon the number and 
form of appropriations bills" (Nelson 1953,275). Cannon argued that just 
as the House Appropriations Committee had varied the number of regu­
lar appropriations bills between 9 and 12 during the previous decades, the 
Committee could decide as well to have one big bill. Hence, the House 
impetus for the omnibus procedure was not based on a chamber-supported 
resolution. 
For legislative scholars who assume that institutional structures and 
mechanisms are exogenous to policy making, this case of Representative 
Cannons contributing to the start of the omnibus revolution without full 
House blessing provides ironclad evidence that institutions sometimes 
change through an endogenous process (Binder 1997; King 1997).6 Along 
these same lines, King (1997) documented the role of the unelected House 
parliamentarians to determine the contours of the committee system 
through bill referral precedents. 
Using the Omnibus Plan in 1950 
In 1950, the House Appropriations Committee bundled all the regular 
appropriations measures into an omnibus package. The bundling process 
undertaken by Chairman Cannon and the committee was quite similar to 
the procedure outlined in the Senate-supported omnibus resolution of 
1949 (S. Con. Res. 18).The bill contained 10 separate chapters, which were 
The Birth of Omnibus Legislating 95 
analogous to single regular appropriations bills from previous years. The 
House Appropriations committee divided itself into 10 subcommittees 
(with five members), each to focus on one of the chapters of the massive 
bill (Nelson 1953). "The breakdown was as follows: (1) District of Colum­
bia; (2) Legislative Branch; (3) State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary; 
(4) Treasury-Post Office; (5) Labor-Federal Security; (6) Agriculture 
Department; (7) Interior Department; (8) Independent Offices; (9) Army 
Civil Functions; (10) Defense Establishment" (Nelson 1953, 277-78). 
Clearly, this listing of areas and issues, representing all functions of the gov­
ernment at that time, meets the scope requirement (spanning three or more 
major areas or 10 or more subtopic areas) for an omnibus measure! 
The 10 House Appropriations Subcommittees began hearings in earnest 
on January 5,1950. Meanwhile, the Senate Appropriations Committee 
decided to give the new procedure being undertaken in the House a fair 
try in the Senate. Senate Appropriations Chairman Kenneth McKellar 
(D-TN) used committee procedures much like the House Appropriations 
approach. Further, "it was decided that the subcommittees would hold 
hearings simultaneously with those in the House Committee, instead of 
waiting (as usual) until the House had completed action" (Nelson 1953, 
278). Senate Appropriations subcommittee hearings started on January 23, 
1950. 
When the subcommittees finished their scores of hearings, an execu­
tive subcommittee of the full committee consolidated the products into one 
measure, H.R. 7786. The full House Appropriations Committee approved 
the omnibus budget bill on March 21. At this juncture, H.R. 7786 was 431 
pages long. Congressman Cannon sought and received unanimous consent 
to give the bill priority over all other House matters. General debate lasted 
from April 3 until April 6, at which time the omnibus measure was con­
sidered a chapter at a time (Nelson 1953). Many funds were added on the 
House floor through amendments. However, the last two amendments were 
economy measures that cut about $1 billion. On May 10, the full House 
approved the omnibus bill. 
Nearly two months elapsed before Senate Appropriations approved the 
Senate version on July 8, seven days after the new fiscal year started. The 
Senate process was held up because the committee had to decide whether 
to go ahead with its version or amend to bring the Senate version more in 
line with the House-approved version. The original intention was for the 
Appropriations Committees from both chambers to march in lockstep on 
the omnibus bill. Ultimately, however, the Senate committee decided to go 
its own way. The Senate version did not include the economy amendments 
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incorporated at the last minute in the House. About a month later, the full 
Senate approved the omnibus bill. A House-Senate conference committee 
ironed out differences in mid-August, and the conference report was 
approved by the House and Senate later that month. President Harry Tru­
man signed the bill into law on September 6,1950. 
Member Concerns 
As an idea, the omnibus plans (S. Con. Res. 6 in 1947-48 and S. Con. Res. 
18 in 1949-50) faced no visible opposition. However, once they were 
implemented in 1950, several members raised questions about the omnibus 
budget technique. Typical objections pertained to the comparative lack of 
floor participation by members who did not serve on Appropriations be­
tween the traditional process (10 to 12 separate bills) and the new one. 
Under the traditional process, individual appropriations bills were debated 
(and nitpicked to protect pork barrel projects, the omnibus proponents 
argued) in great detail. This pattern of annual debate was one reason why 
appropriations always ran late. 
In 1950, when the House and Senate omnibus budget bills were between 
the committee and floor stages of the process, and after final passage, com­
plaints about fair consideration of the legislation were lodged. The follow­
ing comment by Congressman Sidney Yates (D-IL), written in response to 
a CQ survey of members concerning the omnibus method, exemplifies 
opponents' concerns: "It [the omnibus budget bill] is too cumbersome. It 
receives less attention from the membership as a whole than the individual 
bills" (Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1951,130). Indeed, House floor con­
sideration of the omnibus bill in 1950 was much shorter than combined 
participation on individual appropriations in 1949 (Nelson 1953). Propo­
nents argued that this was as intended. 
Opposition complaints were not political charges against omnibus plan 
proponents. Rather, the comments concerned a negative consequence of 
the plan—the lack of member participation and the lack of member infor­
mation when voting for the final plan. Concerns about participation under­
lay Senator Richard Russell's (D-GA) prospective concerns. Russell feared 
that in the future the method would become a vehicle for enacting distrib­
utive projects by tucking them away in a massive bill. "The omnibus plan 
does not promote economy and it does promote log rolling" (Congressional 
Quarterly Inc. 1951,130). He did not assert that the omnibus bill leaders 
in 1950 used the technique in this manner. Rather, he feared this method's 
potential to be used for a select few over the objections of a majority. 
Chapter 5, which shows that distributive projects are often included in 
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omnibus packages in contemporary times, bears Senator Russell out. How­
ever, Congress uses omnibus bills in contemporary times to improve capa­
bility as well, as Senator Byrd and Congressman Cannon predicted. 
Omnibus proponents responded vigorously to the concerns of Con­
gressman Yates, Senator Russell, and others. Supporters argued that the 
omnibus method was economically effective. The data bear them out. The 
omnibus bill appropriated 4.6 percent below the budget requests, while 
the individual bill method of 1948 and 1949 appropriated 2.8 and 3.0 per­
cent below the requests of those years, respectively (Nelson 1953,282). 
Proponents argued that the omnibus procedure forced members to make 
tough decisions about the entire budget, rather than being swayed one way 
or the other on the individual, more particularistic components of the pack­
age. Just prior to the final vote, Congressman Cannon stated that "in the 
fierce light of publicity which will be concentrated on that final vote, there 
will be no escape from responsibility. A clear, unequivocal record must be 
made. And public opinion will do the rest" (U.S. News 1950, 42). Indeed, 
on the House floor, the last two amendments (which slashed $1 billion) 
became popular among members as a means of communicating to con­
stituents that responsiblefiscal decisions were being made. "Many Congress­
men seemed to welcome a chance to go on record for economy on an across-
the-board basis, without specifying cuts for projects that might influence 
votes" (Morris 1950,2). 
Supporters also stated that the method helped Congress finish the bud­
get sooner than they would have with separate bills. Indeed, the omnibus 
bill was signed into law on September 6,1950, even with the new Korean 
conflict confusing matters on Capitol Hill (Nelson 1953). In the previous 
year, several appropriations measures had been enacted in late October, 
three months after the fiscal year began on July 1. Hence, the new con­
gressional budget process was completed about two months faster than the 
traditional process in 1949. 
In response to CQ s member survey on the omnibus method, Congress­
man Cannon argued forcefully: "No constructive criticism has been lodged 
against the adoption of the omnibus appropriation bill. It has vindicated 
every promise; it has justified every expectation. And no cogent reason has 
been advanced for a return to the old system" (Congressional Quarterly Inc. 
1951,129). 
The Governing Context 
Most scholars look to the 1980s for the origin of the omnibus revolution. 
Accordingly, their explanations of the rise of omnibus legislating focus on 
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potential factors of those times. These causes include budget deficits and 
divided government (Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1997; Smith 1989). Indeed, 
strong omnibus trends exist in the 1980s. Therefore, such factors ought to 
be examined. We saw in chapter 6 that deficits and divided government 
(along with other factors like issue complexity and fragmentation) posi­
tively affect aggregate omnibus use in the period from 1949 to 1994. 
For venturing contextual answers to why the 81st Congress enacted the 
initial omnibus act, however, we need to look beyond divided government 
and deficit politics. These particular attributes do not apply to that time 
period as well. The 81st Congress featured unified control of the chambers 
of Congress and the presidency. Moreover, the budget deficit was not the 
issue that it later became in the 1980s and 1990s. The average annual bud­
get deficit in the several years surrounding the 81st Congress was a mere 
$3 billion (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996). 
What contextual factors led to the first use of omnibus legislation in 
the 81st Congress? When we remove divided party control and deficit 
politics from the list of challenging governing circumstances developed in 
the theoretical framework of chapter 3, we are left with issue complexity 
and workload, party composition and unity (the legislative potential for 
minority obstructionism), and bicameral differences. 
Analyzing bicameral differences does not take us very far. The overall 
ideological distance between the House and Senate chambers (both Demo­
cratic) in 1949-50 was practically nonexistent. The difference between Poole 
and RosenthaTs first-dimension W-NOMINATE scores for the House 
and Senate in the 81st Congress is .022 (on a scale from 0 to 1). This fig­
ure represents the second lowest such bicameral distance in the period from 
1947 to 1996 (Binder 1999, 527). The 1949-50 chamber distance is also 
lower than the ideological distance figures for recent unified Congresses 
since the mid-1980s, in what has been called a period of increased party 
unity (Fleisher et al. 2000). Moreover, none of the case evidence amassed 
for this chapter makes mention of bicameral rivalry as a reason for employ­
ing the omnibus budget bill. 
Explaining away bicameral differences leaves two explanations: issue 
complexity/workload and party composition conditions that foster minority 
obstructionism. I turn first to party composition factors. As Brady (1988) 
showed in his excellent study of electoral realignments and congressional 
public policy making, the New Deal realignment sent overwhelming and 
unified majorities to Congress. The large majority party margins made it 
possible to innovate dramatically through traditional legislative channels 
without much fear of minority obstructionism. However, party levels 
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eventually equilibrated, and party unity declined after the New Deal years 
(Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979; Hurley and Wilson 1989). Smaller 
majority party levels and decreased intraparty homogeneity increase the 
likelihood and effectiveness of minority obstructionism. Majority party 
leaders in such circumstances look for creative ways to enact their cherished 
policies. 
The equilibration of party levels and the decline of unity suggest ripe 
conditions for omnibus use. However, these factors were lacking. Majority-
minority party power differences and unity were low (and therefore minor­
ity obstructionism became more likely) in many other periods in American 
history, including periods following electoral realignments (Binder 1997; 
Cooper and Young 1997). Yet omnibus use did not begin at those times. 
Moreover, the omnibus plan enjoyed bipartisan support. Minority mem­
bers did not complain that the omnibus plan was being shoved down their 
throats. In summary, partisan factors alone do not provide a full explana­
tion of the first use of omnibus legislation in 1950. 
What was different about the period in which omnibus use started? 
Issue complexity is the final factor on our list. Indeed, the complexity of the 
issue agenda in the years after the New Deal reached heights not compa­
rable during any other period in our history up to that time. Prior to the 
New Deal, the issue agenda of the national government was considerably 
smaller and less complex than the myriad issues facing Washington and 
the Congress shortly thereafter. The major issues facing Congress after 
World War I and before the New Deal were government operations, agri­
culture (particularly as it related to the Great Depression), and trade (Cham­
berlain 1946). 
Beginning with the New Deal years, the national government increased 
in size and entered various sectors of American society (Baumgartner, 
Jones, and MacLeod 2000; Polsby 1968). The major policy issue that was 
incorporated into the agenda at this time was social welfare. Social welfare 
was a multidimensional issue that cross-cut other topics like labor, business 
and banking, health, housing and community development, and energy 
(in the case of the Tennessee Valley Authority). Defense policy and foreign 
affairs matters further expanded the agenda with U.S. participation in World 
War II and later Korea. 
The reasons supplied by omnibus supporters accord well with the 
increase in issue complexity. The national government had become too 
complex to justify a piecemeal budget process that prevented a broad view 
of inputs and outputs. Hence, members found the method helpful for sim­
plifying a more complex legislative process always susceptible to stalemate. 
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At the macro and micro levels of analysis, then, this discussion suggests 
that collective institutional concerns best account for the first use of the 
mega-bill method. In this respect, the first use of an omnibus package con­
stituted a missing chapter from the 1946 reorganization of Congress. The 
omnibus plan shares the tenor of the 1946 reforms aimed at improving 
the capability of congressional institutions. Of course, the omnibus method 
started quite differently than the 1946 act did. The 1946 reorganization was 
a public law enacted after Congress stood back and took a careful look at 
itself; it was an exogenous process (King 1997). In contrast, the omnibus 
method started endogenously in the House, with Congressman Cannon, 
as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, unilaterally ruling that the 
budget would be bundled. This account is consistent with recent work by 
Binder (1997) and King (1997), which envisions institutional change in 
Congress as an endogenous process. 
After the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950 
Interestingly, the House Appropriations Committee decided not to bundle 
the regular appropriations bills in 1951, thus abandoning the particular 
omnibus method used in the 81st Congress (Nelson 1953). Too many mem­
bers complained about the massiveness of the bill and their inability to 
comprehend what they were voting for. As Louis Fisher (1993) cleverly 
stated, "It was comprehensive but also incomprehensible" (20). 
Nevertheless, the packaging method had been used for an important 
test run. Consistent with the concept of path dependency, this initial usage 
set the stage for future omnibus employment. Senators and Representatives 
of the 81st Congress had no idea what they had started, just as Senators 
who abandoned the previous-question motion in the early 1800s could not 
fathom its necessity later in that century (Binder 1997). 
Omnibus legislating was increasingly used in the 1950s and 1960s, 
but not for bundling regular appropriations bills, as was the case in the 1950 
bill. Congress increased its use of large supplemental appropriations, which 
often began to include a variety of attached policy riders. These bills 
became the new "last train to the station" on Capitol Hill, the functional 
equivalent in some cases of the 1950 budget act. Omnibus bills also were 
used outside the budget process to package together items from such diverse 
policy areas as housing, social security, tax policy, and agriculture. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress returned to the 1949-50 technique 
of bundling items in the regular budget process. These more contemporary 
omnibus budget measures, which continue to the present day, include the 
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annual budget resolution, the budget reconciliation bill, and on occasion 
the bundling of some (as was the case in 1999 for the fiscal year 2000 bud­
get) or all (as in 1998 for thefiscal year 1999 budget) of the 13 regular appro­
priations bills. 
Additionally, continuing resolutions (CRs) have become a regular 
feature of the congressional budget process (Cranford 1989; Fisher 1993; 
Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1997). CRs are typically enacted to continue current 
funding levels for a temporary period of time into the nextfiscal year when 
the budget process is running late. These massive bills become vehicles for 
many other nonbudget items. Thus, permanent policy is made in tempo­
rary funding measures. 
Discussion: Institutions Are Exogenous 
and Endogenous 
Path dependency suggests that institutions tend to stay on a path once it is 
created. In this sense, institutions are exogenous; previous developments 
affect future ones (Riker 1980). Further, institutional arrangements affect 
how issues are processed, as I discussed in Chapter 6. However, one impor­
tant point of this chapter (and the book generally) is that institutions also 
involve choices: that is, they are endogenous. 
In a discipline that typically demands that research articles, for entry 
into top journals, contain clean, structural equations with left-hand-side 
dependent variables and right-hand-side independent variables, this reality 
certainly complicates things. Much like the relationship between people 
and their elected representatives, institutional change is a dynamic, inter­
active process. 
Future research on institutional change should bear this in mind and 
consider the appropriate methods to test such a dynamic interplay. Perhaps 
scholars of institutional change could emulate the award-winning piece on 
dynamic representation by James Stimson, Michael MacKuen, and Robert 
Erikson (1995) in approach and methodology. In that article, the authors 
used several creative measures combined with advanced time series methods 
to make a complicated democratic relationship quite simple and elegant for 
analysis. 
8

Getting around Gridlock I: 
Making Health Care Policy through 
Omnibus Bills 
In 1994, Bill Clinton joined a long list of presidents (both Democratic 
and Republican) who, after pushing for lasting change in health care pol­
icy, ultimately saw their plans die a slow death on Capitol Hill. Health 
care overhauls were pushed unsuccessfully by Presidents Harry Truman, 
John R Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, 
Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1951-
1989).1 
Also during the 103rd Congress, another notable trend continued 
alongside the line of failed large-scale health proposals. Congress enacted 
a cadre of omnibus bills (18 according to my tabulations), 16 of which 
contained health care provisions. In all, there were over 30 different health 
care bills and provisions attached to the omnibus bills.2 
This chapter examines reasons for these trends in the health care pol­
icy domain and in so doing contributes a fourth perspective on the "Why 
omnibus?" question. I begin by focusing on a key institutional explanation 
of major health policy failures—jurisdiction^ gridlock in the congressional 
committee system. I demonstrate with a new data set of all congressional 
hearings held in the post-World War II period that health care is the most 
fragmented policy area in the committee system on Capitol Hill (Baum­
gartner, Jones, and MacLeod 1999). I then argue that omnibus bills allow 
a way around this problem for enacting some health care policies. I con­
clude the chapter with a discussion of the costs and benefits of this trend 
for making substantial change in health care policy. 
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A Jurisdictional Quagmire 
Scholars have spilled a lot of ink in venturing reasons for the failure of 
meaningful health care reform in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Health policy analysts offer a variety of traditional explanations for policy 
failure. These reasons include controversy, the power of opposition interest 
groups that favor the status quo, and a mismatch between the policy pref­
erences of Senators and Representatives and the proposed reforms. 
The three arguments unfold in chronological order as follows. Well-
intentioned but massive health care solutions are proposed to alleviate prob­
lems of health care access and quality. Small businesses and the medical 
establishment effectively raise doubts about the workability of the solution 
(Alford 1975; Marmor 1973). Public opinion for the plan then plummets 
(Jacobs 1993). Ultimately, failure is blamed on a mismatch between the 
preferences of members of Congress (who serve as agents of the disen­
chanted public) and the proposal (Brady and Buckley 1995). 
This intertwined logic provides a helpful but incomplete explanation 
for failure, however. Major policy proposals in other issue areas in the 1990s 
(such as civil rights and college student financial aid) sparked controversy, 
ignited opposition from powerful interest groups, and activated conflicting 
preferences among members of Congress. Yet Congress passed major pol­
icy proposals in those areas, and the president signed them into public law. 
Moreover, these policy changes succeeded in periods of divided as well as 
unified control of the branches of Congress and the presidency. 
In the civil rights policy domain, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
a major step forward in providing rights for the handicapped, was enacted 
over the vociferous opposition of small businesses. In the postsecondary 
education domain, major amendments to the Higher Education Act were 
passed at two junctures. These reauthorizations included provisions for a 
pilot student loan program (and later a more sweeping change of direct 
lending). Under the new program, the federal government (not banks) gives 
loans to students. Direct lending provides lower interest rates to students 
and removes banks from the financial aid equation. The banking industry 
opposed this policy change. It is no secret that banks enjoyed an ongoing 
financial bonanza from the federally guaranteed loans. In the final analysis, 
the Higher Education Act amendments and the Americans with Disabil­
ities Act were enacted in the face of controversy and powerful opposition. 
Why were important changes delivered in education policy and civil 
rights policy and not in health care? What is the critical difference between 
104 Chapter 8 
health care policy and education and civil rights policy that leads to change 
in the other areas and stalemate in health care policy? The key difference 
is the institutional structure that processes these issues on Capitol Hill. 
Higher education policy and civil rights policy are processed in primarily 
one committee in each chamber. Higher education legislation is, for the 
most part, considered in the House Education and Labor Committee and 
the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. Civil rights legisla­
tion is processed principally through the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees. In addition to legislative jurisdiction in Judiciary, civil rights 
issue discussions (hearings) are often held in other committees, such as 
the House Commerce Committee and the Senate Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation Committee.3 
In sharp contrast to the committee institutional arrangement in the areas 
of education and civil rights, scores of committees in both the House and 
Senate consider health care policy measures. "By the mid-1990s no less than 
five major congressional committees claimed authority over health care 
legislation" (Steinmo and Watts 1995, 363). Each of these standing com­
mittees contains numerous subcommittees. Dozens more bodies hold inves­
tigative or oversight hearings on health care matters. This decentralized and 
fragmented committee arrangement for health care frustrates health care 
reform efforts (Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 1999; Steinmo and Watts 
1995). While some sharing of issues between committees may lead to shared 
expertise and therefore better policy (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; King 
1997), the extent of fragmentation in health care appears to cross a thresh­
old from the sharing of ideas to fragmented chaos.The turf battles that come 
up over health care can be quite intense. Examples abound on the Hill. 
To illustrate, in 1993, prior to the formal proposal of the Clinton health 
care plan, many in Washington (on Capitol Hill and in the White House) 
thought that policy makers should get a head start on health care reform. 
However, the two main committees that consider health care in the House 
(Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce) had very different opinions 
on whether and how to proceed. The Ways and Means and Energy and 
Commerce Committees share policy committee jurisdiction over the Medi­
care program. The Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health, chaired by 
Pete Stark (D-CA), wanted to do little to alter established programs like 
Medicare and Medicaid. His committee voted by voice vote to freeze the 
Medicare inflation adjustments for payments to physicians and health care 
organizations. It was intended as a placeholder bill for the forthcoming 
Clinton plan. "Why should we go through this [the effort at major reform] 
twice?" said Congressman Stark (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1994,366). 
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The Energy and Commerce Committee had a very different opinion 
on how to proceed. The Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, 
chaired by Henry A. Waxman (D-CA), approved a package of Medicare 
cuts that were expected to save $28 billion over five years. In the area of 
Medicaid, the subcommittee approved the expansion and entitlement of the 
childhood immunization program, a key Clinton administration priority 
This example shows the disagreement that can arise between rival sub­
committees, even those subcommittees chaired by members of Congress 
from the same party and the same state (California)! 
In a recent paper, Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod (1999) systemat­
ically demonstrated the jurisdictional quagmire present in health care pol­
icy on Capitol Hill and compared health to all other major policy issues on 
the congressional agenda. As part of their massive Policy Agendas Project, 
Baumgartner and Jones coded every congressional hearing held from 1946 
to the present. Over the course of several years, each hearing was assigned 
a unique policy topic code and the committee venue was noted. Hence, the 
hearings data set can be analyzed to view the extent to which hearings for 
a particular issue are held in one principal committee or perhaps across many 
more committees. Toward this end, Table 8.1 displays an index of jurisdic­
tional clarity for every major policy topic in both the House and Senate for 
the time period from 1947 to 1993. This index ranges from a low of 0 to a 
high of 100. If all hearings in a given issue are held in one committee, the 
value of the index is 100. 
Table 8.1 demonstrates an overall lack of jurisdictional clarity in Con­
gress. Even traditional subsystem areas like agriculture and transportation 
are spread across more than one principal committee. Yet when we talk 
about these areas, we use the old "iron triangle" metaphor. In an iron tri­
angle, one congressional committee quietly processes policy in concert with 
experts in the executive branch for the given policy and the appropriate 
interest groups (e.g., Ripley and Franklin 1991). The iron triangle concept 
is too simplistic a heuristic for the contemporary reality of congressional 
committee politics (see Browne 1995 for an elaboration of this argument). 
Hence, these results generally demonstrate the complexity of the congres­
sional committee system. In the face of this complexity, congressional insti­
tutions look for creative ways to make policy, such as the use of omnibus 
bills. 
Directly pertinent to our purpose in this chapter, Table 8.1 also shows 
that, of the 19 major topics, health care is the single most fragmented 
policy area in the House and the second most fragmented issue area in the 
Senate. In contrast, the other policy areas to which I have compared health 
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Table 8.1 
Index of Jurisdictional Clarity by Topic Area, 1947-1993 
Topic Area Senate House 
Education 52 53 
Agriculture 39 49 
Space, science, technology­ 31 40 
Foreign affairs and foreign aid 36 39 
Defense 25 29 
Public lands, indian affairs, water 43 25 
Labor and employment 24 22 
Macroeconomics 25 20 
Law, crime, and family issues 37 20 
Community development and housing 55 19 
Civil rights, minority issues 33 19 
Energy 28 18 
Transportation 38 17 
Social welfare 19 17 
Government operations 9 17 
Foreign trade 20 16 
Banking,finance, and commerce 20 16 
Environment 27 15 
Health 20 13 
N= 64,977 
Source: Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod (1999). 
care policy (education policy and civil rights policy) feature more concen­
trated jurisdictions. In both the House and Senate, education policy is the 
most clear issue jurisdiction (and the least fragmented). The broad Baum­
gartner and Jones topic of civil rights/civil liberties/minority issues is more 
fragmented than education but more concentrated than health care policy. 
In summary, as they set out to make meaningful policy, health care 
policy makers and reformers face the worst set of jurisdictional circumstances 
among all policy issues considered on Capitol Hill. Given the situation, it 
is not surprising that turf battles and policy stalemate ensue. On the Clin­
ton health care plan, one of the biggest battles was fought over whose bill 
would be the legislative vehicle and hence which committee in the House 
and the Senate would take the lead. In contrast, education and civil rights 
policy makers make policy amidst a less daunting set of institutional 
arrangements. This is not to say that making education and civil rights 
policy is easy. It is not. However, policy makers in health care do indeed 
face a much worse policy-making situation. 
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Dealing with Fragmentation 
Not surprisingly, health care policy making regularly deadlocks in the 
decentralized chaos of committee jurisdictions on Capitol Hill. Even 
bipartisan proposals, like those pushed in recent Congresses by Senators 
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT), are stalled. Hence, 
health care policy makers are faced with a vexing dilemma. Health care is 
a pressing issue in American politics. A growing percentage of Americans 
are uninsured. Those Americans blessed with health insurance increasingly 
pay bigger proportions of their health care costs. In return, they receive a 
lower quality product (often offered to them through an inflexible health 
maintenance organization [HMO]). 
Yet an institutional nightmare confronts policy makers when they 
attempt policy change on Capitol Hill. It is a formidable task to get rival 
committees with different perspectives on health care, who guard their 
turf with jealousy and venom (King 1994,1997; Talbert, Jones, and Baum­
gartner 1995), to agree on policy. This is the key difference between health 
care policy and education and civil rights issues. 
As a means of adapting to this situation and getting around the dilem­
mas, policy makers increasingly turn to omnibus bills to make health care 
policy. Omnibus bills take the health issue away from deadlocked commit­
tees and give it to the central party leaders. Thus, jurisdictional wrangling 
is sidestepped. As King (1997) contended, coming to grips with the rise of 
omnibus bills requires a careful look at turf battles. 
The many different types of data that I gathered for this book bear this 
trend out empirically. Of the 87 omnibus bills I identified from 1979 to 1994, 
81 of them (or 93 percent) contained health care policy Moreover, and as 
I show in Table 4.5 (see chapter 4), health care policy makes up the single 
largest proportion of omnibus bill attachments among the 19 major policy 
topic areas in the period from 1979 to 1994. Health care policy accounts 
for 66 of 511 omnibus attachments (about 13 percent). In contrast, educa­
tion policy accounts for just 16 of 511 omnibus attachments (3 percent). 
Civil rights/civil liberties/minority issues are represented only twice among 
the 511 omnibus attachments from 1979 to 1994 (less than 1 percent). 
Of the different types of omnibuses moving through the Capitol Hill 
station, budget reconciliation bills are the most used for transporting health 
care policy items (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1980-1997). Of the 66 
health policy attachments identified in my coding of the omnibus attach­
ment process, I found that 40 of them were enacted through budget rec­
onciliation bills. 
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Budget reconciliation is a required stage in the budget process (see 
Oleszek 1989 for a thorough description of the budget process). It occu­
pies stage 3 of the five in the process. In stage 1, the president proposes a 
budget to Congress by early February. In stage 2, House and Senate budget 
committees produce a budget resolution, which is a blueprint that contains 
overall spending limits for the areas of the budget. The budget resolution 
must be approved by both the House and Senate. Budget reconciliation is 
step 3 in the process. In this stage, the authorizing and tax-writing com­
mittees produce legislation to meet the targets set in the budget resolution. 
The various bills are then bundled in one massive omnibus bill. When the 
bundling begins, things get interesting. Reconciliation is often used as a 
vehicle for policy riders, despite the existence of the Byrd rule in the Sen­
ate. The Byrd rule aims to limit extraneous amendments. If a provision is 
considered extraneous on reconciliation, a three-fifths vote of the Senate is 
required to keep it in. However, defining extraneous is difficult in the multi­
dimensional reality of congressional politics. Moreover, one needs to find 
the extraneous matter to raise the Byrd rule. In bills that require two hands 
to hold and are several inches thick, it is not always easy to find the extra­
neous matter. 
Every single budget reconciliation bill enacted from 1980 to 1994 con­
tained health care policy provisions. Almost all reconciliation bills contained 
what many health policy experts would likely consider significant changes. 
Of course, it is difficult to define significant in any precise way. Neverthe­
less, to gain a rough measure of importance, I define a health care policy 
change on reconciliation as significant if the health item received its own 
separate story in annual editions of CQ Almanac. Using this definition, I 
find that significant health policy changes occurred through the reconcili­
ation process in 10 of the 16 years from 1979 to 1994. 
Table 8.2 summarizes the significant health care changes made through 
budget reconciliation. Many of these items were expansions or cuts in exist­
ing federal programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid. However, one would 
be incorrect to conclude that these were all incremental adjustments to the 
status quo. For example, a family living in poverty in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s saw a significant difference in their "health care reality" com­
pared to the leaner offerings by federal programs in the early to mid-1980s. 
Significant changes in this regard were enacted in 1986 (pregnancy services), 
1987 (extension of Medicaid to poor pregnant women and infants), 1990 
(inclusion of mammograms and expansion of aid to poor children), and 
1993 (entitlement to immunizations). 
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Table 8.2 
Significant Health Policy Changes in Budget Reconciliation Bills, 
1979-1994 
Year Highlights of Changes 
1980 Made a number of major changes in Medicare and Medicaid, including 
improvements in the coverage of the elderly through expanded home 
health services, authorizations for Medicare reimbursement for outpatient 
surgery, and the first use of cost-shifting techniques to achieve budget 
savings. 
1981 Included the largest Medicaid cuts of the Reagan era, created the section 
2176 waiver (which allows states to obtain permission to use Medicaid to 
fund home care for those traditionally institutionalized), reduced spending 
for the education of doctors and nurses, provided federal aid to HMOs, 
and started a program of health block grants to ease federal control of 
19 programs. 
1982 Produced major Medicare savings and contained sweeping structural 
expansions. Authorized contracts between HMOs and the government 
to enroll Medicare beneficiaries, allowed Medicare payment for hospice 
services for mentally ill Americans, mandated that government workers 
pay Medicare taxes, and created the Peer Review Organizations (run by 
doctors) to take the place of the Professional Standards Review Organi­
zation program. 
1984 In addition to achieving massive Medicare savings by freezing physician 
fees and expanding Medicaid services to single poor women, created the 
participating physician program (PAR). PAR was created "to encourage 
doctors to agree in advance to accept Medicare's approved fee as payment 
in full for all patients for all services for a 12-month period. In exchange, 
physicians participating in the program received a series of incentives" 
(CQ Almanac 1990,160), including higher Medicare payments. 
1986 COBRA: Founded the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC), 
required state and local government employees to pay Medicare payroll 
taxes, barred patient dumping through threats to health organizations, 
when employees quit addressed the problem of health care coverage by 
requiring employers to continue for 18 months existing group coverage at 
the rate the employer paid, and required states to provide pregnancy ser­
vices for women in two-parent families when the principal wage earner 
was unemployed. 
1986 OBRA: Allowed a 3.2 percent increase in physician fees and a 1.15 per­
cent increase in hospital fees and authorized one year of Medicare cover­
age needed to supply the medicine direly required after organ transplants. 
1987 Overhauled the federal regulation of nursing homes that serve Medicare 
and Medicaid patients, implemented a no-fault compensation system for 
families of children who have negative reactions to vaccines, allowed 
states to extend Medicaid coverage to pregnant women and infants in 
families in poverty, and attempted to correct the rules on physicians' 
payments that gave more benefit for surgery than for primary care. 
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Table 8.2 
{continued) 
Year Highlights of Changes 
1989 Barred Medicare payments to clinical labs when the referring doctor had 
ownership interests in the lab, expanded Medicaid coverage, overhauled 
the system of physician payments, and created a new agency for health 
research. 
1990 Forced drug manufacturers to give bulk purchase discounts to Medicaid 
providers, included mammograms on the list of approved procedures 
allowed under Medicare, expanded in phases Medicaid to poor children, 
tightened federal regulation of Medi-Gap insurance, and modified nurs­
ing home regulations. 
1993 Included provisions to trim nearly $63 billion overfive years from Medi­
care and Medicaid, redirected funding toward preventive and primary 
care (especially for children), and provided a $1.5 billion entitlement to 
pay for children's immunizations and protect against children's diseases. 
Source: Congressional QuarterlyAlmanac, 1979-94 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1980-95). 
Another major health change made via budget reconciliation was the 
entitlement given to employees for health insurance when they depart a job. 
As part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 
(COBRA), employers are required to offer departing employees the health 
insurance coverage they enjoyed on the job for up to 18 months at the rate 
that the employer pays the insurance company. The employer pays a group 
rate that is considerably lower than what individuals "off the street" pay for 
the same coverage. When Americans talk about this important benefit, it 
is called "Cobra." Americans are less likely to go uninsured between jobs 
with COBRA benefits available to them. 
The Benefits and Costs of Making Health Policy 
Aboard Omnibuses 
This case study of health care policy shows the adaptive, innovative nature 
of congressional institutions. Faced with the most daunting set of institu­
tional circumstances on Capitol Hill, Congress found a way to get something 
done in health care policy. Omnibus bills provide a way around the prob­
lems of jurisdictional gridlock. 
This interpretation, though, paints the rosiest of pictures for omnibus 
health care policy making. There are also sacrifices made when omnibus bills 
are used. First, members deliberate less on omnibus bills than on typical 
Getting around Gridlock I 111 
bills. In the Senate, this is especially the case on budget reconciliation bills, 
which I show above are a major vehicle for health care changes in contem­
porary times. According to the Senate rules, members may not filibuster floor 
consideration of budget reconciliation measures (either the Senate version 
or the subsequent House-Senate conference report). 
Health care policies affect constituents from every congressional dis­
trict and state in the United States. Representation suffers when members 
do not participate. Moreover, centralizing health care policy with the party 
leaders who package the bills discourages the full investigation of the health 
care issue by members of Congress. 
On the other hand, the normal legislative process does not work for 
health care policy. Stalemate results. From this perspective, making health 
care policy in omnibus bills is better than making no policy at all. Thus, the 
sacrifices of representation may be worth it. Several significant health pol­
icy changes have been adopted via omnibus bills. These measures allow the 
Congress to be more responsive in health care than if traditional bills were 
employed and defeated. 
Yet while many important policies have been enacted through reconcil­
iation and other omnibus measures, omnibus bills have yet to produce the 
large-scale health policy changes that reformers desire. The many significant 
policies adopted through omnibus bills, when compared with proposed 
health reforms like the Clinton plan or national health insurance, are piece­
meal changes. Any one change may be significant, but they do not together 
constitute national health reform. 
This discussion begs a further question. Why don t party leaders attach 
a large-scale change like the Clinton health plan to reconciliation? Party 
leaders, who serve as agents of their party caucus, would probably never do 
that. Members would go ballistic. On gigantic health policy change, mem­
bers want to have a traditional role in the legislative process and understand 
that for which they are voting. Omnibus bills, adaptive as they may be, 
are likely to have an upper bound (please see the discussion of limits to 
omnibus bills in chapter 3); they are, in this respect, self-regulating. Hence, 
for large-scale health policy to pass, the traditional process likely will have 
to be employed. Many democratic theorists and scholars of representation 
would argue that this is as it should be. Omnibus bills may be most effec­
tive (and appropriate) for mid-level health care policy change. 
9

Getting around Gridlock II: The 
Effect of Omnibus Utilization on 
Legislative Productivity 
Each time an omnibus bill is moved through the legislative process, oppo­
nents of the particular package (who might very well adore the omnibus 
method in other cases) lodge complaints about the lack of participation by 
members, logrolling, and the incomplete information members have when 
they vote for the package on the floor. Former Sen. Howard Cannon (D­
NV) had this to say about an omnibus maneuver in the early 1980s: "This 
maneuver is simply an effort to avoid open debate and fair consideration of 
this legislation* (Sarasohn 1982,2382). "It [omnibus legislating] is a sad way 
to do business," said Rep. Jamie L. Whitten (D-MS) (Tate 1982,2381). 
In response, proponents argue that omnibus bills are a way to get things 
done in an otherwise impossible legislative process. "The only way you can 
get things through is to package them," said Rep. Barber B. Conable, Jr. 
(R-NY) (Tate 1982, 2383). Legislative scholar Walter Oleszek (1989) 
argued that packaged bills are one way Congress "can develop coherent 
responses to public problems" (285; see also Sinclair 1997,233). From this 
perspective, omnibus bills show the adaptive nature of congressional insti­
tutions to tough governing circumstances. 
In this chapter and the following one, I turn my attention to two poten­
tial effects of the omnibus change. Here, I examine the effect of omnibus 
legislation on the productivity of our lawmaking system. The aim of this 
chapter is to examine whether the omnibus method positively affects leg­
islative productivity, as suggested by many in Washington and academia. I 
begin the chapter by discussing systematic studies of congressional law­
making. Next, I discuss the data and method to be used to test the effect of 
omnibus legislation on productivity. Third, I replicate both Mayhew's (1991, 
112 
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1995) prominent analysis of landmark enactments and Edwards, Barrett, 
and Peake's broader ratio measure that considers failures as well as enact­
ments (1997), and I introduce an independent variable for omnibus uti­
lization. I find omnibus usage to be a positive and significant independent 
influence on legislative productivity. 
The Beginnings of Systematic Analysis 
of Lawmaking Outputs 
The study of American lawmaking has largely been dominated by the micro-
level analysis of the behaviors of individual members of Congress rather 
than by macro-level analysis of the performance of the lawmaking system 
as a whole. Studies of individual-level roll call behavior are perhaps the 
single most common type of analysis of congressional activity. 
Important issues that have been addressed include how legislative lead­
ers control agendas and thereby influence the decisions of members; how 
coalitions are constructed; how the ideologies of members affect the dimen­
sional structure of the decision space; how the preferences of committee 
members relate to the preferences of the members of the whole chamber (or 
the preferences of the party caucuses); and how members are affected in vot­
ing and participation by constituency pressures, lobbying, and the president. 
Recently, however, important system-level analyses have been done as 
scholars have focused on the production of legislation in Congress (Baum­
gartner et al. 1997; Cameron et al. 2000; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; 
C.Jones 1994; Kelly 1993; Mayhew 1991,1995; Wirls 1995). In general, 
however, we have more developed theories about the behaviors of indi­
vidual members of Congress than we do about the behaviors and outputs 
of the lawmaking system as a whole. 
In his 1994 presidential address to the American Political Science Asso­
ciation annual meeting, Charles Jones (1995) provided the following chal­
lenge to the discipline: "Lawmaking is the core decision-making process of 
a democratic state. It is the means for defining, promoting, and regulating 
community life and, accordingly, is spectacularly interesting and highly rel­
evant to our purposes as political scientists. Yet it has received limited direct 
attention by political scientists, even by legislative scholars" (1—2).1 
Studying Congressional Outputs 
Numerous case studies have depicted the dynamics of how a particular piece 
of legislation was produced (e.g., Bailey 1950; Berman 1966; Eidenberg and 
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Morey 1969; C.Jones 1975; Light 1985, 1992; Peabody, Berry, Frasure, 
and Goldman 1972; Wilds, Gonzales, and Krutz 1994). Recently, however, 
American politics scholars have taken an interest in studying legislative out­
puts more systematically with larger numbers of cases. Most such studies 
have considered the effect of party control and composition on legislative 
production (Cameron et al. 2000; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; C.Jones 
1994; Kelly 1993; Mayhew 1991,1995; Wirls 1995). The traditional wis­
dom is that party control of Congress and the presidency is important in the 
production of legislation. Unified control of the institutions by one party, 
it is said, will result in more policy innovation and less gridlock than divided 
government. In this way of thinking, political parties bring order to an 
otherwise dispersed policy process (Cox andMcCubbins 1991; Destler 1985; 
Kernell 1991; Sundquist 1992). 
Research, therefore, by Mayhew (1991,1995) and Charles Jones (1994) 
suggesting that party control may not matter in the production of major 
legislation has come as a surprise to many political scientists. In a study of 
267 landmark enactments from 1946 to 1990, Mayhew (1991) found sim­
ilar levels of major legislative innovations in unified and divided party con­
trol of the presidency and Congress. Moreover, this nonfinding holds under 
multivariate regression analysis. Studying in much more depth a subset of 
28 of the Mayhew bills from 1953 to 1989, Charles Jones (1994) similarly 
found no divided-government effect on outputs: "Presidents continue to 
make proposals and Congress continues to legislate, even when voters return 
divided government to Washington" (196). 
Mayhew and Charles Jones address and examine major legislation that 
was enacted: in other words, innovation. One issue they do not address or 
test is the blocking of legislation in divided and unified government, or 
gridlock Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) argued that examining fail­
ures is critical: "If our concern is whether or not divided government 
obstructs the passage of legislation, we ought to investigate legislation that 
was proposed but that did not pass. Comparing the failure of potentially 
important legislation under divided and unified party government is the 
best test of the constraining impact of divided government" (547, italics in 
original). 
Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) analyzed patterns of failed major 
legislation and found that many more such bills fail in divided than unified 
government, a result that holds under multivariate regression analysis. 
Further, they constructed a ratio measure of legislative production for each 
Congress based on Mayhew s measure of enactments and their accounting 
of failures. With this combined measure, they provided further evidence 
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that the existence of divided government negatively and significantly affects 
legislative production. In a recent analysis that examined different cate­
gories of all laws enacted (but that, like Mayhew, did not include failures), 
Charles Cameron and colleagues (2000) also furnished evidence that divided 
government affects outputs. 
The main Edwards, Barrett, and Peake findings beg a further question. 
If, as the authors noted, important proposals are more likely to be defeated 
in periods of divided government, what is the cause of this? They focused 
on the amount of legislation opposed by the president and found much 
higher amounts of such opposition in divided government. 
A Puzzle of Lawmaking 
Does the Edwards, Barrett, and Peake research showing that gridlock is 
greater in divided than unified government refute Mayhew's analysis entirely? 
No, not entirely. What it does do is present a challenging and important 
puzzle of lawmaking in need of theoretical exploration by scholars. That 
is, while systematic research on the effect of party control on lawmaking is 
in its infancy, we have two somewhat sound empirical regularities. First, 
roughly equivalent amounts of major enactments appear to occur in uni­
fied and divided government (Mayhew 1991). Second, much more failed 
important legislation occurs in divided than unified government (Edwards, 
Barrett, and Peake 1997). These two results leave us in the discipline 
wondering: What forces provide "constancy" in outputs in the face of dif­
fering governing circumstances (Mayhew 1991,100; see also C.Jones 1994)?2 
"What is it that evens things out, so to speak, across circumstances of uni­
fied and divided control?" (Mayhew 1991,100). 
In light of the nonfinding for party control that he found in his study, 
Mayhew (1991) devoted considerable space in his book to speculating 
about potential sources of constancy in lawmaking. He concluded, "If I 
were aware of one over-arching, integrated answer to this question [of what 
evens out lawmaking], I would try to present it here. But I doubt that one 
is achievable" (100). 
One source of constancy in lawmaking, according to Mayhew (1991), 
is the electoral incentives of members. "In general, House and Senate 
members run for re-election, and House members seek Senate seats, regard­
less of circumstances of unified or divided party control. [This provides] a 
systemic thrust toward lawmaking constancy" (104). 
Mayhew (1991) also argued that presidents have provided leadership in 
proposing and enacting major laws in both divided and unified government 
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(112-19). This argument is consistent with a more cogently stated and 
detailed Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) proposition that is supported 
empirically: 
We have seen that presidents oppose more legislation under divided gov­
ernment than under unified government. In order to play a leadership 
role, however, they must support a wide range of potentially significant 
bills under all conditions of party control. Opportunities for failure for 
these bills should be similar under both divided and unified government, 
because divided government is but one of many obstacles that legislation 
faces on the path to enactment. Thus, we hypothesize that the chief exec­
utive will support similar levels of potentially important legislation under 
both divided and unified government. We expect, moreover, that divided 
government will not have a significant impact on the amount of legisla­
tion that the administration supports that fails to pass. (557) 
In suggesting another source of constancy, Mayhew (1991) and Jones 
(1994) presented evidence that many of the landmark enactments since 
World War II have passed with supermajorities and bipartisan support. This 
argument is consistent with new frameworks of lawmaking presented quite 
recently by Keith Krehbiel (1998) and Brady and Volden (1998), which 
emphasize the "pivots" that must be overcome in lawmaking to enact leg­
islation, most notably the Senate filibuster and presidential veto. 
Charles Jones (1994) discussed the continuing agenda of government 
as a source of constancy. The presidency and congressional institutions oper­
ate in an environment already in motion. "The national government has an 
agenda that is continuous because much of it is generated from existing 
programs" (164). 
Omnibus Utilization as a Source of Productivity 
in Lawmaking 
I consider here the prospect of and test the effects of a potential source of 
productivity in lawmaking—omnibus utilization. Does omnibus usage make 
our lawmaking apparatus more productive and contribute to the net pattern 
of constancy that Mayhew sought to understand? First, with regard to pro­
ductivity, proponents of omnibus lawmaking argue that the omnibus tech­
nique provides a way to get things done in an otherwise difficult legislative 
process (Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1997; Tate 1982). By combining items that 
face opposition together with core legislation that has widespread support 
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in Congress, more can be accomplished than if the controversial items had 
to "go it alone" through the legislative gauntlet. In a similar vein, my the­
oretical framework of omnibus packaging (chapter 3) predicts that bills 
facing opposition within Congress or from the president are more likely to 
be incorporated into omnibus measures than other bills. My empirical test 
of the omnibus attachment process supports these expectations (see chap­
ter 5). Hence, omnibus bills appear to provide one way to get more done. 
Second, with regard to constancy, Mayhew (1991) pondered why he did 
not find peak and valley patterns of major enactments according to party 
control circumstances. What factors help even things out? Edwards, Barrett, 
and Peake (1997) found that more important failures happen in divided 
than unified government. More specifically, they documented greater inci­
dence of presidential opposition in divided government than in unified 
government. Omnibus bills are useful in passing legislation that would be 
likely to fail alone. Indeed, I found a higher incidence of omnibus use in 
the contexts of divided government and a more complex congressional 
agenda—challenging situations when a mechanism is needed to get some­
thing done (see chapters 5 and 6). This link suggests that omnibus bills pro­
vide part of the answer to why similar patterns of successful outputs result 
under divided and unified government. 
In summary, this discussion suggests that the omnibus method improves 
productivity generally by giving coalition leaders a tool to get around grid­
lock. Hence, omnibus use leads to increased productivity. Further, this 
method is particularly helpful (and is used more) when governing circum­
stances are especially likely to produce gridlock—for example, in periods of 
divided government and high issue complexity. That omnibus bills are used 
more in these circumstances than others suggests an overall push toward 
constancy Congress attempts to make laws. When the process becomes 
deadlocked because of challenging governing circumstances, omnibus bills 
provide one way to accomplish as much as when governing circumstances 
are favorable. The positive impact of omnibus use on productivity appears 
to counteract the negative influence of gridlock. However, this evidence is 
at best indirect. In a more direct analysis of outputs, does the omnibus 
method positively affect system lawmaking outputs? The empirical expec­
tation to be tested is as follows: 
Omnibus Utilization Hypothesis: The higher the level of omnibus 
utilization, the more productive the lawmaking apparatus on major 
policy enactments. 
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Data and Method 
To test in a direct fashion the impact of omnibus utilization on legislative 
productivity, I sought to replicate the Mayhew (1991,1995) and Edwards, 
Barrett, and Peake (1997) analyses by introducing an independent variable 
for the extent of omnibus utilization in a Congress. The dependent vari­
ables are Mayhew's count of major enactments per Congress from 1949 to 
1994 (Mayhew 1991,1995) and Edwards, Barrett, and Peake s (1997) ratio 
measure of legislative production, which is a function of enactments and 
major failures. On the ratio measure, I recomputed the ratio to be enact­
ments over enactments plus failures so that the expected direction of the 
independent variables (positive or negative) would be consistent in both 
models. 
To evaluate the impact of omnibus use on outputs, I will turn to mul­
tivariate regression analysis, which Mayhew and Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 
also employed. My principal independent variable is a measure of omnibus 
use as a proportion of major lawmaking per Congress from 1949 to 1994. 
This is simply the number of omnibus bills employed divided by the num­
ber of major bills in that Congress. (The measurement of this variable was 
described in some detail in chapter 4.) To restate the hypothesis, I expected 
that the higher level of omnibus utilization the more productive the lawmaking 
apparatus (the higher the number of major policy enactments [Mayhew variable] 
and the higher proportion of major policy enactments as a proportion of major 
enactments and failures [Edwards, Barrett, and Peake variable]). 
Sorting through the effects of omnibus use on different categories of 
outputs can be a real brain-teaser. It is important to clarify why I expected 
a positive relationship between omnibus use and major policy outcomes. 
When more omnibus bills are used (containing many more items than 
typical bills), wouldn't we expect the number of overall laws enacted to go 
down? Descriptive data suggest that the answer is yes. We have fewer but 
larger laws in recent decades than in the period immediately following 
World War II (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1996,166). 
However, the current question is what factors affect the amount of 
major policy or landmark enactments (and such enactments in relation to 
similar failures), not just any enactments. Political observers and scholars 
argue that omnibus bills provide a way to get major policy passed in an 
impossible legislative process (Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1997; Tate 1982). 
Further, as mentioned above, evidence from my analysis of the omnibus 
attachment process (see chapter 5) suggests that these measures provide 
a way to get more done because they incorporate items that may fail if 
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pursued sequentially. Additionally, many major enactments are omnibus 
bills (Mayhew 1991). Mayhew's (1991) evidence also suggests that omni­
bus budget bills can be vehicles for major policy enactments. For instance, 
the major enactment on child care in 1990 (see Mayhew 1991, 43 [note 
23]) was found in an omnibus budgetary measure and counted as its own 
landmark enactment in Mayhew's accounting. All in all, this discussion 
suggests that the effect of omnibus use on productivity is an empirical ques­
tion well worth exploring. 
Control Variables 
Consistent with Mayhew and Edwards, Barrett, and Peake, I also included 
several control variables that might have an independent impact on leg­
islative outputs. I had a dummy variable for party control (coded as 1 if 
divided and as 0 if unified). The tightness of the fiscal environment might 
influence the success of important legislation, with failures being more 
likely in times of scarcity. The budgetary situation was operationalized as 
surplus or deficit in the budget as a proportion of total outlays, averaged 
over a Congress, a two-year period. 
Greater legislative production might also occur in the first Congress 
of a president's tenure (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Mayhew 1991). 
This "start of term" variable was coded as a dummy variable (1 for the first 
two years and 0 otherwise). 
For the analysis of enactments only, I included, like the other scholars, 
a control for activist mood. This variable controls for the level of legislative 
activity of an era, with the expectation that more active eras will produce 
more legislation. Activist mood was also coded as a dummy variable (1 for 
1961-1976 and 0 otherwise). I did not include this variable in the second 
model because the ratio measure of enactments over enactments plus fail­
ures controlled for the level of legislative activity in a given Congress. 
Findings 
I begin with a multivariate analysis that seeks to explain variation in the 
number of successful major enactments per Congress from 1949 to 1994 
(the Mayhew dependent variable). Table 9.1 presents the results. Because 
of the presence of autocorrelation, I used maximum-likelihood iterated 
generalized least squares (as did Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997). Like 
Mayhew, I found that the start-of-term and activist mood variables had 
large coefficients and clear standard levels of statistical significance. 
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Table 9.1 
Model Explaining the Number of Important Laws Enacted per 
Congress, 1949-1994 
Expected 
Independent Variable Direction B / 
Divided control .165 .084 
Start of term + 3.467* 2.123 
Activist mood + 5.731*** 4.627 
Budget deficit + .004** 3.445 
Omnibus utilization + .72%* 2.431 
Constant 4.654* 2.238 
R2 .789 
Adj.R2 .765 
.F statistic 18.247*** 
N of cases 23 
Source.-Mzyhew 1991, updated 1995. 
Note: One-tailed significance tests employed except for constant. The dependent variable is 
the number of important enactments per Congress from 1949 to 1994. Model estimated 
with maximum-likelihood iterated generalized least squares because of the existence of 
autocorrelation. 
*/><.O5. **/><.01. ***/><.001. 
Important laws are more likely to pass in the first two years of a pres-
ident's term, and more important laws might be expected to be enacted in 
the activist era from 1961 to 1976.3 In addition, the divided-control vari­
able washed out, as it did in Mayhew's original analysis. Its sign was in the 
wrong direction, and the / value was nowhere near standard levels of sta­
tistical significance (the two-tailed significance would be .930). In contrast 
to Mayhew, I found a statistically significant effect for the budget deficit 
variable. While the coefficient was much smaller than all the other signif­
icant variables, important laws are more likely to be passed when slack 
resources exist than when deficits emerge. 
The coefficient for the omnibus utilization variable was significant and 
in the expected direction. The more omnibus bills used as a proportion of 
major lawmaking, the more important laws enacted. This result survived 
despite the many strong control variables, particularly the activist mood 
variable. 
Finally, the constant was positive in sign, strong in magnitude, and 
statistically significant. Mayhew (1991) had a similar but larger constant 
coefficient in his original analysis. He suggested that such a result meant 
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Table 9.2 
Model Explaining the Proportion of Passed Important Legislation per 
Congress, 1949-1994 
Expected 
Independent Variable Direction B t 
Divided control -1.737** -2.76 
Start of term + .692** 2.694 
Budgetary situation + .001*** 3.327 
Omnibus utilization + 1.512** 2.884 
Constant 1.564*** 4.863 
R2 .724 
Adj.R2 .664 
F statistic 12.451*** 
N of cases 23 
Sources: Mayhew 1991, updated 1995 for passed important legislation; Edwards, Barrett, 
and Peake 1997 for failed important legislation. 
Note: One-tailed significance tests employed except for constant. The dependent variable is 
a proportion calculated from the number of important enactments over that same number 
plus important failures per Congress from 1949 to 1994. Model estimated with maximum-
likelihood iterated generalized least squares because of the existence of autocorrelation. 
*/><.O5. *><.01  . ***/><.001. 
that there are probably other factors, not included in the model, that affect 
lawmaking outputs. In the current analysis, the omnibus utilization vari­
able was significant, the constant was smaller than Mayhew s, and the model 
diagnostics were better. This finding suggests that I have identified an 
influence on lawmaking and that other sources probably exist that are not 
modeled. 
One prominent criticism of the Mayhew variable is that it does not 
have a proper denominator (Fiorina 1992). That is, it lacks a control for the 
amount of legislation attempted.4 Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) pre­
sented a way to have a denominator by coding all the significant major bills 
that failed. Therefore, I also did a multivariate analysis of variation in a 
proportion measure of enactments over enactments plus failures, a deriv­
ative of the Edwards, Barrett, and Peake variable. Table 9.2 presents the 
results.5 Recall that the activist mood variable from Mayhew's analysis was 
not included in this model because the dependent variable controlled for the 
amount of legislative activity (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997). 
The results are largely consistent with the Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 
findings. I found that divided control negatively and significantly affects 
122 Chapter 9 
the proportion of enactments. I also found the start-of-term and budget 
deficit variables to be significant. The proportion of passed important leg­
islation was higher at the start of presidential terms and when slack resources 
existed. 
Finally, the omnibus utilization variable in this model (as in the first) 
was significant and in the anticipated direction. This result survived with 
controls. In sum, the two analyses above provide evidence that omnibus 
lawmaking positively affects lawmaking productivity. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I focused on the effect of omnibus legislation on the pro­
ductivity of our lawmaking system. Advocates of omnibus bills argue that 
they provide a way to get things done in a fragmented legislative process. 
Does omnibus use make our lawmaking apparatus more productive? I tested 
this question by replicating both Mayhew s (1991,1995) prominent analysis 
of landmark enactments and Edwards, Barrett, and Peake's (1997) broader 
ratio measure that considered failures as well as enactments and by intro­
ducing an independent variable for omnibus use. I found omnibus use to be 
a positive and significant independent influence on legislative productivity. 
Further, since these packages are employed more in times of gridlock, omni­
bus lawmaking appears to contribute to an overall push toward constancy 
in lawmaking. The positive influence of omnibus use counteracts the neg­
ative effect of gridlock. This explanation with supporting evidence helps 
to explain why approximately even levels of important enactments occur in 
divided and unified government (Mayhew 1991), despite a higher occur­
rence of important failures in divided government (Edwards, Barrett, and 
Peake 1997). 
Even with this addition to the systematic literature on lawmaking pro­
ductivity, there is much we do not know about legislative outputs. Earlier 
in this chapter, I discussed several sources of lawmaking constancy that 
scholars have suggested, including the electoral goals of members (Mayhew 
1974,1991), presidential leadership (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; 
C.Jones 1994; Mayhew 1991), and supermajority support for major enact­
ments (Brady and Volden 1998; C. Jones 1994; Krehbiel 1998; Mayhew 
1991). I then identified a potential new source of constancy involving omni­
bus use and focused upon that possibility with positive results. 
Scholars, however, have had much less to say on the sources of grid­
lock that might affect lawmaking productivity beyond divided government. 
We need to incorporate other potential sources of gridlock, such as policy 
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issue jurisdictional fragmentation in the committee system. To illustrate, 
policy makers in the health care domain must try to make coherent policy 
while over 20 committees on Capitol Hill claim some jurisdiction on the 
issue. Some have suggested that this situation is part of the reason why 
lasting policy change desired by policy makers and citizens in health care 
has not occurred (Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 1999). In conclusion, 
future studies of lawmaking productivity should consider a full complement 
of explanations beyond the traditional focus on party control. 
10 
The Omnibus Change and 
Presidential-Congressional Relations 
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan was able to enact an ambitious agenda of 
program reductions and tax cuts by working with congressional allies to 
forge all-or-nothing votes through the use of omnibus bills (Oleszek 1989). 
Following the Reagan success, the conventional wisdom became that 
presidents could use omnibus bills to their advantage over Congress. In 
academic circles, certain scholars (Charles Stewart 1989 and, to a lesser 
extent, Barbara Sinclair 19971) have touted this conventional wisdom that 
presidents can lead on omnibus bills. 
Not surprisingly, then, during transition planning meetings in 1992, 
President-elect Bill Clinton expressed interest in using Reagan's big omni­
bus bill approach to move his ambitious campaign agenda in the legislative 
arena: "As President-elect Clinton and his aides develop a blueprint for 
their transition into power and first 100 says in office, they find themselves 
looking to a surprising role model: former president Ronald Reagan and 
the Republican takeover of government he led 12 years ago" (Devroy and 
Marcus 1992, Al) . 
Despite working with a Democratic Congress in 1993-94, however, 
Clinton did not get his wish. Most of his agenda items had to "go it alone" 
as single bills in the legislative process. Moreover, Clinton signed into law 
several provisions that he disliked contained in omnibus bills in order to 
get items that he desired enacted. 
President Clinton's omnibus challenges notwithstanding, the conven­
tional wisdom that omnibus packages benefit the president more than 
Congress has endured. In discussing the gigantic 1998 omnibus budget 
bill (a package on which Clinton did well), the Congressional Quarterly (CQ) 
Weekly Report generalized beyond the single case being covered: "The 
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reality is that, because presidents hold the veto pen, the single-bill style of 
governance [packaging everything] favors the chief executive" (Doherty 
1998,2795). 
I will argue in this chapter that the conventional wisdom is wrong. I 
begin by arguing that theory leads us to expect the omnibus technique to 
be more a congressional tool than a presidential tool. I then present a 
method for studying presidential-congressional relations on omnibus bills 
that borrows from Charles Jones's (1994) work on lawmaking. I then pre­
sent the results of the analysis. I find that, in contrast to the conventional 
wisdom, Congress dominates more on omnibus bills than the president in 
comparison to a control group of typical major bills from 1979 to 1994. 
Most omnibus bills, however, feature shared power between the branches. 
I conclude the chapter by discussing the line-item veto and presidential-
congressional adaptation. 
Theoretical Framework—Regular Bill versus 
Omnibus Bill 
Should we expect omnibus bills to be more a presidential tool or a con­
gressional tool compared to typical bills? In my theoretical framework for 
explaining why omnibus bills are used, I argued that bargaining would take 
place because both branches may have something to gain in omnibus bills. 
Specifically, I anticipated that leaders would add items opposed by the 
president to essential items to avert the veto for those items but that some 
appeasing of the president would have to take place in the form of also 
incorporating his measures. Empirical tests in chapter 5 supported these 
expectations. Such a conceptualization suggests some balance or shared 
power in omnibus lawmaking; the branches need one another (Peterson 
1990). That the branches need one another is not entirely unexpected in a 
system of separated branches sharing power (C.Jones 1994; Neustadt 1960). 
This chapter seeks to answer a clearly delineated question: Which of 
the branches gets more out of omnibus bills than the other? Working from 
theory, rather than the conventional wisdom or the practical examples of 
Reagan and Clinton in my introduction, let us ponder this. If you are the 
president, how would you prefer 10 bills to arrive at the White House from 
Capitol Hill? Assume that as president you favor eight of the bills (some 
intensely) and oppose two. You would rather see the 10 bills in turn (sequen­
tially) so that you could sign the eight you like and veto the two you dislike. 
If you received a massive omnibus bill with all 10 measures incorporated, 
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you would have to think about accepting things you disliked in order to get 
something you really wanted. It is important to note that decisions on the 
final form that legislation will take ultimately reside with the Congress. 
Sinclair (1997) and Stewart (1989) have argued that omnibus bills invite 
the president into a stage of the process where the president previously did 
not participate, the development of legislation. We hear about high-level 
meetings between congressional leaders and the president on omnibus bills. 
However, I would argue that the veto already took the president into those 
stages, just not always with public negotiations. Scholars are just now begin­
ning to look at the veto as an agenda control mechanism (see Cameron's 
[2000] new book on veto bargaining). For example, Edwards, Barrett, and 
Peake (1997) in their study of failed bills found the veto to be a potent 
mechanism. But Congress has its own agenda control mechanism in the 
omnibus technique in terms of getting controversial items by the president. 
With bundled bills, the president—even if he obtains some of the items 
he desires—may have to sign measures he dislikes to get what he wants. 
Therefore, a veto comes at a high cost because the president will be veto­
ing some items he really favors (Sinclair 1997). In sum, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, theory predicts that omnibus bills may be more a 
congressional tool than a presidential tool and that shared lawmaking may 
be the most likely state of affairs. 
Data and Method 
Scholars have used two techniques to study the interaction of the president 
and Congress as the legislative process progresses. Mark Peterson (1990) 
studied a sample of 299 presidential initiatives from the Eisenhower to the 
Reagan administrations (1953-1984). He traced them to passage or failure 
and assigned them various categories: inaction by Congress, congressional 
dominance, compromise, presidential dominance, and consensus. This clas­
sification is helpful for my purposes in terms of classifying which branch, 
if either, most drives particular instances of lawmaking. However, the suc­
cess or failure part of the classification is not applicable to an examination 
of omnibus bills because omnibus bills do not vary in how far they get: 
they invariably succeed. Moreover, this classification is president centered, 
tapping into how Congress engages the president on his own initiatives. 
I used a technique originally employed by Chamberlain (1946) and 
recently adapted by Charles Jones (1994) for classifying bills that gets at 
the nature of the interaction between the branches from the perspective of 
a system of shared powers. Chamberlain studied 90 major bills considered 
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(passes and failures) from 1873 to 1940. Jones examined 28 major bills 
enacted between 1953 and 1989 (i.e., successes only, no failures). These 
scholars placed each bill in their sample in one of three categories: con­
gressional preponderant (Congress is more dominant), presidential prepon­
derant (president is more dominant), or joint presidential-congressional 
action (shared lawmaking). 
To test the question of whether omnibus bills are more a congressional 
tool or a presidential tool, I used CQ Almanac and detail from LEGI-SLATE 
to build a legislative history for each omnibus bill and each typical major 
bill from 1979 to 1994. There were 87 omnibus bills in this period and 
263 typical major bills (like Chamberlain, I included both successes and 
failures). 
In studying these bills, I paid careful attention to the presidential-
congressional interaction. Charles Jones (1994) in particular shared in some 
detail how he went about studying the bills in his sample and how he deter­
mined the category in which they belonged. I followed his lead wherever 
possible in hopes of making replication of my work a possibility. Specifi­
cally, Jones mentioned several telltale signs of presidential preponderance, 
congressional preponderance, and shared lawmaking. I followed these tips 
quite closely; hence, I share them here. 
Presidential-preponderant bills include instances "when an issue is 
accepted as sufficiently vital to require bipartisan support for an administra­
tion plan. When that occurs, congressional support follows. Neither Con­
gress nor the opposition party forgoes its prerogatives, but all sides have rea­
son to work with the administration" (C.Jones 1994,212). Other regular 
instances of presidential preponderance are instances "when presidents are 
entrusted with a mandate and therefore normal presidential-congressional 
politics is suspended" (212). 
The initiative for congressional-preponderant legislation often comes 
primarily from Capitol Hill, not the White House. "The president was 
essentially an observer for much of this legislation—an active monitor, to 
be sure, but hardly serving as leader or manager of the lawmaking process" 
(C.Jones 1994,222). And while presidential-preponderant bills often fol­
low a more or less standard sequence, congressional-preponderant acts show 
considerable variation in sequence (C.Jones 1994). 
The shared-lawmaking category includes "enactments that reflect more 
balanced participation in lawmaking by the White House and Congress" 
(C.Jones 1994,238). Given that our lawmaking system by design requires 
laws to have the blessing of both branches, it is not surprising that this was 
the modal category in Jones's study. 
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My sample of bills includes both passes and failures, whereas Charles 
Jones studied only enactments. Therefore, some of my coding required deter­
mining which branch (if any) was more preponderant on failed bills. For 
these, I followed Chamberlain's work (1946), which included assigning 
failures into the categories used here. Chamberlain left less detail for future 
scholars than Jones. However, he apparently determined who led on these 
bills, who sought to block the legislation (in some cases), and who lost out 
the most in the defeat of the legislation. In my sample, many of these fail­
ures were vetoed bills or bills that stalled because a veto appeared imminent. 
While this coding process is not as clear-cut as the more common prac­
tice of studying presidential wins and losses on roll call votes (where a pres­
idential position is clearly given and covered by CQ), I found that it worked 
rather smoothly. I encourage other scholars to use it as well. 
In summary, I used the Chamberlain/C. Jones technique to analyze 
the 87 omnibus legislative histories and determined in which category the 
bills should be placed. To have a control group with which to compare the 
omnibus results, I also analyzed the 263 typical major bills from the same 
time period and determined in which category each of those bills should 
be placed. In terms of methods, I rely on basic descriptive tables to illus­
trate the findings. 
Findings 
Table 10.1 displays branch preponderance by type of bill (omnibus or typ­
ical major bill). This table demonstrates that lawmaking on both types of 
bills features much joint action. "Shared lawmaking" describes 65 percent 
of major bills and 70 percent of omnibus bills. For the remaining bills, there 
is a distinct difference between typical major bills and omnibus bills. On 
typical bills, presidential preponderance occurs 26 percent of the time and 
congressional preponderance 10 percent. For omnibus bills, the results are 
quite different. Presidential preponderance occurs only 9 percent of the 
time, while congressional preponderance occurs 21 percent of the time.The 
relationship between type of bill and branch preponderance is statistically 
significant in a two-way chi-square test (%2 = 14.47, p < .001). 
It appears that Congress gets its way on omnibus bills more than the 
president does, at least in comparison to the control group of typical major 
bills. It is also interesting to note that I found more presidential-prepon-
derant bills relative to congressional-preponderant bills in the typical major 
bills category than Charles Jones (1994) did. This discrepancy is largely 
due to the fact that Jones analyzed only successes, while I considered both 
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Table 10.1 
Preponderance by Type of Bill, 1979-1994 
Typical Major Omnibus 
Institutional Preponderance % (N) % (N) 
Congress 10 (26) 21 (18) 
Shared 65 (170) 70 (61) 
President 26 (67) 9 (8) 
Totalsa 101 (263) 100 (87) 
X2 = 14.47***(2d.£) 
Percentage totals may not equal 100 owing to rounding. 
**><.001. 
successes and failures. Some of the bills exhibiting presidential prepon­
derance were failures in which the president exercised the veto or a veto 
threat to block major legislation he disliked (this finding is consistent with 
results in Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997). By excluding failures, Charles 
Jones missed cases of presidential preponderance. Chamberlain (1946) 
examined both passed and failed major bills and for the 1931-1940 time 
frame found a similar breakdown of preponderance to that observed here 
(more presidential preponderance relative to congressional preponderance 
than Jones). 
Table 10.2 displays the results by presidential administration. The 
overall finding from Table 10.1 that lawmaking is mostly shared, with more 
presidential preponderance on typical bills, and that more congressional 
preponderance on omnibus bills holds across most administrations. The 
single exception is the first Reagan administration (1981-84), only the first 
two years of which featured Reagan leading on omnibus bills (and prompted 
the conventional wisdom that presidents dominate on omnibus bills).2 The 
overall finding for the first Reagan administration is that there is no dif­
ference in the two distributions. 
Table 10.3 divides the first Reagan administration (1981-84) into two 
Congresses for separate analysis. In so doing, the table demonstrates that 
the 1983-84 Reagan omnibus experience is quite similar to the general 
finding in Tables 10.1 and 10.2. Lawmaking is mostly shared, with more 
presidential preponderance on typical bills and more congressional pre­
ponderance on omnibus bills. The 1981-82 Reagan scenario is strikingly 
different in two ways. First, these data suggest less shared lawmaking on 
omnibus bills than typical major bills. Second, Reagan led more on omnibus 
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Table 10.2 
Preponderance by Type of Bill by Administration, 1979-1994 
Carter (1979-80) Reagan I (1981-84) 
Typical Omnibus Typical Omnibus 
Institutional 
Preponderance % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) 
Congress 12 (5) 13 (1) 14 (8) 18 (5) 
Shared 64 (27) 88 (7) 62 (36) 61 (17) 
President 24 (10) 0 (0) 24 (14) 21 (6) 
Totalsa 100 (42) 101 (8) 100 (58) 100 (28) 
Table 10.2 (contact) 
Reagan II (1985-88) Bush (1989-92) Clinton (1993-94) 
Typical Omnibus Typical Omnibus Typical Omnibus 
% (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) 
14 (7) 23 (5) 6 (4) 24 (5) 5 (2) 25 (2) 
59 (30) 73 (16) 70 (49) 76 (16) 67 (28) 63 (5) 
27 (14) 4 (1) 24 (17) 0 (0) 29 (12) 13 (1) 
100 (51) 100 (22) 100 (70) 100 (21) 101 (42) 101 (8) 
Percentage totals may not equal 100 owing to rounding. 
bills than typical major bills. It was in this Congress that Reagan success­
fully moved his economic agenda in omnibus bills. That experience started 
the conventional wisdom. 
In successive sessions of Congress, however, President Reagan learned 
to dislike the omnibus technique. Congressional leaders used the packages 
to push through measures the president opposed, such as several health care 
changes and reauthorizations for the Small Business Administration and 
the Department of Education (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., annually, 
1982-1989). In his final State of the Union address in 1988, Reagan (1989) 
declared, "Congress shouldn't send another one of these [omnibus bud­
getary acts]. No, and if you do, I will not sign it" (86). Reagan signed five 
omnibus bills into law that year. 
Omnibus bills vary in how many substantive policy areas they span. 
To see if there is variation in preponderance on the omnibus bills based on 
policy span, I separated the omnibus bills into three categories: those span­
ning 3 to 7 areas, those spanning 8 to 12 areas, and those spanning 13 or 
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Table 10.3 
Preponderance by Type of Bill by Congress, 1981-1984 
1981-82 1983-84 
Typical Omnibus Typical Omnibus 
Institutional 
Preponderance % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) 
Congress 12 (3) 13 (2) 16 (5) 23 (3) 
Shared 65 (17) 53 (8) 59 (19) 69 (9) 
President 
Totalsa 
23 
100 
(6) 
(26) 
33 
99 
(5) 
(15) 
25 
100 
(8) 
(32) 
8 
100 
(1) 
(13) 
Percentage totals may not equal 100 owing to rounding. 
Table 10.4 
Preponderance on Omnibus Bills by Policy Span, 1979-1994 
Number of Policy Areas Spanned 
<7 8-12 >13 
Institutional 
Preponderance % (N) % (N) % (N) 
Congress 24 (8) 20 (3) 18 (7) 
Shared 71 (24) 67 (10) 71 (27) 
President 6 (2) 13 (2) 11 (4) 
Totalsa' 101 (34) 100 (15) 100 (38) 
Percentage totals may not equal 100 owing to rounding. 
more areas. Table 10.4 shows that next to no variation in branch prepon­
derance occurs across these three categories. Congressional preponderance 
hovers around 20 percent, shared action at about 70 percent, and presiden­
tial preponderance at about 10 percent. Hence, the general findings from 
Table 10.1 hold across different compositions of omnibus bills.3 
Conclusion and Discussion 
I have focused in this chapter on the implications of the omnibus change 
for presidential-congressional relations. Do omnibus bills strengthen Con­
gress vis-a-vis the president compared to typical major bills? In summary, 
as we should expect from a constitutionally designed system of separated 
powers, my analysis demonstrates that much of major lawmaking (on 
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typical bills and on omnibus bills) is shared between the president and Con­
gress. Along these lines, Mark Peterson (1990) argued, the president and 
Congress need one another to make laws, a point made quite well to an ear­
lier generation of scholars by Chamberlain (1946). This point is consistent 
with the congressional-presidential omnibus game explored in detail and 
tested in earlier chapters, which predicts that items the president favors (his 
own agenda items) anditems the president dislikes will be significantly more 
likely to become attached to omnibus bills than typical bills. Clearly, presi­
dents negotiate with the Congress on the content of bills (Cameron 2000). 
However, there is an important difference between branch interaction 
on the two types of bills. On typical major bills, there is greater preponder­
ance for the president to lead in the legislative process, some of it through 
the use of the veto as an agenda control mechanism. But preponderance 
is greater for Congress on omnibus bills, as theory leads us to expect. This 
technique undercuts the presidential veto. 
Therefore, it appears that the Clinton experience was the typical one 
and the 1981-82 Reagan experience the exception. And the conventional 
wisdom that presidents dominate the Congress on omnibus bills is wrong. 
In the 1992-93 presidential transition meetings, the Clinton team should 
have considered the experience of presidents with omnibus bills in years 
other than 1981—82. However, in politics as in scholarship, conventional 
wisdom has a way of becoming ingrained and unquestioned. 
The Line-Item Veto 
What about the line-item veto (or statutory veto, as it is sometimes called)? 
The line-item veto was recently used by President Clinton until it was found 
mostly unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court (City of New York v. 
Clinton, Snake River Potato Growers v. Rubin).4 Much has been made of the 
line-item veto of late and how it might change lawmaking. Might it not 
allow the president to strip down these omnibus bills? However, the line-
item veto does not nearly make up for the weakening of the veto that has 
occurred with the proliferation of omnibus bills. 
The main limit of the line-item veto is that it can only be used on 
budget items. Yet the controversial parts of big omnibus bills are typically 
the policy change provisions, such as program authorizations, in the same 
bill with appropriations. These, under the line-item veto that was legal from 
January 1997 until February 1998, could not be vetoed. Further, even on 
budget items, President Clinton used the technique quite selectively, which 
is not entirely surprising given the shared nature of lawmaking. If Clinton 
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stripped down a bill entirely in one year, what chance would he have to get 
something he wanted enacted the following year? There are bounds within 
which behavior must occur for the branches to agree and enact policies. 
Presidential-Congressional Adaptation 
Finally, I think if we step back and think broadly about presidential-
congressional interaction and preponderance across the twentieth century, 
a picture of institutional adaptation back and forth between Congress and 
the president comes into view. Let me elaborate. 
Let's go back to the turn of the century, a period that Chamberlain 
(1946) studied in his analysis of important bills from 1873 to 1940. From 
1900 to 1930, congressional preponderance was the overwhelming category 
for major legislation. From 1931 to 1940, the New Deal decade, this pic­
ture changed dramatically to one where presidential preponderance became 
more likely than congressional preponderance. This change was in part 
because of special circumstances of that time. A large part of this switch 
from mostly congressional preponderance to a greater likelihood of presi­
dential preponderance, however, was due to the employment of the veto 
on a regular basis for the first time for political and policy reasons (Watson 
1988). President Franklin Roosevelt used the veto frequently as a policy 
tool, often successfully (Watson 1988). Before that, vetoes were ordinarily 
used for private bills, and only on occasion for reasons of policy (Watson 
1988). Presidential power probably accrued for other reasons in this time 
(e.g., through a complex budget process centering on the president), but 
the regular use of the veto for policy reasons surely increased the signifi­
cance and power of the president in the legislative arena. 
Chapter 7's analysis of the 1950 omnibus budget act demonstrates that 
one of the motivations for that bill was strengthening Congress in relation 
to the executive. Over the ensuing decades, we see a gradual increase in 
omnibus bill use by Congress. Since omnibus bills have the potential to 
make lawmaking at a minimum more shared between the branches than 
presidential preponderant, or at a maximum to make lawmaking more 
congressional preponderant, it appears that two institutional adaptations 
have occurred across time. First, presidents started using vetoes for policy 
reasons to get more power. Second, the rise of omnibus bills represents a 
reaction to this development in an effort to return some power to the Con­
gress in major lawmaking. Finally, a third adaptation to swing power back 
to the president in this regard was attempted in the form of the line-item 
veto, a tool to "unpack" omnibus bills. 
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In this regard, omnibus legislating is one development in an ongoing 
struggle for political power between Congress and the president. Lawrence 
Dodd (1977) similarly argued that relations between Congress and the 
president have a cyclical pattern. Indeed, his description of this cycle led to 
a prediction about legislative attempts to circumscribe presidential power. 
When decentralization in Congress (which describes the institutional sit­
uation in the heyday of the committee barons in the 1950s to 1970s) leads 
to "eventual presidential assault on Congress itself... Congress reacts by 
reforming its internal structure. Some reform efforts will involve legislation 
that attempts to circumscribe presidential action' (Dodd 1977, 306). This 
argument and the perspective and evidence presented in this chapter sug­
gest an additional interpretation for why omnibus usage has increased: 
Congress sought to find a way to increase its power in the legislative process 
vis-a-vis the president. 
However, this interpretation also makes it difficult to explain why 
Congress passed the line-item veto law in 1995. Why would members of 
Congress vote to give more power to the president? The simple answer may 
be because the Republicans won both Houses of Congress in 1994. In the 
decade prior to the 1994 congressional elections, the minority Republicans 
repeatedly argued for a line-item veto, which would have given Republican 
presidents some authority to strip out Democratic projects incorporated by 
the chamber majority leaders. Having pushed the line-item veto for so long, 
the Republicans made it part of their "Contract with America" campaign 
platform. It was sold as a budget deficit control tool. Therefore, the new 
Republican majority was somewhat bound to support the line-item veto 
when they gained control of Congress, despite the irony that they were 
giving this tool to a Democratic president. 
11 
Evaluating Omnibus Legislating 
The national media focus a great deal of attention on the legislative process 
in Congress. In addition, local media outlets, which typically share national 
political correspondents with one another and rely also on the satellite 
studios operated by both political parties, carry stories on the Congress 
that have a decidedly more local angle. Americans who read either medium 
on a regular basis often see the word omnibus in coverage of their national 
legislative institutions. 
In conversations I have had with people who are not legislative scholars 
and not inside-the-Beltway types, I typically receive the following comment 
when I tell them my research topic: "They're those big bills, aren't they. 
What are those all about?" Americans are accustomed to the word omnibus 
in American political discourse. However, their knowledge of omnibus leg­
islating represents little more than a cryptic definition of the concept. The 
public wants to know more. 
From another set of conversations I have with Capitol Hill staffers, I 
learn that Washington insiders know a bit more than the public about omni­
bus bills. They know that omnibus legislating is important. They know 
that it is controversial.1 But, with the exception of a select few policy mak­
ers and staff that bundle the bills in the House and Senate, the inside-
the-Beltway crowd views omnibus legislating as a black box. One staffer 
referred to such a legislative package as "the anonymous omnibus" (Staff 
Interviews 2000). 
Staffers know that the black box produces a potpourri of policy out­
comes, some nationally oriented and others particularistic (pork barrel pro­
jects). Insiders know that omnibus measures helped Congress address 
tough national issues like deficit reduction and health care. They also know 
that members of Congress seek to tuck their treasured district projects 
inside them. "They throw all this s in there," said a committee staffer 
(Staff Interviews 2000). A recurring anecdote I hear pertains to the chewing 
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gum research rider for an Illinois House district tucked away in the fall 
1998 bundled regular appropriations bill. The bottom line from insiders: 
"Omnibus bills are just a part of the process now." 
What everyone wants to know is why. Yet apart from brief mentions 
in textbooks and a chapter in Sinclair's (1997) excellent book Unorthodox 
Lawmaking, we in the legislative studies field have had little to say about 
omnibus bills. If truth be known, we know just a bit more than the public 
about omnibus bills and less than Washingtonians. I set out in this book 
to fill this void with a careful treatment of how omnibus legislating works 
and why. 
Though it is hard to talk about lawmaking and policy outputs in 
Congress without using the word omnibus, we political scientists typically 
punt on the omnibus topic. Sure, we try to deal with the formidable unit-
of-analysis issue that omnibus bills present to our studies of lawmaking 
(Binder 1999; Cameron et al. 2000; Mayhew 1991).2 However, we know 
little beyond that. At the beginning of this research project, one particular 
issue I had to deal with was the question of whether the topic was impor­
tant. If it was important, why had no one else offered a systematic, careful 
treatment of it? Perhaps research on omnibus legislating would not interest 
people. 
However, after a few months of digging around to develop a research 
design in 1997,1 realized just how important omnibus legislating is in 
Congress. Phone calls with former Senate staff colleagues of mine proved 
to me that people wanted to know about this topic. The descriptive reality 
was also inescapable. I learned the basic script that I offer at the front of this 
book. Omnibus legislation is a technique that has become a standard part 
of the contemporary legislative landscape in Washington. A significant 
proportion of major lawmaking is undertaken with this method, and many 
bills in Congress see the light at the end of the legislative process because 
they become attached to invariably successful omnibus bills. Omnibus bills 
alter the traditional lawmaking process in many ways. 
Deliberation and input from members at large is comparatively less than 
for typical major bills. In contrast, omnibus bills greatly empower the cen­
tral party leadership. The "smoking gun" question, though, is: Why omnibus 
bills? In the lexicon of Rohde and Aldrich (1998), what conditions led to 
the development of the strong party tool that is omnibus legislating? Every 
chapter in this book was part of my effort to answer that question. In this 
final chapter, I begin by highlighting my answers and suggesting what 
they mean for theories of congressional change. I then discuss an important 
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topic in light of the findings: the normative implications of omnibus leg­
islating. Knowing more about the "what is" of omnibus legislating informs 
our conversation of "what should be." 
The ensuing discussion leads to two arguments. First, any overarching 
theory of institutional change must be evolutionary. It must include and 
link both strategic behavior on the part of political actors and institutional 
adaptation to a changing political environment. Congress is a social system 
that adapts to the internal balance of forces and the external strains of the 
environment. Emphasizing one category of explanation (political struggles 
or institutional concerns) over another leaves a drastically incomplete pic­
ture of congressional evolution. 
Second, omnibus bills, while having significant drawbacks for democ­
ratic deliberation, do indeed have value. They help make it possible to 
accomplish things that would not be possible through traditional methods 
in an increasingly complex political environment, and in a system that allows 
for fragmentation by constitutional design. 
Why Omnibus Legislating? 
The 1990s might well be viewed in historical perspective as the decade of 
debates in congressional scholarship. In the study of congressional com­
mittees and floor procedures, three main camps developed. One group of 
scholars (e.g., Krehbiel 1991) advocated an informational theory of Con­
gress that focused on explanations of congressional behavior and organiza­
tion that center on information and efficiency. Scholars who advocated a 
distributive theory of Congress (e.g., Baron 1991; Baron and Ferejohn 1989) 
argued that the best way to understand Congress was from a reelection-
driven, logrolling perspective. Finally, partisan scholars (e.g., Cox and 
McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991) posited that congressional behavior was 
best understood through rigorous consideration of the majority party power 
apparatus. 
Among those studying institutional change, a similar debate has ensued. 
Organizational theorists maintain that Congress evolves to adapt to strains 
created by the environment, an argument that is intellectually consistent 
with Krehbiels informational theory because both at base are about effi­
ciency. In contrast, a group I have called "purposive" scholars (including 
partisan and distributive proponents) argue that institutional changes are 
the result of political struggles. 
This study shows an important role for both viewpoints. There is 
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certainly a political undercurrent to omnibus legislating. This point was 
supported by findings in the omnibus attachment test and the longitudinal 
test. I found numerous omnibus attachments that were party centered or 
distributive in nature: that is, they were not median voter pieces of legisla­
tion. Omnibus bills help insulate controversial party agenda items and pork 
barrel projects from opposition and scrutiny. The longitudinal test demon­
strated that the majority party bundles bills when they face a unified and 
vocal minority party, a finding consistent with Binder's (1997) work on rules 
changes in the House and Senate. Also, when the chambers differ in their 
policy preferences, omnibus bills are employed more often. 
That politics abound in omnibus legislating may not surprise many 
people, whether they are members of the public, Washingtonians, or polit­
ical scientists. The conventional wisdom on omnibus bills, supplied by the 
national media and Congress watcher groups, states that omnibus packages 
are political vehicles. 
What may surprise some people are my strong findings for an efficiency 
rationale of omnibus legislating. Collective institutional concerns crept up 
at every turn I made in this research project. The use of omnibus packag­
ing appears to be driven not only by raw politics but also, to a large extent, 
by efficiency. Bills are slipped into omnibus measures to get around the 
gridlock of fragmented committees and to enact congressional items over 
an unwilling president. Longitudinally, the strongest factor independently 
and through interactions was issue complexity. As the complexity of the 
issue agenda increased and issues increasingly spilled over into more than 
one committee, Congress found omnibus bills a useful tool for getting 
things done. According to the case evidence presented in chapter 7, the ini­
tial omnibus employment in 1950 was driven by collective concerns. Later 
chapters have demonstrated that omnibus legislating improves aggregate 
legislative productivity and congressional power vis-a-vis the president. 
Taken together, these results support the evolutionary theoretical frame­
work of institutional change that I developed in chapter 3, which includes 
a micro-level, rational-actor perspective combined with a macro-level effi­
ciency component. Like other social systems, Congress must adapt to its 
environment as well as to the internal balance of forces within the institu­
tion. While the politicking that goes on around omnibus bills often receives 
negative coverage in the media (as in Will's [1998] garbage pail analogy), 
the efforts of strategic politicians make institutions vibrant. As King (1997) 
argued, "Legislative entrepreneurs breathe life into legislatures and help 
governments embrace new problems" (147). Healthy institutions are adap­
tive and flexible from without and within. 
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What does this approach mean for the three main theories of Congress? 
The bottom line of this study is that these competing viewpoints (infor­
mational, partisan, distributive) are only partial explanations. Alone, they 
provide an incomplete picture of institutional behavior and change. As we 
saw in the empirical tests of my theoretical framework of omnibus usage, 
all these viewpoints received empirical support. Omnibus bills simultane­
ously serve the goals of efficiency, partisan politics, and logrolling for 
enhancing reelection. A broad theory of institutional change must find a 
place for all three explanations. As Bryan Jones (1998) eloquently stated, 
"Each of these depictions represents something important about Congress— 
because our national legislature is an adaptive organization facing compet­
ing demands. So long as an adaptive, evolving organization faces multiple 
demands, its solutions . .  . will be an evolving compromise" (466). 
A handful of scholars have resisted the temptation of becoming overly 
attached to one explanation of Congress. Maltzman (1995,1997) suggested 
that all three explanations (efficiency or informational, partisan, and dis­
tributive) have a role in explaining congressional committee behavior vis-
a-vis various principals. The particular explanation of Congress supported 
(in the form of which principal a committee responds to) is dependent on 
the salience or prominence of a committee's issue agenda. "The respon­
siveness of committees and committee delegations to their chamber and 
parent parties clearly hinges on the issues before the committees. Where 
the chamber or party shares high interest in a committee's work, the panel 
is most likely to be a faithful agent of those principals" (Maltzman 1995, 
677). Outlier committees with distributive logrolls are more likely on issues 
that are less salient to the chamber and parties. 
Dodd (1997) also cast a broad theoretical net. He argued that under­
standing congressional change requires multiple theoretical lenses. In 
particular, he both focused on strategic-level behavior of purposive politi­
cians and stepped back to consider the adaptation of the institution more 
broadly. Along these same lines, my theoretical framework of omnibus 
legislation features strategic-level bargaining grounded in particular polit­
ical contexts and is solidly supported by empirical testing. Institutions change 
gradually over time in a way that benefits actors in the process politically 
and provides a way for institutions to adapt so that they may endure. 
What does this discussion in particular and this study of omnibus 
legislating suggest for future scholarship? For one, it suggests that future 
research ought to cast a broad theoretical net in studying how our lawmak­
ing institutions change. It also suggests that a long time horizon is needed 
in any study of institutional change. 
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This study demonstrates as well that lawmaking and budgeting are 
intertwined. Many of the omnibus bills in this study were large budget items 
that carried policy attachments. In the legislative studies subfield, we tend 
to separate the legislative process of bills from the budgeting and appro­
priations process. For example, many studies of lawmaking outputs exclude 
appropriations and focus exclusively on traditional bills. Such an approach 
misses many policy innovations, such as the health care policy changes 
made through budget reconciliation shown in chapter 8. 
Much more research should be undertaken on the topic of omnibus 
legislation. While I am comfortable with the analysis and work I have 
offered in this book, I have certainly not covered the entire range of the 
topic. Indeed, I may have raised as many questions in this study as I have 
answered. For example, the micro-level portion of the theoretical frame­
work features two important relationships (party leaders-members and 
Congress-president). Much could be gained theoretically from formal 
models that predict when omnibus bargains are struck between these actors. 
Even something as simple as a game involving three legislators, each with 
a particularistic bill he or she wants enacted, that is played out in the pres­
ence of an agenda setter could lead to important insights. 
Additionally, further research should examine why omnibus legislating 
is kept within certain bounds and not used all the time. I have argued that 
leaders do not bundle bills all the time for fear of member retribution and 
presidential vetoes. However logical this may seem, my empirical test of 
that notion (demonstrating that particularly large attachments to omnibus 
bills are unlikely) is indirect. A study aimed squarely at why omnibus bills 
are held below a threshold is needed. Again, I invite fellow scholars, espe­
cially those who use formal analyses and who might think of this thresh­
old as an equilibrium, to take up this question. 
Finally, future research should examine the timing of omnibus legis­
lation. If omnibus bills are used for efficiency purposes as well as for polit­
ical purposes, then we should expect them to be more heavily used during 
the busiest times on the Hill (the end of a session). Timing might also be 
important in the Congress-president omnibus dynamic. The president might 
be operating from a better strategic position on an omnibus bill at the end 
of the second session (i.e., in even years), when the Congress is trying to 
get out of town to campaign. The few omnibus bills that President Clin­
ton dominated in the second term of his presidency came at that point in 
the congressional cycle (especially the bundles of budget items in 1996 and 
1998). 
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Normative Implications of Omnibus Legislating 
What are the normative implications of the findings of this book? What 
are the costs and benefits of doing business aboard an omnibus? What is 
the value of omnibus legislation? By discussing these questions, one recog­
nizes the tension between representation and responsiveness. Chapter 1 
brought into clear view some of the drawbacks of omnibus legislation. This 
technique alters lawmaking in important ways. Omnibus use potentially 
changes many critical concepts and relationships in American politics, 
including the member-constituent relationship and the proper level of delib­
eration on legislation. 
Omnibus bills obscure the pathways of representation and affect demo­
cratic accountability. Because of their size and complexity, these packages 
make it less clear to constituents where members of Congress stand on the 
important issues of the day. They potentially dissolve what Arnold (1990) 
called the "causal chain" (13) between members and constituents. Members 
can choose which of many parts of an omnibus bill they will call attention 
to as a way of explaining their vote. Challengers, too, can pick particular 
parts of omnibus bills with which to hammer their election opponent. 
This technique changes the deliberative process. Omnibus bills are often 
fast-tracked through committees with fewer hearings and less markup 
consideration than would be expected from several important standard bills 
(Sinclair 1997; Smith 1989). Once assembled in the prefloor process, they 
are treated as one piece of legislation, thus seriously restricting the choices 
available to members on the floor (Oleszek 1989; Sinclair 1992,1995,1997; 
Smith 1989). In sum, there are drawbacks to omnibus lawmaking in terms 
of democratic theory 
On the other hand, there are many benefits of omnibus legislation. First 
among these is the potential to get things done in the legislative process by 
managing uncertainty. Omnibus bills provide a way to enact policies that 
might not make it alone. They provide a way to circumvent the pressures 
of deficit politics and issue complexity, the gridlock of divided government, 
and the gridlock of committee jurisdiction fragmentation. Chapter 9 pro­
vides evidence that omnibus utilization helps make our lawmaking appa­
ratus more productive, and Chapter 10 suggests that omnibus bills are a way 
for Congress to increase its power vis-a-vis the president. In this regard, 
omnibus bills tell a collective story of successful strategic-level and institu­
tional adaptation to challenging circumstances. 
However, there are limits to the scope of change of policy that may be 
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incorporated into omnibus bills. My theoretical framework suggested that 
there are limits to how often omnibus bills may be used and how promi­
nent the attachments to omnibus bills maybe before the two main omnibus 
bargains break down (leaders-members and Congress-president). In this 
respect, omnibus legislating is self-regulating on the basis of the dynamics 
of those two relationships. 
Omnibus bills are probably most useful for midlevel policy change. 
Legislative proposals for large-scale changes are more likely to have to go 
it alone. On the other hand, these limits are reassuring from the standpoint 
of representation and democratic deliberation. Using omnibus bills all the 
time would not be good in this respect. For very major changes, we want a 
bill to be enacted through a process of full deliberation and consideration. 
Thankfully, it appears that omnibus legislation operates within some 
bounds defined by the players. This makes it a useful tool for getting things 
done without requiring a total sacrifice of the tenets of democracy. On 
balance, then, it is arguably worth the sacrifice of deliberation and represen­
tation, up to a point, to use omnibus legislation for making policy. To the 
extent that use has some defined limits, therefore, omnibus bills arguably 
are good for legislative institutions and have value for democratic politics. 
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Constructing a Data Set of Bills 
per Congress 
I describe here in more detail how the Baumgartner and Jones data set 
(Baumgartner et al. 1997) of annual Congressional Quarterly (CQ)Almanac 
articles (stories) was used to construct a data set of major bills per Con­
gress. As one portion of their large National Science Foundation project 
"Policy Agendas in the United States since 1945," Baumgartner and Jones 
captured information on every story written in the CQAlmanacs from 1948 
to 1994 (this information is accessible on line in Microsoft Excel format 
at http://depts.washington.edu/ampol/). This particular data set was the 
result of a three-year coding effort from 1994 to 1997 that I (as a graduate 
student) helped direct in consultation with the principal investigators. 
Two shortcomings of the data set for my purposes here, however, are 
that the unit of analysis is the story (not the legislation) and that the time 
increment is a year. For the present study, I needed the unit of analysis to 
be the bill and the time increment to be a Congress (biennial). Some adjust­
ments and recoding, therefore, were needed. Most CQ stories are about leg­
islation, and the Baumgartner and Jones project coded the bill numbers and 
other information (when present in the story) needed to discern legislative 
from other stories. Other CQ topics (besides legislation) include stories about 
activities of the Supreme Court, presidential activity, the behavior of vot­
ers in elections, and nonlegislative congressional currencies like treaties and 
nominations. To get to a bill unit of analysis, I began by purging these non-
legislative stories. 
The second challenge was obtaining a Congress time increment. CQ 
Almanac is published annually, whereas Congress meets two years at a time. 
A bill covered in the 1989 CQ Almanac, for example, may pass Congress in 
1990. That bill may appear to fail in the 1989 Almanac but pass later so that 
the correct information will be in a story in the 1990 Almanac. Moreover, 
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one bill considered in both years of a Congress may receive a story in both 
annual editions of the Almanac. Hence, I reconciled the two years of a Con­
gress with one another to avoid duplications (and to obtain the fullest and 
most accurate information on the bills). 
This important process of making the yearly Baumgartner and Jones 
CQ story data set into a data set of bills per Congress was quite time con­
suming, involving 46 years (23 Congresses) of data and about 12,600 CQ 
stories. One side benefit of completing this challenging task was that the 
eight Congresses covering the period from 1979 through 1994 were already 
in a biennial bill unit-of-analysis format for the "hitching-a-ride" empirical 
test in chapter 5. 
Appendix 2 
Policy Agendas Project Topic and 
Subtopic Categories 
For each major topic, all subtopics are listed. Each major topic includes a 
code 99 for "other" subtopics that did not fit into any of the categories and 
for which there were too few cases to justify the creation of a new category. 
In addition, the general (00) subtopic includes cases where more than one 
distinct subtopic was discussed. For example, if a case discussed both water 
pollution (code 701) and air pollution (code 705), it would be coded as a 
general environmental issue (code 700). Thus, the general category within 
each major topic area includes some cases that are truly general as well as 
some cases that are a combination of as few as two subtopics. A list of "see 
also" suggestions is provided for categories that have close links with other 
subtopics. The topic and subtopic numbers are consecutive. Please see the 
Policy Agendas Project Web site for a more thorough topic codebook with 
numerous examples for each subtopic category: http://depts.washington.edu/ 
ampol/. 
1. Macroeconomics 
100: General Domestic Macroeconomic Issues (includes combinations of 
multiple subtopics). 
101: Inflation, Prices, and Interest Rates. 
103: Unemployment Rate. See also 502 and 503, solutions to unemploy­
ment problems. 
104: Monetary Supply, Federal Reserve Board, and the Treasury. See also 
1808, exchange rates; 1501, Federal Reserve banking issues. 
105: National Budget and Debt. 
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107: Taxation, Tax Policy, and Tax Reform. See also 2009, Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) administration. 
108: Industrial Policy. See also 1806, international business competition; 
1403, economic development programs. 
110: Price Control and Stabilization. 
199: Other. 
2. Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties 
200: General (includes combinations of multiple subtopics). 
201: Ethnic Minority and Racial Group Discrimination. 
202: Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination. 
204: Age Discrimination. 
205: Handicap or Disease Discrimination. 
206: Voting Rights and Issues. 
207: Freedom of Speech. 
208: Right to Privacy. 
209: Antigovernment Activities. 
299: Other. 
3. Health 
300: General (includes combinations of multiple subtopics). See also 
1300, general Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
appropriations. 
301: Health Care Reform, Health Care Costs, Insurance Costs and 
Availability. 
303: Medicare and Medicaid. 
306: Regulation of Prescription Drugs, Medical Devices, and Medical 
Procedures. See also 1520, business competition in the drug industry. 
307: Health Facilities Construction and Regulation, Public Health Service. 
See also 311, nursing home regulation. 
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309: Mental Illness and Mental Retardation. 
310: Medical Fraud, Malpractice, and Physician Licensing Requirements. 
311: Elderly Health Issues. See also 303, elderly and Medicare; 1303, elderly 
assistance programs. 
312: Infants, Children, and Immunization. 
313: Health Manpower Needs and Training Programs. 
315: Military Health Care. 
331: Drug and Alcohol Treatment. See also 332, alcohol abuse and treat­
ment; 334, illegal drug abuse and treatment. 
332: Alcohol Abuse and Treatment. See also 331, drug and alcohol abuse. 
333: Tobacco Abuse, Treatment, and Education. 
334: Illegal Drug Abuse, Treatment, and Education. See also 1203, drug 
trafficking and abuse; 306, regulation of prescription drugs. 
349: Specific Diseases. 
398: Research and Development. 
399: Other. 
4. Agriculture 
400: General (includes combinations of multiple subtopics). 
401: Agricultural Trade. See also 1800, general foreign trade; 1502, agri­
cultural commodities trading. 
402: Government Subsidies to Farmers and Ranchers, Agricultural Dis­
aster Insurance. See also 1404, farm real estate financing. 
403: Food Inspection and Safety (including seafood). See also 401, inspec­
tion of food imports. 
404: Agricultural Marketing, Research, and Promotion. 
405: Animal and Crop Disease and Pest Control. See also 704 for pollu­
tion effects of pesticides; 403 for pesticide residues on foods. 
498: Agricultural Research and Development. 
499: Other. 
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5. Labor, Employment, and Immigration 
500: General (includes combinations of multiple subtopics). 
501: Worker Safety and Protection, Occupational Safety and Health Ad­
ministration (OSHA). 
502: Employment Training and Workforce Development. 
503: Employee Benefits. See also 2004, federal employee benefits. 
504: Employee Relations and Labor Unions. See also 1926, International 
Labor Organization; 1202, illegal activities of labor unions. 
505: Fair Labor Standards. 
506: Youth Employment and Youth Job Corps Programs. See also: 501, 
child labor safety. 
508: Parental Leave and Child Care. 
529: Migrant and Seasonal Workers, Farm Labor Issues. 
530: Immigration and Refugee Issues. See also 1524, tourism; 1929, pass­
port issues. 
599: Other. 
6. Education 
600: General (includes combinations of multiple subtopics). 
601: Higher Education. See also 1611, military education. 
602: Elementary and Secondary Education. 
603: Education of Underprivileged Students. See also 201, school deseg­
regation efforts. 
604: Vocational Education. 
606: Special Education. 
607: Education Excellence. 
609: Arts and Humanities. See also 1707, public broadcasting; 1798, 
National Science Foundation (NSF) funding. 
698: Research and Development. 
699: Other. 
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7. Environment 
700: General (includes combinations of multiple subtopics). 
701: Water Pollution and Drinking Water Safety. 
703: Waste Disposal. 
704: Hazardous Waste and Toxic Chemical Regulation, Treatment, and 
Disposal. 
705: Air Pollution, Global Warming, and Noise Pollution. 
707: Recycling. 
708: Indoor Environmental Hazards. 
709: Species and Forest Protection. 
710: Coastal Water Pollution and Conservation. 
711: Land and Water Conservation. See also 2104, water development 
projects. 
798: Research and Development. 
799: Other. 
8. Energy 
800: General (includes combinations of multiple subtopics). 
801: Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issues. 
See also 501, nuclear worker safety; 1614, defense-related nuclear waste; 
704, nuclear waste. 
802: Electricity and Hydroelectricity. 
803: Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas). See also 
2103, mineral resources of the outer continental shelf; 710, oil spills; 1520, 
antitrust issues in oil and gas distribution. 
805: Coal. 
806: Alternative and Renewable Energy. 
807: Energy Conservation. 
898: Research and Development. 
899: Other. 
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10. Transportation 
1000: General (includes combinations of multiple subtopics). See also 1003, 
budget requests and appropriations for the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) 
and Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). 
1001: Mass Transportation and Safety. 
1002: Highway Construction, Maintenance, and Safety. 
1003: Airports, Airlines, Air Traffic Control and Safety. 
1005: Railroad Transportation and Safety. 
1006: Truck and Automobile Transportation and Safety. See also 806, 
automobile Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards; 705, 
automobile emissions regulation. 
1007: Maritime Issues. See also 2104, port development and construction; 
1915, Panama Canal. 
1010: Public Works (Infrastructure Development). See also 800, energy 
projects; 2104, water projects. 
1098: Research and Development. 
1099: Other. 
12. Law, Crime, and Family Issues 
1200: General (includes combinations of multiple subtopics). 
1201: Executive Branch Agencies Dealing With Law and Crime. See also 
1800, U.S. Customs appropriations. 
1202: White-Collar Crime and Organized Crime. See also 1203, drug-
related money laundering. 
1203: Illegal Drug Production, Trafficking, and Control. 
1204: Court Administration. See also 1205, parole issues; 1210, criminal 
sentencing requirements and civil suit guidelines. 
1205: Prisons. 
1206: Juvenile Crime and the Juvenile Justice System. 
1207: Child Abuse and Child Pornography. 
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1208: Family Issues. 
1209: Police, Fire, and Weapons Control. 
1210: Criminal and Civil Code. 
1211: Riots, Crime, and Crime Prevention. See also 1208, domestic 
violence. 
1299: Other. 
13. Social Welfare 
1300: General. See also 300, DHH S appropriations specific to health; 300 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) appropriations 
specific to health; 600 DHE W appropriations specific to education. 
1301: Food Stamps, Food Assistance, and Nutrition Monitoring Programs. 
See also 349, the role of diets in disease prevention. 
1302: Poverty and Assistance for Low-Income Families. See also 1204, legal 
assistance for the poor. 
1303: Elderly Issues and Elderly Assistance Programs (Including Social 
Security Administration). See also 311, elderly health issues; 1301, elderly 
nutrition assistance programs; 1408, elderly housing. 
1304: Assistance to the Disabled and Handicapped. See also 205, handi­
capped access to federal buildings. 
1305: Social Services and Volunteer Associations. See also 1929, Peace 
Corps. 
1399: Other. 
14. Community Development and Housing Issues. 
1400: General. 
1401: Housing and Community Development. See also 1403, urban eco­
nomic development; 1405, rural economic development. 
1403: Urban Economic Development and General Urban Issues. See also 
2001, intergovernmental relations. 
1404: Rural Housing and Federal Housing Authority (FHA) Housing 
Assistance Programs. See also 1405, rural economic development. 
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1405: Rural Economic Development. See also: 802 rural electric devel­
opment. 
1406: Low- and Middle-Income Housing Programs and Needs. See also 
200, fair housing initiatives and discrimination in housing; 1408, elderly 
housing. 
1407: Veterans Housing Assistance and Military Housing Programs. 
1408: Elderly and Handicapped Housing. 
1409: Housing Assistance for the Homeless and Homeless Issues. See also 
603, education of homeless children. 
1410: Secondary Mortgage Market. See also 1504, consumer mortgages. 
1499: Other. 
15. Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce 
1500: General. 
1501: U.S. Banking System and Financial Institution Regulation. See also 
104, Federal Reserve Board issues; 1525, Truth-in-Lending Act; 1202, 
prosecution of financial institution crimes. 
1502: Securities and Commodities Regulation. 
1504: Consumer Finance, Mortgages, and Credit Cards. See also 1410, 
government mortgage programs. 
1505: Insurance Regulation. See also 1523,flood and earthquake insurance. 
1507: Bankruptcy. See also 1204, bankruptcy courts. 
1520: Corporate Mergers, Antitrust Regulation, and Corporate Manage­
ment Issues. See also 1501, banking deregulation; 1003, airline deregulation; 
1005, railroad deregulation; 1006, trucking deregulation; 1706, telephone 
deregulation; 1526, sports regulation; 803, oil industry deregulation; 1505, 
insurance industry regulation. 
1521: Small Business Issues and the Small Business Administration (SBA). 
See also 1523, small business disaster loan programs; 201, SBA minority 
business programs; 1609, Veterans Administration (VA) small business 
loans. 
1522: Copyrights and Patents. 
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1523: Domestic Disaster Relief. 
1524: Tourism. See also 530, immigration and refugee issues; 1929, pass­
port issues. 
1525: Consumer Safety and Consumer Fraud. See also 708, protection 
from indoor radiation hazards; 1504, fraudulent land sales. 
1526: Sports and Gambling Regulation. 
1599: Other. 
16. Defense 
1600: General. See also 1701, National Aeronautics and Space Adminis­
tration (NASA)/Department of Defense (DoD) issues. 
1602: U.S. and Other Defense Alliances, U.S. Security Assistance. 
1603: Military Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Espionage. 
1604: Military Readiness, Coordination of Armed Services Air Support 
and Sea-Lift Capabilities, and National Stockpiles of Strategic Materials. 
See also 803, strategic petroleum reserves; 1616 defense industry. 
1605: Arms Control and Nuclear Nonproliferation. 
1606: Military Aid and Weapons Sales. 
1608: Manpower, Military Personnel and Dependents (Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Marines), Military Court. See also 315, military health care. 
1609: VA Issues. See also 315, veterans' health care; 601, VA education 
benefits; 1407, VA housing; 1409, homeless veterans. 
1610: Military Procurement and Weapons Systems Acquisitions and 
Evaluation. See also 1617, oversight of defense contractors and contractor 
fraud; 1604, adequacy of supplies. 
1611: Military Installations, Construction, and Land Transfers. 
1612: National Guard and Reserve Affairs. See also 601, ROTC college 
education. 
1614: Military Nuclear and Hazardous Waste Disposal, Military Environ­
mental Compliance. See also 704, nonmilitary hazardous waste disposal. 
1615: Civil Defense (War Related). See also 1523, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), domestic (weather related) disaster relief. 
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1616: Department of Defense Civilian Personnel, Civilian Employment 
by the Defense Industry, Military Base Closings. 
1617: Oversight of Defense Contracts and Contractors. 
1619: Direct War-Related Issues. See also 1620, settlement of war related 
claims against the U.S. government. 
1620: Relief of Claims against the U.S. Military. 
1698: Research and Development. 
1699: Other. 
17. Space, Science, Technology and Communications 
1700: General. See also 1798, NSF research funding. 
1701: NASA, U.S. Government Use of Space, Space Exploration 
Agreements. 
1704: Commercial Use of Space, Satellites. See also 1707, satellite TV 
broadcasting; 1708, weather satellites. 
1705: Science Technology Transfer, International Scientific Cooperation. 
1706: Telephone and Telecommunication Regulation. See also 208, tele­
phone privacy; 1525, telephone marketing fraud. 
1707: Broadcast Industry Regulation (TV, Cable, Radio). See also 1929, 
Radio Free Europe. 
1708: Weather Forecasting and Related Issues, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Oceanography. See also 710, 
protection of marine environments. 
1709: Computer Industry and Computer Security. 
1798: Research and Development. 
1799: Other. 
18. Foreign Trade 
1800: General. See also 401, foreign agricultural trade. 
1802: Trade Negotiations, Disputes, and Agreements. 
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1803: Export Promotion and Regulation, Export-Import Bank. 
1804: International Private Business Investments, Overseas Private Invest­
ment Corporation. 
1806: Productivity and Competitiveness of U.S. Business, U.S. Balance of 
Payments. 
1807: Tariff and Import Restrictions, Import Regulation. 
1808: Exchange Rates and Related Issues. 
1899: Other. 
19. International Affairs and Foreign Aid 
1900: General (Department of State and U.S. Information Agency 
Appropriations). 
1901: U.S. Foreign Aid. 
1902: International Resources Exploitation and Resources Agreement. See 
also 700, domestic environmental protection. 
1903: U.S. Territorial Issues. 
1905: Developing Countries Issues (for financial issues see 1906). See also 
1911, famine in Africa. 
1906: International Finance and Economic Development. 
1907: China. 
1908: Soviet Union and Former Republics. See also 1605, US.-Soviet arms 
agreements; 1901, U.S. foreign aid to the former Soviet Union. 
1909: Eastern Europe. 
1910: Western Europe, Common Market Issues. 
1911: Africa. 
1912: South Africa. 
1914: Latin America (South America, Central America, Mexico, Carib­
bean Basin, Cuba). 
1915: Panama Canal Issues. 
1919: Asia, Pacific Rim, Australia, and Japan. 
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1920: Middle East 
1925: Human Rights. 
1926: International Organizations Other Than Finance: United Nations 
(UN), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), International Red Cross. 
1927: Terrorism, Hijacking. 
1929: U.S. Diplomats, U.S. Embassies, U.S. Citizens Abroad, Foreign 
Diplomats in the U.S., Passports. 
1999: Other. 
20. Government Operations 
2000: General (Including Budget Requests and Appropriations for 
Multiple Departments and Agencies). 
2001: Intergovernmental Relations. 
2002: Government Efficiency and Bureaucratic Oversight. See also 
appropriations for departments and agencies under topical field. 
2003: Postal Service Issues (Including Mail Fraud). See also 201, racial 
discrimination in the U.S. Postal Service. 
2004: Government Employee Benefits, Civil Service Issues. See also 200, 
discrimination in federal government employment. 
2005: Nominations and Appointments. 
2006: Currency, Commemorative Coins, Medals, U.S. Mint. See also 104, 
monetary policy. 
2007: Government Procurement, Procurement Fraud and Contractor Man­
agement. See also 1610, military procurement; 1617, military contractor 
oversight. 
2008: Government Property Management. 
2009: Internal Revenue Service Administration. See also 107, taxation. 
2010: Nixon Impeachment. 
2011: Federal Government Branch Relations and Administrative Issues, 
Congressional Operations. 
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2012: Regulation of Political Campaigns, Political Advertising, PAC reg­
ulation, Voter Registration, Government Ethics. 
2013: Census. 
2014: District of Columbia Affairs. 
2015: Relief of Claims against the U.S. Government. 
2030: Federal Holidays. 
2099: Other. 
21. Public Lands and Water Management 
2100: General. 
2101: National Parks, Recreation, and Historic Sites. 
2102: Native American Affairs. 
2103: Natural Resources, Public Lands, and Forest Management. See also 
709, animal and forest protection. 
2104: Water Resources Development. See also 711, water and soil conser­
vation; 1007, maritime issues. 
2199: Other. 

Notes 
Chapter 1 
1. I shall more carefully define omnibus legislating below. Currently, there is 
no agreed-upon technical definition of omnibus bill (Sinclair 1997, 64). 
2. In a study of prominent failures, Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) did 
not find many omnibus bills. That they did not find any is not surprising because 
omnibus bills almost always succeed. 
3. Similarly, Steven Smith (1989) found "a significant contraction in the num­
ber of major bills reaching the Housefloor" in the early 1980s compared to the late 
1970s (55). Further, enacted laws, while smaller in number, are much longer in 
recent times than they used to be (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1996). The total 
number of bills is decreasing as well. Bill introductions declined steadily in the 
1970s, dropped dramatically in the 96th Congress (1979—80), and continued to de­
cline through the 1980s and 1990s (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1996,158-59). 
4. Unfortunately, many formal analyses of Congress leave out omnibus or 
"multidimensional" bills by employing a unidimensional assumption (e.g., Cox 
and McCubbins 1993; Krehbiel 1991, 1998). Unidimensional simply means that 
actors view a bill along the same dimension, which is typically assumed to be a 
conservative-liberal dimension. The existence of multiple dimensions complicates 
the formal modeling enterprise (Riker 1980). Yet much is lost theoretically with 
this approach because the manipulation of the salient issue dimensions is the inter­
esting part; it is the way that party leaders exercise power with the omnibus tech­
nique (see McKissick 1995 for a similar critique of unidimensional assumptions in 
studies of lobbying). 
5. Another prominent use of riders by members is to kill a bill (e.g., Enelow 
1981; Enelow and Koehler 1979,1980; Wilkerson 1999). 
6. Keith Krehbiel's (1998) pivotal-politics theory of lawmaking and David 
Brady and Craig Volden's (1998) revolving gridlock conception similarly suggested 
that two critical pivots exist in lawmaking: one within Congress (the filibuster) and 
the other the presidential veto. 
7. One effect already explored in the literature is the impact of omnibus use on 
party leader strength (Sinclair 1992). Sinclair presented evidence that omnibus bills 
are one of many reasons why party leadership has become stronger since the 1970s. 
8. C. Lawrence Evans's recent piece on legislative structure exemplifies this 
trend (1999). In an otherwise impressive review of the literature on legislative 
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1991; Oleszek 1989; Smith 1989). Baumgartner et al. (1997) plotted trends, rely­
ing on a CQJndication of omnibus bill. Sinclair (1997) documented a percentage 
increase in omnibus use but did not indicate precisely how omnibus bills were 
selected. 
2. Indeed, my categorization of omnibus bills based on the concept differs 
in significant ways from a categorization of bills named omnibus. My opera­
tionalization produces 242 omnibus bills from 1949 through 1994, while the other 
classification yields 115 (less than half). Moreover, 17 of the 115 bills named omni­
bus did not meet my definition standards and thus are not in my population of 
omnibus bills. 
3. Baumgartner et al. 1997. The Baumgartner and Jones project coded in­
formation from every article in annual CQ Almanacs from 1949 through 1994. 
Appendix 1 contains more detailed information on the use of this source. 
4. As a researcher on the Policy Agendas Project, I was involved in the devel­
opment of the topic-coding system. I have had extensive experience using it. 
5. This omnibus trend could be misleading if the total number of bills is also 
increasing across the post-World War II period. In fact, the total number of bills 
has been decreasing. Bill introductions declined steadily in the 1970s, dropped dra­
matically in the 96th Congress (1979-80), and continued to decline through the 
1980s and 1990s (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1996, 158-9). This is the same 
time period in which omnibus use soared. 
6. The Baumgartner and Jones (Baumgartner et al. 1997) CQ stories data 
set contains the number of column lines for each story. 
7. In fact, if commemorative laws are included, the trend in statutes actually 
shows an increase in recent decades. See Baumgartner et al. (1997,10). 
8. This coding process was made easier by the existence of the Policy Agen­
das Project CQ stories data set. This source contains all CQ Almanac stories from 
1948 to 1994 and has the headline for each. This information made it easier for 
me to find the stories. 
9. One limit of using CQ Almanac for a legislative sample source is that the 
unit of analysis is the story, not the bill. CQ tends to cover one bill in one story, 
regardless of the size of the bill. Hence, the longer stories centering on the omnibus 
bills include discussion about many other bills considered. My coding process 
involved converting the CQ stories to a bill data set of QQ-covered bills. All of 
the 3,190 bills were similar and comparable because each was important enough 
to receive CQ coverage. 
10. This omnibus attachment process does not capture all of the "rider" activ­
ity that occurs on Capitol Hill. A study of all the attaching of riders that occurs in 
the legislative process is beyond the scope of this book. There is reason to suspect 
that combining bills is quite common. I found more attachments to omnibus bills 
with the current definition of omnibus bill (242 omnibus bills of 1,180) than with 
a more narrow definition based on three major policy areas (165 omnibus bills of 
1,180). Of 3,190 bills from 1979 to 1994,16 percent became attached with the 
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1,180). Of 3,190 bills from 1979 to 1994,16 percent became attached with the 
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current definition, while 14 percent were attached with the earlier definition. I dis­
cuss in Chapter 1 how the omnibus phenomenon differs from traditional methods 
like riders. 
Chapter 5 
1. In addition to these four bundled general appropriations bills, numerous 
other appropriations bills were designated omnibus through the coding process, 
including many continuing appropriations bills and budget reconciliation bills. 
2. Baumgartner and Jones (1997). The measure is based on a Herfindahl 
Index (see Hardin 1998) and captures the degree to which attention to an issue is 
concentrated in one or a few committees or spread across many. 
3. I also ran a test for heteroskedasticity and two tests for multicoUinearity, 
none of which indicated a problem. 
4. The deficit politics variable might be a proxy for time. Indeed, deficit pol­
itics and time are correlated. However, the deficit politics finding survives in the 
presence of dummy variables for each of the eight Congresses. 
5. I do not create interactions with the "ripe conditions for minority obstruc­
tionism" variable because it is already an interaction between majority party size 
and party cohesion. 
Chapter 6 
1. My depiction of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 relies on excellent 
books by Lawrence Chamberlain (1946) and Schattschneider (1935). 
2. While the amount of deliberation on this trade bill in committee and on the 
floor may seem enormous by contemporary standards, many in 1930 complained 
about the lack thereof (Chamberlain 1946). "This time, extensive though it was, 
did not begin to provide sufficient time for those who wished to present their case" 
(125). "There was nothing resembling free debate in the House" (127). 
3. My discussion of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
relies mostly on data obtained from an on-line search of the bill on the Library of 
Congress's Web site Thomas. I also consulted Charles Jones's (1994, 231-234) 
study of 28 major policy enactments (which included the omnibus trade bill) and 
CQ Almanac. 
4. As one of the reviewers noted, what is defined as a period of tight financial 
resources might vary from era to era. Therefore, I measured deficit politics as a per­
centage of the budget, rather than in raw numbers. 
5. Please see chapter 5 for the measurement of the following variables: deficit 
politics, minority obstructionism, divided government, and bicameral differences. 
6. Actually, to be more precise, the Durbin-Watson value for both models 
using OLS fell in the inconclusive region (Greene 1993, 424). Fortunately, 
Shazam contains a procedure that produces a significance test for the Durbin-
Watson statistic. This test indicated that autocorrelation was a problem in both 
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models. Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) used the same Shazam procedure and 
correction. 
Chapter 7 
1. Historians of Congress may rightly point to the existence of bundles of 
private bills in early Congresses (Oleszek 1989). However, the first omnibus bill 
under the contemporary conceptual definition (large and spanning many policy 
areas) was in 1949-50. 
2. I rely on several primary and secondary sources in this chapter. My princi­
pal source is hearing testimony on the omnibus act. My secondary sources include 
a report by Louis Fisher (1993) from the Congressional Research Service, Dalmus 
Nelson's (1953) excellent scholarly study of the legislation, several articles in the 
New York Times, and summary stories in the CQ Almanac. It is more difficult to 
find information on a bill considered 50 years ago than one considered in recent 
times when scholars are blessed with on-line services like Thomas and Congres­
sional Universe! I have newfound respect for congressional historians. 
3. Improving the efficiency of the budget process was one goal not achieved 
in the 1946 reorganization (Fisher 1993; Galloway 1953). "The greatest failure of 
reorganization has been in the field of more effective fiscal control. This failure was 
offset in part in 1950 by the consolidation of eleven separate supply [appropria­
tion] bills into one omnibus appropriation bill for the first time in more than a 
century and a half" (Galloway 1953, 619). 
4. These arguments for congressional power vis-a-vis the president were 
put forward by congressional Democrats with Democrat Harry Truman in the 
White House. Hence, this was an institutional concerns logic, not a partisan logic. 
5. Senator Byrd's remarks formed the centerpiece of the omnibus platform. 
Consistent with the Senate environment that Donald Matthews (1963) observed 
in the 1950s, junior members deferred to senior members at the hearing. Senator 
Byrd did not repeat his omnibus plan points from the 1947 hearing for freshman 
senators. He told the new members to obtain the appropriate committee docu­
ments for the 1947 hearing if they wanted to read what he had said previously (U.S. 
Senate 1949). 
6. It is ironic that Representative Cannon, a committee leader, jump-started 
a legislative technique that later empowered party leaders to the disadvantage of 
standing committee chairs. Moreover, House party leaders were not tireless advo­
cates of the consolidated technique, not realizing that someday omnibus legislat­
ing would become a powerful weapon in their legislative arsenal. 
Chapter 8 
1. All the presidents except Reagan proposed new programs. Reagan s aim, 
which was no less major than the others, called for major change in the other direc­
tion. His goal was to dismantle many federal health care programs. 
164 Notes to Chapter 9 
2. Recall that I coded omnibus attachments from legislative summaries writ­
ten in GQAlmanac, not from reading the actual omnibus bills (a process that would 
have required a decade or more to finish). Hence, this total of 30 health care attach­
ments is a conservative measure for the number of attachments. 
3. One should not assume that nonlegislative hearings are inconsequential. 
Such hearings can be important in pushing particular facets of issues onto the 
agenda, in effect forcing the committee with bill jurisdiction to act. Moreover, 
scholars (King 1997; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995) have demonstrated 
that entrepreneurial committee chairs use nonlegislative hearings as a way to stake 
out new jurisdictional claims. King (1997), for example, showed how the House 
Commerce Committee gradually expanded its issue agenda across the twentieth 
century. Committee jurisdictions are inherently dynamic. 
Chapter 9 
1. Charles Jones also in particular has encouraged scholars to study how leg­
islation is put together. Toward that end, my focus on the omnibus attachment 
process provides one of the few analyses of the factors that affect bill construction. 
2. The existence of roughly even enactments regardless of control and a greater 
existence of important failures under divided government also suggests that more 
innovation is attempted under divided than under unified government. Why is this 
the case? One simple answer maybe that entrepreneurs pushing bills from both sides 
of the political spectrum see a chance for success when one of the branches is con­
trolled by their party. Under unified government, in contrast, minority members 
may think it futile to push very hard for major legislation when the opposition 
party controls the internal congressional institutional levers of power as well as the 
threat of the presidential veto. A second answer may be that both parties under 
divided government engage in "symbolic representation" acts. That is, they push 
items that their supporters in the electorate and interest group system favor, real­
izing all the while that these things will fail. 
3. I should remind the reader that the activist mood variable is a very strong 
control variable by design. It aims to control for more productive eras. While this 
may be perceived as atheoretical, I want to fully replicate Mayhew's analysis to test 
for omnibus effects. 
4. Mayhew (1991) acknowledged this problem (134-36). 
5. As in the analysis presented in Table 9.1, the Durbin-Watson statistic in­
dicated the existence of autocorrelation. Therefore, I used maximum-likelihood 
iterated generalized least squares. 
Chapter 10 
1. Sinclair also recognized the potential of omnibus bills to be used as a con­
gressional tool. 
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2. I did not compute a %2 test for this and subsequent subanalyses because the 
expected values for many of the cells dropped below 5 and the number of cases 
became too small (Witte 1993). 
3. These findings also hold when the omnibus sample is divided into budget 
acts and nonbudget acts. 
4. These cases involved similar claims and were heard together by the Court. 
Both cases involved parties who stood to gain from the provisions of budget bills 
that President Clinton removed with the line-item veto. Both the City of New York 
and the Snake River Potato Growers argued that they were entitled to the benefits 
in the act as passed by the Congress (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1998). 
Chapter 11 
1. The technique is so controversial, I am told, that no research entity on 
Capitol Hill has defined the term omnibus bill 
2. The basic problem is as follows: If bills in recent decades are bundled, how 
do we compare recent legislative outputs to earlier eras when single bills were more 
common? Binders (1999) method of following issues instead of bill outcomes is, in 
my view, the best method thus far for addressing this formidable unit-of-analysis 
problem. 
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